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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is twofold. I undertake to 
show that theories of pictorial representation give an 
unsatisfactory account of pictorial experience because 
they neglect the role of imaginative activity in the 
spectator's response. To remedy this problem, I outline a 
theory of imagination and use it to elucidate the nature 
of this activity.
In Part I, I review theories of pictorial 
representation and assert that while "seeing-in" 
recognizes the imaginative component in pictorial 
experience, it concentrates too narrowly on the visual 
experience of the spectator. I advocate Schier's Natural 
Generativity as an alternative to "seeing-in" because it 
has a wider scope than perception theories.
In Part II, I examine the diverse activities 
attributed to imagination in the work of philosophers 
from Plato to Wittgenstein and put forward a spectrum 
model to organize these activities. Using the aesthetic 
theories of Kant and others, I argue that imaginative 
activity is central to the creation and appreciation of 
works of art. After delimiting the role of imagination in 
aesthetic experience, I show the ways imagination is used 
in the interpretation and appreciation of pictures by 
analyzing the kinds of imaginative activity possible (and 
relevant; in the spectator s response.
In the final chapter I offer further justification 
for the value of imagination in aesthetic experience. I 
draw together the ideas of Parts I and II, and conclude 
that as a theory of pictorial representation, Natural 
Generativity offers a flexibility which welcomes the role 
of imagination.
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PART I 
CHAPTER Is INTRODUCTION
1-1 Introduction
My objective in this thesis is to elucidate the 
nature of pictorial representation through an examination 
of the spectator's experience. The logical relation which 
holds between a picture and some object is that the 
picture represents the object. While we can accept this 
as an account of the function of a picture, it does not 
explain how we understand pictures as representations or 
how our experience of a picture differs from that of the 
object it represents.
Most theories of pictorial representation attempt 
only to explain the relation between the picture and the 
object it represents. For example, the Resemblance Theory 
maintains that pictures represent their objects in virtue 
of the resemblance which holds between the picture's 
images and what they represent. Some theories, such as 
"seeing-in", explain the relation in terms of how the 
spectator sees the picture. "Seeing-in" claims that 
pictures represent in virtue of the fact that we see 
objects iri the picture, e.g. we see a tree in the painted 
patch in the corner of a picture. In this respect, both 
views illustrate that the concept of a picture entails 
that it must be perceived, so in this respect we approach
1
the question of pictorial representation from the point 
of view of the percipient.
An inquiry into the nature of pictoral representation 
thus includes a consideration of the beholder's share: 
what we see in the picture; how we recognize the images 
in the picture; what role perception, thought, and 
imagination have in the activity of interpreting the 
picture's content. "Seeing-in", for example, concentrates 
on the visual experience of the spectator. This kind of 
approach isolates a feature of the spectator's experience 
as definitive of how a picture represents a thing. While 
it does not entirely ignore the other features of 
pictorial experience, it marginalizes them. In Part I, I 
argue that this approach does not provide a cogent 
account of pictorial experience, even if we wish to 
identify some conditions which must hold if a picture is 
to be understood as such. In respect of establishing such 
conditions, the merits of Flint Schier's Natural 
Generativity will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Pictorial experience is not unique, though it differs 
from ordinary experience in that the spectator treats a 
picture as a representation in addition to treating it as 
an object in the world. In other words, a picture is 
treated as an object hanging in a gallery and as a 
picture oT something. I advocate the view that we use the 
same interpretative tools when we perceive both the world 
and representations of it. That is, no special perceptual
2
capacities are required in pictorial experience. However, 
this is not to suppose that when we approach pictures as 
art objects that the experience is not aesthetic.
1.2 Pictures, Interpretation, and Imagination
We know that pictures function as representations of 
the world, but in studying this relationship pictorial 
experience itself should be taken into account. What this 
experience consists in, and the variety of responses 
which are appropriate to a single picture, are an 
integral part of understanding pictures as such.
My observations about pictorial experience are 
confined to our perceptions, thoughts and imaginings in 
connection to pictures as art, namely paintings. In this 
context, as is the context of pictorial representation, 
my subject is representational paintings. While some 
aestheticians put abstract works, such as one of Rothko's 
colour paintings, in this category, I will limit my 
discussion to naturalistic or realistic pictures, 
including impressionism and some post-impressionist 
works. The line between representational and non- 
representational is not sharply drawn, and I make no 
attempt here to draw that line. In my view, each picture 
should be considered on an individual basis, and it might 
even be counter-productive to try to see how an abstract 
work is representational if such a treatment was not
3
intended.
The activity involved in the understanding and 
appreciation of pictures is an interpretative activity. 
Therefore, when using "interpretation" to describe 
pictorial experience I equate the term with the activity 
of interpreting.^ In this sense, the interpretation of a 
work is an experience which is part of the overall 
appreciation of a picture, rather than just a particular 
reading of a work (taking into account that different 
interpretations of a single picture can be equally 
valid).
The spectator's interpretation of a picture consists 
in a range of activities from perception to imagination, 
including both sensory imagining or imaging, and non- 
sensory imagining. While visual perception of a picture 
is a necessary condition of experiencing it properly, and 
therefore of appreciating and evaluating it, other 
activities such as thought and imagination may play a 
greater or lesser role depending on what the artist has 
created and depending on the spectator's "cognitive 
stock", that is, his or her background knowledge, 
beliefs, etc. The shortcomings of some theories of 
pictorial representation stem from a failure to take into 
account some of these aspects of the spectator's 
experience. I will claim that there is a particular lack 
of attention to the imaginative component of pictorial 
experience. In fact, some theories discourage imaginative
4
activity, and argue that it is has no place in the 
appreciation of artworks. This position is supported by 
claims that imaginative activity is irrelevant to 
interpreting the work and that it can be detrimental to 
our aesthetic experience of the object- imagination 
spiriting the spectator away from the work itself.
There are two main reasons why this view is not 
unpopular. Firstly, imagination is commonly associated 
with fancy, fantasy, daydreams, and with anything which 
frees us from practical concerns. The concept has also 
been generally distrusted in philosophy. Alan White's 
observation encapsulates this view: "Descartes says he 
gave up reading fables because they may 'make one imagine 
many events possible which in reality are not so'. 
Imagination is thus treated as a capacity which must be 
kept in check by reason, for without this restraint, it 
will misrepresent reality to us.
Secondly, the concept of imagination is so overused 
that it has become vague and therefore obsolete. There is 
an odd connection between this point and the previous 
one. Romanticism replaced reason with imagination, 
maintaining that imagination led the way to truth and 
understanding about the world. Herein lay the roots of a 
new view, where imagination is recognized for its 
creative potential and is associated with inventiveness, 
originality, and genius. But our concept of imagination 
has suffered for this. Imagination is now equated with
5
any creative endeavor, so that we have lost touch with 
what it is that imagination, strictly speaking, actually 
does. What are its functions? How do we use it to 
perceive the world and how do we use it in aesthetic 
experience?
For these reasons, I attempt to define imagination 
(in Part II). By identifying its activities and uses as 
recognized by various philosophers, we can reach a better 
understanding of its role in the creation, 
interpretation, and appreciation of art. Moreover, a 
clearer notion of imagination will provide the foundation 
of an argument for its relevance in aesthetic experience.
Imaginative activity can be exercised in a way which 
is part of the interpretation of the work, in fact it may 
in some cases facilitate a full understanding of the 
content of the work. In cases where imagination is so 
involved, and where it increases the pleasure in the 
individual's aesthetic experience, such activity is not 
only justifiable, but should be cultivated. This is the 
position I will take when evaluating an important and 
defensible pictorial theory, Richard Wollheim's "seeing-
in .
The connection between pictorial representation and 
the imaginative activity in the spectator's response is 
not tenuous. Although I will not argue that this activity 
is always necessary for grasping pictures as 
representations or for interpreting their content
6
properly, I will show some of the ways we use imagination 
in pictorial experience. There is value in this project 
in two respects. I aim to remedy the weaknesses in 
existing theories of pictorial representation, and, by 
elucidating the ways in which we use imagination in this 
context and in the wider context of aesthetic experience, 
the desirability of this capacity for enriching our 
appreciation of art will, I think, become apparent.
1.3 Aesthetic Experience and Pictures
Pictorial experience is a category of aesthetic 
experience. In my view, an experience need not meet 
necessary and sufficient conditions in order to be called 
"aesthetic", so I am not advocating such a definition.
But since my ideas in this thesis focus on the 
spectator’s response to pictures, it will be useful to 
make a few preliminary observations about the character 
of aesthetic experience. (My observations are relevant to 
art rather than to nature.)
Artworks do not require us to use different 
capacities than those which we use for perceiving and 
understanding non-art objects. Aspect perception is used 
in ordinary perception, such as when we mistake a paper 
bag, at a distance, for a cat, and it can be used 
deliberately to see things as other things. When we look 
at pictures, we use aspect perception, "seeing-as", but
7
there is no special pictorial perception invoked. The 
thoughts that we have when looking at a real person, and 
looking at a representation of that person may not be the 
same, but many of the things we think about them will be 
similar. For example, we might wonder why a face, real or 
representational, is so flushed. We might guess that the 
real person has just run a long distance; the 
representation, alternatively, might lead us to believe 
that the person normally has a red face. The use of 
imagination for contemplating artworks is also an 
extension of the use of imagination in ordinary 
experience. I can imagine what my cat is thinking when 
she stalks across the garden after an insect. Similarly,
I may want to imagine the thoughts of Psyche as she sits 
below Cupid's castle in Claude Lorrain's Landscape with 
Psyche at the Palace of Cupid.
While these capacities are the same, they are 
exercised differently in relation to works of art, 
whether such works represent the real world or the 
fictional. That is, the end to which they are used is 
different; to an aesthetic end, our perceptions, thoughts 
and imaginings are involved in appreciating artworks in 
and for themselves. We use these capacities to explore 
the artist's creative work, and we take pleasure in this 
exploration, even if part of our response takes the form 
of shock or horror. In this respect aesthetic experience 
is marked by a heightening of the senses. In particular,
8
I believe that the nature of art makes it prone to evoke 
the percipient's imagination; artists often demand (and 
intend) an active use of imagination in response to their 
works.
We can recognize ways in which we treat non-art 
objects aesthetically, so my remarks here are not 
intended to entirely mark off aesthetic experience from 
ordinary experience, only to describe some of the ways in 
which we approach art. My characterization of aesthetic 
experience is also deliberately open-ended in order to 
take into account the various kinds of responses we have 
to artworks. It is intended to be unrestrictive because I 
believe that the appropriate interpretation of a work of 
art can include both information intrinsic and extrinsic 
to i t.
For example, to interpret a picture it may help to 
know something about the artist's life and previous 
works. A full understanding of what is represented might 
be impossible without such knowledge, though not all 
pictures will require this information to be appreciated 
properly. The artist's intention can also be part of the 
knowledge we use when interpreting the picture, even 
though the intention may not be self-evident in the work. 
In any case, knowing or guessing the intention can be 
relevant to appreciating the work properly, though such 
knowledge is by no means always necessary.
The spectator's own "cognitive stock" can be tapped
9
as well, provided that the information is relevant to the 
work. This point is important in relation to the 
imaginative activity called into play by the picture. The 
spectator may be required to restrain this activity if it 
draws his or her attention away from the content of the 
work by, for example, replacing contemplation of the work 
with unrelated imaginative reflection on some past 
personal experience. Such restraint, while not always 
possible, is necessary in order to take advantage of 
imagination1s resources. In Chapters 6 and 7, the 
relevance of imaginative activity in this context is 
examined at length.
1.4 Conclusion
In this introductory chapter, I have sketched the 
arguments in my thesis and provided some preliminary 
remarks regarding my position on the nature of aesthetic 
experience, and what is justifiably part of that 
experience. To summarize, it is not my aim to formulate 
an original theory of pictorial representation. Rather, I 
will assess seeing-in for its strengths and weaknesses, 
and conclude that Natural Generativity offers a better 
account of how we understand pictures as 
representational. Natural Generativity defines the 
structure of pictorial experience less narrowly than 
"seeing-in", and this provides a good starting point for
10
an account of how we use imagination when contemplating 
pictures.
The imaginative component of the spectator*s response 
merits attention, not only because pictorial theories 
neglect this component, but, in general, descriptions of 
how we use imagination in response to art lack detail and 
specificity. Here, the non-aesthetic uses of imagination 
provide some insight into its aesthetic uses.
The second part of the thesis is concerned with 
explaining imagination in relation to art. My account 
concentrates on the spectator's experience rather than 
the artist's, since the context, pictorial 
representation, requires this- but I do not intend 
therefore to marginalize the role of the artist or the 
artist's imagination. Although I make only a few 
observations about this, I do think that it is a 
fascinating aesthetic problem which deserves lengthy 
treatment elsewhere.
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Notes
 ^ S. Feagin, ’’Some Pleasures of Imagination" Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XLIII: 41-55, Fall 1984, 
pp. 46-7.
 ^ A. White, The Language of Imagination (Basil Blackwell, 
1990), 24.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF PICTORIAL REPRESENTATION
2.1 Introduction: What is Pictorial Representation?
What is a pictorial representation? How do we 
experience representations? These are questions I hope to 
answer through a review of various theories of depiction. 
Before considering answers to the main question, let us 
examine the question itself. What it really asks is, what 
is a picture? In itself, that question is easy to answer. 
A picture is a two-dimensional, flat object with lines, 
perhaps colours, and images that represent a real or 
fictional things. A drawing of a person is a 
configuration of lines which forms an image we recognize 
as representing a person. Likewise, a painting is 
coloured blobs of paint on a canvas. A portrait has blobs 
of paint and colours which form images on a canvas and 
are recognizable as a representation of a particular 
person. So a picture is a representation created with the 
intention that it depicts something through images in a 
physical medium.
"Picture" herein will include all kinds of 
representations in different mediums: paintings, 
drawings, photographs, comic strips, graphic art. Since 
the subject of this thesis is limited to pictorial 
representation, I exclude some of the visual and dramatic 
arts such as sculpture, film, television, theatre, dance,
13
and also novels and music, which are sometimes described 
as representational.
Our present definition of pictures defines them as 
physical objects. We perceive pictorial representations 
as objects in the world, created through a physical 
medium. We can see, touch, smell, (and taste) the painted 
images on a canvas. A picture is constructed out of a 
frame, canvas, and paint, so the images themselves, 
though representational, have a physical existence. But 
this definition does not yield a complete understanding 
of what a picture is, because pictures have a function: 
they are objects with images that represent real or 
fictional objects (including events or states of 
affairs). It would be useful to turn to the question of 
how the images in pictures are related to what they 
represent, particularly because theories of depiction use 
this as a starting point.
William Charlton poses a key question, "What makes a 
coloured object a picture of a horse?" Thus far we can 
say that the canvas is a picture of a horse because of 
the configuration which extends over the canvas. There 
are similarities between the ways in which we describe 
the horse in a picture and a real horse. Pictorial horses 
can be said to graze in fields, be male or female, and be
n
coloured like real horses. It would thus be intelligible 
to describe a particular image of a horse by saying, "she 
is a chestnut mare grazing in a field". The language we
use is the same as if we were describing a real horse in 
a real field, but underlying our descriptions is an 
understanding that the reference is to a represented 
horse and not a real horse. (This understanding depends, 
of course, on the context of the description. The context 
is established as pertaining to the picture within the 
conversation itself or by being in the presence of the 
picture.) However, there is a difference between the 
image of a horse and a real horse, and this difference is 
what forms the fundamental division between 
representation and reality.
Pictorial horses are not actually furry, fleshy 
creatures standing fifteen odd hands from the ground.
They are not born, ridden, raced, or slaughtered. Nor do 
they really graze in fields. Therefore they only exist as 
representations of horses- as images created by an artist 
for an audience. The picture exists in real space while 
the actual images in the picture are located on the 
canvas as blobs of paint spread onto it. When looking at 
the picture, we see it as perhaps hung on a wall in a 
room or gallery, but the horse-image is located within 
the picture’s world. We might say that the horse appears 
in the represented space of the picture, for example, in 
a field which is itself represented. Here I follow the 
view that representational space is distinct, and
o
therefore, discontinuous with real space. Depicted 
objects are located in the representational space of the
15
picture.
This representational space, like real space, is both 
limited and unlimited- there is the immediate location of 
the image as well as locations distant from the image. We 
see the representational space in the picture, but this 
space can be extended beyond the painted images through 
imaginative leaps. I can imagine what a painted landscape 
looks like beyond what is depicted. On this point 
Charlton offers the telling example of a picture of a 
king trembling on his throne after being given the news 
that his army has been wiped out. He points out that we 
can only understand the picture properly if we imagine 
the corpse-strewn battlefield which is not depicted. In 
this instance we rely on imagination to complete our 
interpretation by responding to the visual clues provided 
by the picture's images.
How do we talk about the qualities of 
representational objects? The real, physical qualities of 
images differ a great deal from what they represent. The 
horse-image is made of coloured pigments while the horse 
is flesh and all. However, we can speak of the qualities 
the image is represented as having, qualities which are 
identified with the image, not the object represented.
For example, we can say of a portrait of George 
Washington that his skin is pinkish and robust, his hair 
white-gray, and his suit ruby-red velvet. We might have 
attributed the same qualities to the man himself. But we
16
could not say of the real George Washington that his 
earlobe is undefined and smudged. Nor could we say of the 
picture of George Washington that his voice has a rough 
quality or that his mouth twitches nervously (unless we 
could somehow tell this from the image).
Portraits have formal qualities and people have 
natural qualities. Formal qualities include colour, 
style, shape, detail, definition, texture, and any other 
qualities related to the medium. Humans have the 
characteristics which make them living beings like real 
flesh, hair, eyes, etc. We can attribute the qualities of 
colour and texture to paintings and people alike, but in 
paintings, the non-formal qualities are merely 
representational qualities, e.g. the suit in the picture 
is not velvety really, it just looks that way. 
Representational qualities need not correspond to real 
qualities, though it may be no accident that the portrait 
of George Washington depicts a suit identical to one he 
actually wore. Through painterly techniques artists seek 
to create the appearance of certain textures like satin 
or velvet, and they do the same with colours, finding the 
right combination on their palettes to give the 
appearance of, say, a certain skin colour.
The ideas of representational space and 
representational qualities contribute to understanding 
the ontological distinction between pictures and the real 
or imaginary things they represent. Still, the inquiry
17
must be directed at how we treat pictures, that is, how 
we approach and interpret them. Part of our response is 
connected to the concept of resemblance. The resemblance 
between pictures and their subjects cannot be ignored, 
though I do not maintain that resemblance sufficiently 
explains how pictures are representational.
2.2 Resemblance
Too often the concept of resemblance is entirely 
rejected from theories of pictorial representation. 
Historically, it comes as no surprise considering the 
implications of the Imitation Theory for the value of 
artistic creativity. Few aestheticians now deny the 
unique character of works of art, and most support the 
view that artists rarely seek only to produce copies of 
reality. Resemblance cannot be the sole criterion for 
defining and judging a work of art, but this is not a 
satisfactory reason for overlooking the role of 
resemblance in the creation and enjoyment of works of 
art. In fact, the concept is more important to pictorial 
representation in particular because representational art 
consists of depictions while abstract art does not 
(strictly speaking).
When defining pictures, there are similarities in the 
way we talk about things in pictures and things in real 
life. Returning to the horse picture example, in the
18
presence of the picture, pointing to it, I may say to my 
companion that the horse is a chestnut mare, a 
thoroughbred, and a great champion. As remarked above, it 
comes as no surprise that such language is used, since a 
context has been established, and because we have no 
special representational or image-language to use. But 
what is also true is that we would not so readily use the 
same language if we did not see some similarity in 
appearance between the depicted horse and a real horse.
To some extent, I describe the depicted horse as if I 
were looking at the real horse. This is not to say, 
however, that we see an illusion of the horse. In my view 
illusion is not part of pictorial experience (except in 
cases of successful trompe l'oeil pictures). We notice 
resemblances but are always aware that the differences 
between the horse-image and the real horse are greater 
than the similarities.
Resemblance also has a role in the artist's creative 
process. The horse picture is the kind of picture in 
which realistic depiction may be the objective; in 
conveying the beauty and grandeur of the champion, the 
artist may try to depict as accurately as possible the 
presence of the great animal. If the real champion serves 
as the artist's model, then capturing the horse's true 
appearance may be the best way to paint her. On the other 
hand, we also have horse pictures which are less 
realistic, like Gericault's paintings of horses in stormy
19
landscapes. Though not abstract, the artist seems to be 
less concerned with the realistic depiction of the 
subject than with expressing a particular mood.
Resemblance and recognition are connected in the 
spectator's experience. Sometimes, though not always, 
realistic depiction can cause the spectator to recognize 
more readily what images are of. A true-to-life picture 
of Desert Orchid will be recognized as a picture of 
Desert Orchid by anyone who reads the sports pages or 
follows horse racing. The concept of recognition may be 
the key to understanding why we cannot get rid of the 
role of resemblance in representation. Schier argues that 
pictures and the objects they represent do not have 
properties in common but that they do provoke similar 
recognitional abilities in spectators. He notes that the 
experience is not one of recognizing the real object in 
the picture, but that when looking at the real object and 
looking at the picture, the same recognitional abilities 
are provoked in each case.^ His remarks on resemblance 
can, I think, explain the intuitive idea that resemblance 
enters into our interpretations of pictures. However, he 
does not maintain that resemblance explains the relation 
between a depiction and what it depicts.
Another point in support of the role of resemblance 
is that we do enjoy realistic representations. We admire 
an artist who can give us a picture that looks like the 
real thing and are amazed when a picture looks like a
20
photograph; we wonder how the artist achieved such an 
effect. It is clear from such experiences how much value 
we do place on realistic depictions. But it is not that 
our enjoyment of pictures depends on resemblance, only 
that resemblance permeates our ideas about pictorial 
representation. We can and do enjoy pictures which do not 
resemble their subjects, and we value the creative and 
original perspectives of artists. Also, we do not judge 
pictures solely by whether or not they "match" what they 
represent. Representational art is more typically valued 
for the artist's skill and originality, and not for its 
realistic style (though this depends on the individual's 
preference).
In conclusion, it seems that resemblance is a factor 
in representational art that comes into play in the 
artist's creation of a work as well as in the spectator's 
response to it. The spectator may enjoy a picture because 
he or she finds resemblances, and in finding them, 
delights in them. Some artists aim for realistic 
depiction. A picture of Desert Orchid looking proud could 
be the next best thing to seeing the horse in the flesh. 
In seeing the picture, a spectator's enjoyment may result 
from the feeling of being in the presence of a champion, 
while not having anything like an illusory experience of 
seeing Desert Orchid. The value of this work is not in 
its being an imitation of nature, but in the artist's 
ability to move the spectator through the images on the
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canvas.
Resemblance, then, is to some degree involved in the 
way that pictures are created and understood. But an 
argument against the view that resemblance defines 
representation is still necessary to clarify the precise 
relevance of the concept to understanding representation.
2.3 Theories of Pictorial Representation
Philosophers have developed various theories to 
explain what pictures are and how we understand them. In 
the next two chapters I will concentrate on arguing 
against perception theories of pictorial representation, 
specifically, Wollheim's "seeing-in", since it is 
considered to offer the most convincing account of how we 
understand pictures. Before examining this theory, I will 
give an overview of other current theories and briefly 
discuss their strengths and weaknesses.
Resemblance Theory
This theory is intuitively appealing. It claims that 
X represents Y, if X visually resembles Y.~* At first 
glance this view seems remarkably clear. The image of a 
peach looks like a peach because we recognize it as a 
succulent, fuzzy, peach-coloured, peach-shaped object.
But resemblance is a symmetrical relation; if X resembles
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Y, then Y should resemble X. This leads us to discover 
that there is a strong sense in which a painting does not 
look at all like a peach. The painted peach is two- 
dimensional, and though it looks round we can see that it 
is only two-dimensionally round, being painted on a flat 
canvas. Unlike a real peach, the surface of a painted 
peach may even reflect the light in the gallery.
A variant of this view is more plausible. X 
represents Y in virtue of creating an experience for the 
spectator which resembles the experience of seeing Y. 
Still, though this emphasis eliminates the problem of a 
the real peach literally resembling an image of it in 
every visual way, a new asymmetry emerges. My experience 
of seeing a still life picture of a peach may not be so 
different from seeing a peach in a bowl on my kitchen 
table. I may have the urge to pick that peach right out 
of the picture and eat it. But I do not do this, nor 
would I ever believe that I could. Every spectator can 
tell the difference between appreciating a real peach and 
appreciating an artist's rendering of it. Though we can 
appreciate nature's artistry, we appreciate different 
aspects of a real peach compared to a picture of it.
The Resemblance Theory attempts to show how we come 
to recognize an image in a representation in virtue of a 
resemblance to what it represents. Beyond identifying 
some similarities in appearance between pictures and 
their subjects, e.g. colour, resemblance does not
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elucidate the nature of depiction. Many things resemble 
other things in one way or another because of similar 
characteristics or appearances. Also, resemblance 
expressed in terms of "looks like" is vague. To what 
degree must X resemble Y for X to be a representation of 
Y? Therefore, it can be said against this view that it 
gives an unsatisfactory account of what it is for a 
picture to be representional.
Illusion Theory
"Seeing-as" forms the basis of Ernst Gombrich's view 
that representation is illusion.'7 He takes the concept of 
"seeing-as" from Wittgenstein who describes it as 
interpretive seeing or seeing an aspect. In Philosophical 
Investigations (part II, section xi), he gives various 
examples of how we can see different aspects of the same 
object or picture. We can see the duck-rabbit figure as a
duck or a rabbit, the double cross as a white cross on a
black background or as a black cross on a white
O
background.
Gombrich maintains that all seeing is "seeing-as" so 
that our perceptions of reality are inseparable from the 
interpretations of what we see. Our perceptions are not 
expressed in terms of "seeing-as", e.g. "I see that
object on the wall as a clock."; we simply say when
asked, "That's a clock." But according to Gombrich, we
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cannot separate our perception of an object from a 
description of it. The duck-rabbit picture illustrates 
how we cannot simply look at the pattern and see it both 
as a duck and a rabbit, rather, we have two 
interpretations based on the two different aspects we see 
in the one configuration.
Gombrich applies his theory of perception to how we 
perceive representations, where interpretive seeing 
becomes a kind of representational seeing. To see a 
painting of a peach is to see a part of the canvas as a 
peach. So X is a representation of Y in virtue of our 
being able to see X as Y.
"Seeing-as" offers a way of understanding
representation, but it is limited to a description of how
we look at pictures: we see part or all of the picture as
some object, event, state of affairs, etc. Although we
often use aspect perception when we look at ordinary
objects and representations, the theory falls short of an
explanation of the images themselves and how we go about
interpreting them. Charlton faults "seeing-as" for
leaving many questions unanswered.
We want to talk about objects in pictures, 
about the face, say, in a Rembrandt picture 
of an old woman. Are we to say we are 
talking about the face we see part of the 
canvas as? What then is the status of a 
face something is seen as? How does itQ 
compare with other faces? Where is it?
To his questions we can add the general question of what
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pictorial experience consists in.
For Wittgenstein, illusion plays no part in "seeing- 
as". "Seeing-as" in his terms is simply the distinction 
between seeing an object and "seeing an aspect" of that 
object. By contrast, Gombrich's "seeing-as" implies that 
when we see pictures, we are seeing illusions of real 
things. For if the spectator sees part of the canvas as a 
peach, this implies that he or she sees an illusion of a 
peach since the image is intended to have the appearance 
of a real peach (in realistic paintings). Yet the picture 
is something quite different from that, namely a 
construction of paint on a canvas.
Gombrich recognizes the incredible skill of some
painters, but his analysis of pictorial representation is
misleading.
While standing in front of a painting by 
Jan Van Eyck we fall under this very spell.
We believe he succeeded in rendering the 
inexhaustible wealth of detail that belongs 
to the visible world. We have the 
impression that he painted every stitch of 
the golden damask, every hair of the 
angels, every fibre of the wood. Yet he 
clearly could not have done that, however 
patiently he worked with a magnifying 
glass. Little though we may know about the 
secrets of such effects, they must be based 
on an illusion.
How literally are we to take Gombrich1s words? Does it 
follow that illusion necessarily means delusion? When 
faced with a straightforward still life painting, does 
the spectator really see anything like an illusion of a
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bowl of fruit?
It is not clear in Gombrich's account whether or not 
illusion leads to delusion. In Art and Illusion he 
devotes much of his discussion to the psychology of 
optical illusions, and he appears to be fascinated by our 
ability to be fooled by them. But it is possible to have 
the experience of an optical illusion which we cannot 
shake off and to be fully aware of the nature of this 
experience. It is his concentration on the allegedly 
deceptive aspect of the spectator's experience which 
weakens the Illusion Theory and makes it vulnerable to 
the criticism that Gombrich places too much importance on 
the painter's ability to reproduce the vision of seeing a 
peach. J.J. Gibson puts this criticism succinctly: "No 
matter how faithful, how lifelike, how realistic a 
picture becomes, it does not become the object 
pictured.
Moreover, illusion is irrelevant to pictorial
representation. In this regard, Dieter Peetz says:
To be somewhat lost in contemplation, say 
at dusk, when confronted by a self-portrait 
of Rembrandt, might be to cease to notice 
the frame of the picture, to concentrate 
on, and be absorbed by the poignant facial 
expression, its mood....and to delude 
oneself in this rather extraordinary way 
that one is confronted by the great master 
Rembrandt himself. This is akin to day­
dreaming, but in a standard setting of 
picture-viewing such delusion, although 
possible, could hardly enter into an 
account of what it is for a picture to 
represent Rembrandt.
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In his attempt to characterize our experience of 
representations, Gombrich claims that the experience 
amounts to seeing an illusion of the real thing. The 
drawback of this view is that if we simply see an 
illusion of the real thing, what information do we take 
in regarding the work itself? If we take Gombrich*s 
theory literally, then seeing the illusion gives the same 
information as seeing the real thing. The implications of 
this claim are grave for the appreciation of artistic 
images in and for themselves.
If we experience pictures as Gombrich claims, we 
attend not to the representation, but to an illusory 
object. Even if most naturalistic paintings were 
illusionistic, which they are not, the point is not 
whether or not we are fooled by them, but how we 
interpret them. The Illusion Theory, therefore, ignores 
just what it sets out to define: an aspect of aesthetic 
experience.
These criticisms are based on a literal reading of
Gombrich's theory as set out in Art and Illusion. In
response to his critics, he says that most spectators do
not experience delusion. In defending this, he remarks
that false belief is a contingent concept in illusion.
Illusion in Gombrich's sense is the illusion the artist
creates for us through his painterly effects.
...[the pleasure] lies in our continued 
feeling of incredulity that the visual 
effect of plumes, of gleam or softness 
has been achieved on a flat hard panel by
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a skilled hand using a brush dipped in 
paint. We may want to touch the panel to be 
quite sure there is no other trickery 
involved, for the visual effect is so 
striking as to set up a real conflict 
between our reaction and our better 
knowledge: the artist has made us see 
something different from what is there. He 
has aroused in us a visual experience of a 
kind that we know from our encounters with 
reality.1
The spectator’s pleasure seems to depend on an awareness 
of the artist's ability to fool through such masterly 
techniques. But here Gombrich provides a better 
description of the spectator's experience, since he 
indicates that the spectator does attend to the artist's 
work.
While Gombrich's account does capture the sense of 
amazement we have in viewing some kinds of paintings, it 
is incomplete in its treatment of pictorial experience. 
Despite his enthusiasm for the artist's techniques, he 
overemphasizes the aspect of illusion, and therefore does 
not explain how we respond to pictures as 
representational.
Make-Believe Theory
Kendall Walton defines depiction in the following 
way: X represents Y, if the spectator can make-believe 
that he is seeing Y in X.^ ** As spectators, we play a game 
in which we pretend that the perception of a peach-image
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is the perception of a real peach. Walton thinks that (as 
the Illusion Theory suggests) it is not difficult, 
especially with naturalistic paintings, to pretend to see 
the real thing. Within this imaginative game, there are 
rules that allow us to make-believe that the experience 
of seeing X and the experience of seeing Y are identical. 
Walton claims that when we see a picture of a horse, we 
pretend to see a real horse. This experience is not 
actually the same as seeing the real thing, but we 
deliberately imagine that it is.
Walton has developed his view considerably in his 
recent book, Mimesis as Make-Believe. Here his main 
example is of two children playing in the woods and 
pretending that all stumps are dangerous bears . ^  Making 
an analogy between make-believe and art, he argues that 
we treat pictures, novels, and films as props in this 
game. In this way, then, he uses make-believe to 
elucidate the nature of representation.
There are several problems with this view. Firstly,
it is not an accurate description of how we approach
works of art. Rarely, if ever, do we deliberately pretend
to see a picture as the real object it depicts. Anders
Pettersson sums up this point well when he says:
If adequate responses to art and literature 
are analogous with games of make-believe in 
this respect, then the competent viewer or 
reader must be consciously, knowingly, 
engaged in a game of make-believe. And in 
that case, an art viewer or fiction reader 
who says that he is not playing a game of 
make-believe must be either incompetent or
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1 7else untruthful or confused.
In his review of Walton*s book, Charlton agrees with this 
criticism when he says that Walton*s accounts of 
depiction "do not ring true".-^ Typically, we approach 
paintings and other works of art with a view to 
appreciating them as such, not as props for our own 
imaginative games. Make-believe does not realistically 
characterize pictorial experience, or the proper way we 
treat representations.
Secondly, I object to the way in which he defines 
make-believe as the imaginative activity we use in 
appreciating pictures. Specifically, it is defined as an 
exercise of imagination "involving props" . ^  But make- 
believe is only one of imagination's many activities, and 
it is not one to be sanctioned in aesthetic experience. I 
would not characterize any of the important ways we draw 
on imagination in aesthetic experience as involving 
props. In this respect, then, I exclude this kind of 
imagination from any proper response to a work of art.
Walton also wrongly portrays imagination in art
20appreciation as egocentric.
It is my impression that virtually all of 
our imaginings are partly about 
ourselves.... all imagining involves a kind 
of self-imagining (imagining de se) ...-*•
Walton uses the example of imagining an elephant in 
Central Park, and claims that it is likely to involve
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imagining oneself seeing an elephant in Central Park, It 
seems to me that we just visualize the elephant, and need 
not "put ourselves" into the imagining.
By including ourselves as part of the games of make- 
believe, Walton's account again sidelines the artwork 
itself. I believe that we can identify imaginative 
activity in artistic appreciation which enriches our 
experience of the work, but I emphasize the condition 
that it is essential that the artwork is the center of 
attention.
Make-believe, like the Illusion Theory, misses the 
point of representation altogether. Instead of discerning 
the difference between experiencing a representation and 
experiencing reality, these theories postulate the idea 
that the two experiences are the same by introducing 
concepts like illusion and make-believe. In a sense, 
artists can create new realities for us, making fantasy 
worlds and unicorns "real" for us, and we delight in 
their creations. We may even prefer an artist's 
representation to the frightening possibility of a live 
monster. But my point is that an explanation is required 
for how pictures are interpreted as works of art, as 
representations. Although artists do draw attention to 
parts of the world, pointing to familiar things, we 
approach pictures as representations of reality, not as 
reality itself. Pretending to have an experience of 
seeing the real thing does not realistically explain what
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happens when I stand in front of a painting, and the idea 
that we play this game is unlikely. We understand 
pictures a^ depicting things.
Semantic Theory
This theory holds that a picture belongs to a symbol
system, and it gives a semantic explanation of how we
understand pictures. In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman
compares pictures to descriptions.
The plain fact is that a picture, to 
represent an object, must be a symbol 
for it, refer to it; and that no degree 
of resemblance is sufficient to establish 
the requisite relationship of reference....
A picture that represents- like a passage 
that describes- an object refers to and, 
more particularly, denotes it. Denotation 
is the core of representation and is 
independent of resemblance.
According to Goodman, "denote" means "describe", and the 
relation between a picture and an object is explained as 
denotation. For example, a picture of a horse is a
representation of a real horse in virtue of the fact that
2 3the picture denotes the horse.
He is eager to remove the ideas of resemblance and 
appearance from a definition of representation, and with 
his theory he attempts to rebut any view even remotely 
connected to imitation. But can the concept of 
resemblance be rejected so easily? In 2.2, I argued that 
the concept of resemblance, while not a sufficient
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condition for representation, is involved in our 
understanding of how pictures relate to the objects they 
represent.
Another weakness in his account of representation is 
his description of pictures as symbols. Pictures are 
iconic, but by comparing them to descriptions, the 
analogy between depictions and language is misleading. 
Generally, it fails to give an accurate experiential 
account. Because of the special nature of a visual art 
like painting, we do not treat pictures as descriptions 
of the objects they represent. The artist gives us a 
creative impression of something, and we delight in the 
visual and imaginative exploration of it. The 
particularity of this project is an aspect of pictorial 
representation which Goodman's view neglects. Further 
problems in his account will emerge through my discussion 
of Schier's Natural Generativity in Chapter 4.
Natural Generativity
Schier offers this theory of depiction in his book 
Deeper into Pictures. ^  His theory locates pictures as 
members of an iconic system, yet he marks off real 
differences between pictures and language, namely the 
absence of the grammar and conventions which belong to 
linguistic systems. Pictures are icons in virtue of the 
fact that they are symbols, but not all icons are visual.
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His theory is only concerned with visual icons, pictorial 
representations.
To explain what a picture is, he develops a theory of 
how we understand pictures- how we come to know that 
pictures represent things. Pictures, or "iconic modes of 
representation" have the property of "natural 
generativity". This property means that all icons can be 
interpreted as representational once an initial iconic 
interpretation is made. After an initial interpretation, 
all successive interpretations are automatic provided 
that the object depicted is recognized by the 
spectator. Natural Generativity tells us "what counts 
as a picture, what counts as pictorial experience, and
9 A
what counts as pictorial competence." Therefore, he 
thinks it can both explain what pictures are and how we 
experience them.
His approach is original, and as a theory of 
depiction it has strong possibilities because of its 
emphasis on interpretation rather than perception. In my 
view this is the right starting point for understanding 
the nature of representation. As an account of pictorial 
experience though, it lacks a close look at what is 
involved in the interpretation of pictures.
Formalism
Formalism has most recently been associated with
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Clive Bell's views in Art and Roger Fry's views in
9 R
Vision and Design'1 . "Significant form" is the concept 
which establishes the view developed by Bell; works of 
art which stir our aesthetic emotions possess a common 
characteristic called "significant form". Aesthetic 
emotions are defined as a peculiar sort of emotion, and 
he defines that quality as "...lines and colours combined 
in a particular way, certain forms and relations of 
f o r m s . . . F o r  a work of art to be a good work of art, 
it must move the spectator through its "significant 
form".
The main weakness in Bell's view is its narrow scope, 
which stems from two claims. He argues that only works of 
art with "significant from" move us aesthetically. Among 
those works which do not have this quality, and hence do 
not stir our aesthetic emotions, are narrative pictures. 
This is connected to his second claim which is that our 
aesthetic response only properly consists in a response 
to "significant form", not to the subject-matter of the 
work.^ We are supposed to approach the work with an 
interest only in its formal qualities, not in its 
"representative element", and thus we need "bring with us
O j
nothing from life."
Though formal qualities are recognized and 
appreciated, it is difficult both to understand the 
concept of "significant form" and to agree with the claim 
that it is the only quality responsible for the
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spectator's emotional response and pleasure. What is 
"significant form" really? Bell's definition of the 
concept is vague, for he says only that it is the 
combination of forms which stir aesthetic emotions. This 
definition also turns out to be circular. We do not know 
if a painting has "significant form" unless it moves us, 
but how can we be sure that it is "significant form" 
which causes the emotional response? In response to this 
criticism the Formalist might say that if we take away 
the subject matter, what we have left is its form. But 
what is "significant" about that form? Here, the 
Formalist's reasoning fails because taking away the 
subject-matter of the work may not just leave us with the 
form.^2
Furthermore, Bell maintains that information 
extrinsic to the work is irrelevant to the spectator's 
experience. But we can find many cases in which such 
information is relevant, and cases in which it can enrich 
our appreciation of the work. Moreover, an understanding 
of what the images depict, or what "is happening" in a 
picture is significant to the interpretation of it. It is 
hard to imagine not being moved by the expression on the 
face of Dolorosa in Murillo's Piedad. In this experience 
our response stems from identifying with Dolorosa's 
feelings, not to the picture's "significant form", 
whatever that may be.
Fry's view is more flexible and resembles other views
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which are classified as Formalist. He refers to the 
importance of the unity of forms in a work of art and the 
elements of design which are line, gesture, the 
represented mass of the images, space, light, shade and
o o
colour. On his view, the formal qualities of the work 
are more important than its subject-matter because it is 
the work’s formal qualities that affect us. So in looking 
at a Cezanne still life picture, it is the organization 
of space, the shapes of the images and the composition 
that we attend to and appreciate, not the depicted 
objects- the pears, apples, or whatever. In this respect, 
Formalists try to separate themselves from views of art 
which make imitation and resemblance the primary criteria 
for critical evaluation.
Though it is a palatable theory because it attempts 
to define what is common between works of art as diverse 
as Cezanne and Rembrandt, Formalism pares down the 
spectator’s experience to one in which there is no 
interest in the narrative of the work of art, or its 
subject.
2.4 Conclusion
I have given an overview of the main theories of 
pictorial representation currently important in 
aesthetics. The Resemblance Theory explains depiction 
through similarities in appearance between pictures and
38
their subjects. "Seeing-as", the Illusion Theory, and the 
Make-Believe Theory define depiction in terms of how we 
see what is represented in pictures. Goodman*s theory 
does away with the distinction between iconic and non- 
iconic visual symbols, while Natural Generativity defines 
pictures and pictorial experience by examining how 
pictures and their interpretations are generated. Each 
account (with the exception of Natural Generativity) has 
been found to be inadequate in explaining what it is for 
a picture to represent a thing, so the next task is to 
find a theory which gives a true, cogent account of 
pictorial representation.
It should have become clear through my criticisms 
above that an account of pictorial representation 
requires some explanation of what constitutes pictorial 
experience. Discovering how pictures represent entails an 
understanding of how we treat them, and this includes 
determining what occurs in a spectator*s response.
When we interpret pictures, we are involved in a 
search for the meaning of the images we see. We begin an 
exploratory exercise to discover what the images are of, 
how they are related to each other, why the artist 
created the picture in such a way and how; in other 
words, what the images mean. In reaching our conclusions 
we use perceptual, conceptual, and imaginative "tools*' 
which move us from a basic perceptual recognition of what 
the images represent to a deeper understanding and
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enjoyment of the work. Different responses to a 
particular picture may be similar in some respects, but 
we need not expect to interpret the same picture in a 
given w ay.^ All that we can definitely say about 
pictorial experience is that a combination of particular 
activities in the spectator leads to a picture*s overall 
interpretation.
The activities, or "tools", can be identified and 
defined, but there is no set formula. Therefore, we also 
cannot say that a particular picture must have a single 
correct interpretation. Several "correct** interpretations 
may be possible because various responses to a single 
work can be appropriate.
All of the theories outlined above consider pictures 
from the point of view of the spectator. The artist's 
experience is important too, since the artist acts as 
both spectator and creator of the picture. Although the 
artist's role is fundamental to understanding pictorial 
representation, as creator this role is only essential 
before and during the production of the picture. It is 
valuable to consider the creative process, but it is how 
pictures are treated once they are made which is the main 
concern of theories of depiction, hence the importance of 
pictorial experience. The creative process should not be 
left out though because it can shed light on how we make 
pictorial interpretations. For example, the artist's 
intention can sometimes explain why we interpret a
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picture in a certain way.
In conclusion, the kind of theory that gives the most 
satisfactory account of pictorial representation is one 
which focuses on the spectator's response. It should 
address representations as such, not simply the objects 
they represent. It is an insufficient theory if it takes 
into account only one aspect of the spectator's response, 
for example the visual experience. Thus, for a 
comprehensive understanding of pictorial representation, 
a full explanation and description of how we contemplate 
and appreciate pictures is essential.
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CHAPTER 3: SEEING-IN
3.1 Introduction
In attempts to define the nature of representation, 
some philosophers argue that an analysis of the visual 
experience of pictures best describes how pictures differ 
from what they represent. But because perceptual theories 
analyze pictorial experience in terms of how we see 
pictures, they fail to acknowledge that perception is 
only one aspect of the activity involved in the 
interpretation of a picture. The perception of a picture 
is not strictly visual, it can be largely perceptual, so 
my argument does not claim that perception theories 
exclude the way in which our perceptions and thoughts 
come together in the interpretation of the picture. 
However, I do think that these theories focus too 
narrowly the visual aspect of pictorial experience.
In this chapter, I examine "seeing-in" and compare it 
to "seeing-as" to determine (1) if it is an improvement 
on "seeing-as" and (2) whether or not it sufficiently 
explains pictorial representation. I conclude that 
Wollheim's theory does not acknowledge all aspects of the 
spectator’s interpretation, especially in that it 
restricts the use of imagination. Generally, the concept 
of "seeing-in" is not explained adequately by Wollheim.
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3.2 Perception Theories of Pictorial Representation
The main proponents of perception theories are
Gombrich, Roger Scruton and Wollheim. Gombrich and
Scruton base their views on Wittgenstein's aspect
perception, and they develop his views, defining
"seeing-as" as a kind of perception used in both
pictorial and non-pictorial experience. For Gombrich,
"seeing-as" serves as the basis for his Illusion Theory.
In the last chapter we examined the drawbacks of that
view, however, independently of the Illusion Theory,
"seeing-as" has some merits, and it provides the basis of
a theory which is an improvement on Gombrich1s. Expressed
as the Aspect Theory, it is defined as follows:
X is a representation of Y, iff 
standardly, x may be seen as containing 
a Y-aspect, without, however, any belief 
by the spectator that X is Y.
Scruton incorporates "seeing-as" into his theory of 
pictorial representation in Art and Imagination. This 
kind of perception describes what happens when we see 
aspects of objects, for example when we do not see 
objects as what they are. I might see a crouching black 
cat against a black wall as part of the texture of the 
wall, not recognizing the cat until it moves. Also, I 
might see a certain object and not see it as anything I 
recognize at all, though I might be able to describe it. 
Wittgenstein points out that we do not use "seeing-as"
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when responding to seeing the object as it actually is. 
For example, we do not say to the sight of a knife and 
fork that we see it a_s a knife and fork.
I favour Scruton1s version of "seeing-as" because it 
is closer to Wittgenstein's own views, and therefore the 
concept of illusion plays no part in his account of 
pictorial representation. He analyzes "seeing-as" as a 
kind of perception which is not used strictly for 
pictures. This point is valuable because the idea of a 
special kind of perception unique to pictorial 
representation is limiting and, I think, untenable. For 
Scruton, "seeing-as" is imaginative seeing because aspect 
perception involves the use of imagery. Though it is 
difficult to pin down exactly how imagination is present 
in "seeing-as", Scruton supports Wittgenstein's point 
that, for example in the duck-rabbit figure, seeing the 
duck aspect is like having the (mental) image of a duck.
"Seeing-as" is a useful concept for explaining how 
we see aspects of both objects and representations, but 
pictorial representation cannot be entirely understood in 
terms of this imaginative perception. We can use 
imagination separately from perception, for example when 
visualizing about the images perceived.
Thus far I have pointed to the problems in Gombrich's 
theory and the merits of Scruton's. I will now turn to 
Wollheim's "seeing-in" theory, which attempts to remedy 
the problems of other perception theories.
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Like Scruton and others, Wollheim argues that 
Gombrich's Illusion Theory implies that when we see a 
picture, we are seeing an illusion of the object depicted 
and are deluded into believing that we see the real thing 
(though Gombrich himself denies this account of his 
view)^. He thinks that it misleadingly describes the way 
we see pictures, so to eliminate this problem he changes 
the wording of "seeing-as", introducing a new kind of 
representational seeing called "seeing-in". This term 
strikes me as equally problematic even though Wollheim 
believes that it gives a clearer description of the way 
in which we see pictures.
"Seeing-in" is a special visual capacity that 
precedes and is independent of pictorial experience. For 
Wollheim, the whole project of representation depends on 
this natural capacity because the artist exploits it by 
painting the canvas in a way which leads us to recognize 
what is depicted. The spectator's experience consists in 
an exploratory perception of the picture, concentrating 
on the images to understand the overall depiction.
Through my analysis of "seeing-in" in the next 
section, it will become clear how sharply defined the 
spectator's experience is for Wollheim. Because 
Wollheim's theory consists of a specific visual capacity, 
his view also lacks the broader scope necessary to 
elucidate representation. After examining the strengths 
and weaknesses of "seeing-in", I will consider what role,
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if any, Wollheim assigns to imagination in pictorial 
experience.
3.3 "Seeing-in"
Wollheim maintains that "seeing-in" is an innate form 
of perception distinct from seeing, "seeing-as", and 
"seeing-that".  ^ What defines "seeing-in" as opposed to 
other kinds of perception is a phenomenological feature 
which he calls "twofoldness". "Twofoldness" is unique to 
experiences of "seeing-in"; it is a way of seeing the 
configurational and recognitional aspects of both 
representations and non-representations. Wollheim uses 
the example of seeing a picture of a woman in which 
recognizing or identifying the woman in the picture is 
the recognitional aspect of the experience and awareness 
of the blobs of paint (the marked surface) is the 
configurational aspect. In fact, he also claims that 
"seeing-in" precedes depiction because it is a natural 
capacity we have to see things in other things. So 
"seeing-in" is engaged when I see an image of my mother 
in a Rorschach test card, a chubby face in a cloud, or a 
tree-shape in a stain. For representations in particular, 
Wollheim says that when an artist creates images on a 
canvas, there is an awareness of the spectator's ability 
to see in this way. The artist expects the spectator to 
use "seeing-in" in order to correctly recognize the
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picture's images.^
"Twofoldness" is also the way in which Wollheim 
explains away the possibility of illusion. Because we can 
attend to both the paint on the canvas and the subject we 
see in the picture, we see the picture as a configuration 
of lines and colours which form the image of the subject. 
Thus, there is no confusion nor delusion, regarding what 
we see. Except when we are fooled by trompe l'oeil, 
Wollheim argues that we can see pictures as 
representations because of the ability to see the subject 
and its medium simultaneously.
The "standard of correctness" defines the difference
between "seeing-in" used for non-representations and
representations. Wollheim says:
Seeing-in does not presuppose 
representation. On the contrary, seeing-in 
precedes representation, and this is why 
seeing-in can be used to elucidate 
representation. Very roughly, P represents 
X if X can be correctly seen in P, where 
the standard of correctness is set for P by 
the fulfilled intentions of the artist of 
P.7
Therefore, when we use "seeing-in" for pictures, we are 
meant to see the picture in a particular way, or to have 
an experience which concurs with the artist s intention. 
Wollheim is not claiming that there must be a match 
between the spectator's experience and the artist's 
intention, but there is a requirement that the spectator 
correctly sees what is depicted by the artist. The
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"standard of correctness" defines the relationship 
between the spectator, what is depicted, and the artist. 
The spectator can make mistakes, either by failing to 
identify what is depicted or by misidentifying it. Also, 
the "standard of correctness" does not demand that the 
spectator sees a picture in one particular way. In this 
respect, Wollheim allows for variations in the way 
different spectators interpret the same picture. For 
Wollheim, the relationship between the artist's intention 
and the spectator's response is not rigidly defined. For 
example, he approves of Proust playing the game of 
finding likenesses to his friends while enjoying
Q
portraits in the Louvre.
Wollheim, then, gives a phenomenological description
of pictorial experience. When we look at pictures, we use
"seeing-in", and "seeing-in" makes it possible to
correctly see what has been depicted by some artist. The
"twofold" nature of "seeing-in" does not divide the
experience into one of seeing the surface and one of
identifying or interpreting what is seen. It is a single,
visual experience which occurs every time we look at a
picture or other surface/object in which we can see
something else. Wollheim argues that
...no systematic account can be given of 
how the two aspects correlate or how the 
marked surface has to be or seem for any 
given thing or event to be perceived in 
it.10
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He does say, however, that what the spectator sees is 
determined by the picture and the cognitive stock 
(beliefs, values, emotions, etc.) of the spectator.
Since Wollheim gives a perceptual analysis of
representation, it will be in his interest to argue that
the perception of the picture is at the fore of the
experience.
Periodically, as the spectator attempts to 
deepen his understanding of the picture, 
further concepts will be plucked out of 
his background beliefs and foregrounded: 
each time this happens, how we see the 
picture shifts somewhat. His perception 
expands.
I do not object to the idea that concepts and background 
information are useful in understanding pictures, but the 
way that Wollheim expresses this view is problematic. 
Concepts and beliefs do not affect just what we see in a 
picture or howT we see it, they affect our overall 
interpretation of the picture. By overall interpretation 
I mean everything that enters into the spectator's 
experience of the picture; the perception of it, 
identification or recognition of its content, interest in 
what the images mean. Though perception and 
interpretation are bound up with each other in the sense 
that the interpretation of a picture depends on 
perceiving it, they are distinct activities. We might 
define the perception as a fundamental part, or the basis 
of interpretation, e.g. when we perceptually explore a
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picture iji order to discover the meanings of the images 
we see. But thinking about these images and imagining, 
say, movement in the images, reaches beyond perception. 
Because Wollheim analyzes the experience in terms of 
perception, he only points to the "expansion" of 
perception without explaining how the overall 
interpretation changes as the spectator "deepen[s] his 
understanding".
In my view, Wollheim's best explanation of pictorial 
experience is in the second and third chapters of his 
most recent book, Painting as an Art. Here, he outlines 
his theory of "seeing-in" and explains how it facilitates 
a spectator's understanding of a picture. In the course 
of his discussion he refers to how information and 
cognitive stock affect and shape a spectator's 
understanding of a picture according to how the artist 
marks the surface of the canvas. On this issue, like his 
view of the "standard of correctness", Wollheim is 
flexible with regard to the spectator's use of non- 
perceptual information in interpreting pictures. The only 
necessary condition is that the information will help the 
spectator to see something the artist intended him or her 
to see. With a particular piece of information at hand, a 
spectator may see something new in a picture, thus 
increasing the overall understanding and appreciation of 
the work. So Wollheim does attend here to the way in 
which non-perceptual information is useful.
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In conclusion, it is clear that Wollheim 
characterizes pictorial experience in terms of a 
perceptual experience. Despite the fact that Wollheim 
identifies how non-perceptual information expands the 
spectator's understanding of a work, his account of 
pictorial representation still lacks attention to the 
non-perceptual capacities used by the spectator. In the 
next section, I will address the question of whether or 
not it is necessary to identify a special kind of visual 
perception for the perception of pictures.
3.4 "Seeing-in" and Ordinary Perception
Wollheim and others define pictorial representation 
by identifying something which marks pictorial 
experience. In their view, by finding that which is 
peculiar about pictures, they are able to say how we 
approach pictures, and thus how pictures differ from 
other objects we encounter in the world.
We have discovered that Gombrich and Scruton favour 
"seeing-as" as the kind of perception used by spectators 
to see pictures as depictions of objects. Wollheim 
rejects "seeing-as" in favour of "seeing-in" which, 
though not just for seeing pictures, is also the special 
tool which spectators use to see pictures, so it alone 
facilitates the understanding of representations. In this 
respect, "seeing-in" defines pictorial experience for
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Wollheim, Without it, artist and spectator alike would be 
at a loss to interpret pictures.
So according to these views, the use of a particular 
kind of perception demarcates pictorial from non­
pictorial experience. Wollheim's theory appears to rely 
more on "seeing-in" than Gombrich1s and Scruton's 
theories do on "seeing-as". For, unless we can see both 
the configurational and recognitional aspects in one, 
single experience, it will not register in the spectator 
that he or she is seeing a picture and not an illusion. 
The "standard of correctness" is built into the concept 
of "seeing-in" (when used for seeing representations), 
and without this, the spectator will not see the picture 
as artist intended, perhaps seeing an illusion of the 
object instead. This is the line of thought which can be 
drawn from Wollheim's arguments for "seeing-in". Though 
he claims that "seeing-in" is activated by any 
differentiated surface (e.g. a stained wall), "seeing-in" 
is essential to interpreting depictions as such.
Wittgenstein makes the connection between aspect 
perception and pictures by using examples of pictures to 
illustrate how we see aspects of objects. But we should 
note that Wittgenstein introduces his concept of "seeing- 
as" by distinguishing between "'two uses of the word 
'see"" Furthermore, he says that seeing is not 
subject to the will while "seeing-as" and imagining are, 
though "seeing-as" is not entirely subject to the will.
54
Therefore, it makes sense to say: 1"Now see the figure
like this" but not: "Now see this leaf green.1,1 ^  The 
picture itself has a role to play in how "seeing-as" and 
imagination operate. Something about the picture has to 
lead a spectator to see it as, for example, a picture of 
a peach.
In Wittgenstein's sense of "seeing-as", we can use it 
to see aspects in pictures, and it is a necessary 
condition for seeing pictures themselves. But we do in 
fact use "seeing-as" in two senses. The first sense is 
seeing an object as itself or mistakenly as something 
else. An example would be to see a brown paper bag as a 
brown paper bag or mistakenly to see it as a small 
animal. The second sense is seeing an aspect of an object 
when looking it (which sometimes happens as the dawning 
of an aspect). An illustration of the second sense would 
be to say of a Constable painting that it is through the 
dawning of an aspect that I realize that I see a red blob 
of paint on the canvas as a little boy. The duck-rabbit 
picture also exemplifies "seeing-as" in which there is 
the dawning of an aspect, that is, when we see an aspect 
of some object where previously there was none.
Scruton supports Wittgenstein's analysis of "seeing- 
as" and pictures, while Gombrich would call for a wider 
role for "seeing-as" in pictorial experience. Clearly 
"seeing-as" is used in ordinary perception, but I do not 
think that it serves to demarcate pictorial experience
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from ordinary experience.
The theories of "seeing-as" and "seeing-in", then, 
are assigned different roles in pictorial experience. 
Against these views, I will maintain that "seeing-in" is 
not essential for the interpretation of pictures, and 
therefore that Wollheim introduces an unnecessary mode of 
perception. The kind of seeing that we use to see objects 
around us, ordinary visual perception, is all that is 
needed for interpreting pictures. To see aspects we call 
on "seeing-as".
Though it is not my intention to argue that "seeing- 
as" defines pictorial experience, I disagree with 
Wollheim's point that "seeing-in" is an improvement on 
"seeing-as". Here I follow some of the points made by 
Alec Hyslop in his article, "Seeing Through Seeing-in.
Wollheim favours "seeing-in" for three reasons. The
first reason relates to the "range of things that we may
see in something as opposed to those which we may see
something as."^ He claims that "seeing-as" only makes it
possible to see sections of a picture as particulars
while "seeing-in" allows us to see not only particulars
in a picture but also states of affairs. For a picture X,
S may see a state of affairs in X but it is not possible
to see X as a state of affairs. He offers this example:
If I am looking at X, and X is a 
particular, I can see a woman in X, and I
can also see in X that a woman is reading a 
love-letter: but whereas I can see X as a 
woman, I cannot see X as that a woman is 
reading a love-letter. b
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Because Wollheim does not offer an explanation of how 
seeing states of affairs differs from seeing particulars, 
his argument amounts to one about awkward wording. It 
does make sense to say that I can see a section of some 
canvas as a woman reading a love-letter. A better example 
to illustrate this point against Wollheim is that it 
would be intelligible for me to say, "I see part of 
Titian's The Three Ages of Man as an elderly figure 
holding two skulls".
His second point against "seeing-as" stems from the 
first because it too involves seeing states of affairs.
He says here that "seeing-as" has a "requirement of 
localisation." He claims that when we see X as Y or part 
of X as Y, "seeing-as" can only account for what is 
actually located in a particular place in the picture. 
"Seeing-in" apparently has no localization requirement 
because "seeing-in" is a special kind of perception which 
enables us to see things absent to the senses. So a 
spectator can see Y in X despite Y's having no particular 
location on the canvas.
Wollheim takes this point further when he says that 
the non-localization requirement on "seeing-in" 
establishes it as the kind of seeing appropriate to 
pictures (i.e. representational seeing). He offers some 
examples of states of affairs, but he leaves this idea 
unexplained. Judging by the examples, it is possible that
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he is referring to non-localized or undepicted pictorial 
content. His examples are seeing the following in 
paintings: the gathering of a storm, that a stag is about 
to die, and a crowd of people, some of whom are obscured. 
Wollheim*s point is that "seeing-inM facilitiates our 
seeing parts of the picture*s content which are not 
actually visible.
But "seeing-as" and "seeing-in" are equally limited 
here, contrary to what Wollheim says. "Seeing-in" also 
has a localization requirement because when we say what 
we see in a picture, the location is implied. Put another 
way, we always see a part or the whole of the canvas as± 
something or we always see something in a part or iri the
whole of the canvas. Thus, how X and Y are related has a
localization requirement built-in as it were.
Furthermore, if what we "see" is not actually
visible, like painted lightning in a sky, we can imagine 
it happening in the picture. It would make sense to say 
that we can "see" the non-visible lightning in the sky 
thereby identifying where in the picture we would "see" 
this future state of affairs (as the consequence of a 
gathering storm). Translated into the terms of "seeing- 
as", I might say that I "see" the upper half of the 
picture as streaked with lightning. But because I have no 
actual visual experience of this future event in the 
picture, both "seeing-in" and "seeing-as" cannot provide 
a description of seeing non-visible pictorial content.
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The "see" will always be figurative, e.g. "I can 'see' 
that the stag is about to die in this picture." Here 
imagination can supply the images to fill the gaps of 
undepicted representational content. "Imagine" can be 
used non-figuratively to describe how spectators 
experience certain pictorial images so that "I can 1 see' 
that the stag is about to die" becomes "I can imagine 
that the stag in the picture is about to die." This 
imagining might involve visualizing the stag's death, 
thus grasping part of the picture's content in this way.
Wollheim overemphasizes the difference between 
"seeing-as" and "seeing-in"; there is really very little 
difference between the two perceptual experiences. He 
describes them as "distinct perceptual projects"; 
"seeing-as" is the visual curiosity of things present to 
the senses whereas "seeing-in" is the ability to see 
things not present to the senses (and also things which 
might not exist). Therefore, "seeing-as" is involved in 
all perception while "seeing-in" is not, the latter being 
especially useful for seeing pictures. However, because 
he fails to provide enough evidence for the value of 
"seeing-in" as a special kind of perception, his first 
two criticisms of "seeing-as" are unconvincing.
Wollheim's third objection to "seeing-as" points to 
what I consider to be a possibly valuable aspect of his 
theory. The concept of "twofoldness" was analyzed in 3.3. 
To review, it is the nature of pictures to have both
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configurational and recognitional aspects, and we 
interpret them as being configurations of lines and blobs 
of paint which form two-dimensional depictions of things. 
Wollheim recognizes this awareness of both aspects- an 
awareness which facilitates the understanding of the 
object as a picture of something. This is the condition 
which, he thinks, eliminates the possibility of illusion 
(except perhaps with good trompe l'oeil pictures).
I think that Wollheim is right in his claim that 
"seeing-in" captures our ability to see both the 
configurational and recognitional aspects of a picture, 
for example, it is possible to see the figure of Joan of 
Arc in the brushstrokes of the painting. However, can we 
be sure that this twofold attention will always take 
place? Sometimes the paint may be so smooth that the 
brushstrokes themselves are indiscernible, therefore 
limiting the spectator's perception only to the images.
In my view, there are degrees of "twofoldness"- sometimes 
we see the two aspects easily and at other times they are 
less distinct. It is also difficult to take on board the 
idea of "twofoldness" consisting in a single visual 
experience. When we see an image according to its shape, 
we do not always notice the brushstrokes at the same 
time, especially if the surface of the painting is 
smooth. "Twofoldness" is intended as a safety measure 
against illusion and delusion, but even if we fail to 
notice the painted surface, we still understand the
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picture as a representation, not as reality, (in Chapter 
4 I will argue that Natural Generativity provides an 
explanation of how we arrive at such an understanding.)
Wollheim's arguments for the value of "seeing-in" are 
not persuasive. I would like to stress that ordinary 
perception and "seeing-as" do meet the requirements of 
pictorial representation, so a special visual capacity 
does not underlie pictorial experience. To claim that 
there is something which marks pictorial experience, i.e. 
something that distinguishes pictorial experience from 
other kinds of experience or ways of seeing, is to assume 
that there is a feature unique to it (and perhaps 
therefore to pictures themselves). Though I maintain that 
there is no definitive feature of this experience, the 
spectator's imagination is an aspect of it which requires 
elucidation. The next section will explore the extent to 
which "seeing-in" makes room for this in its account of 
pictorial representation.
3.5 "Seeing-in” and Imagination
In his debate with Anthony Savile entitled 
"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding"-^ Wollheim 
writes:
...imagination has no necessary part to 
play in the perception of what is 
represented. Imagination may put us in the 
right frame of mind for such perception, 
but it does not have tQ„be a constituent of 
the perception itself.
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I have two objections to what he says here. Wollheim, nor 
Savile, clearly define what imagination means in their 
debate. Both philosophers take the common notion of
imagination, fanciful imagination, rather than a
philosophical definition. A philosophical definition can 
explain the various functions and activities of 
imagination as an image-maker, from its role in visual 
perception to its role in fantasy. If Savile and Wollheim 
had given its meaning a closer look they might have seen
the presence of imagination in all normal visual
perception in virtue of the fact that it makes use of 
images. They might then concede that in this sense 
imagination is necessarily part of "seeing-in** and of 
seeing pictures.
Secondly, it is not clear what Wollheim means by 
imagination putting us in "the right frame of mind*'. Does 
he mean by imagination that the imaginative stance is 
appropriate in the appreciation of art? It is assumed 
that art and imagination go hand in hand in the sense 
that imagination enables us to grasp the powerful, new 
ideas that art often presents to us. Though Wollheim 
acknowledges the value of imaginative activity in 
interpreting particular kinds of pictures, generally, he 
is suspicious of imagination used in the interpretation 
of just any picture.
It is not an uncommon view that fanciful imagination
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used in the contemplation of an artwork can downgrade the 
experience. This view claims that if the spectator gives 
imagination free rein, it can become too free, as it 
were. In this state, imaginative activity distracts the 
spectator from the work because the spectator no longer 
attends to the features of the work itself, but rather to 
some personal fantasy. Such imaginative experience is too 
private to have any proper connection to the work. 
Formalism would take an extreme position in this regard, 
prohibiting any use of imagination because it has no 
relevance to the intrinsic properties of the work.
However, as I hope to show in the course of this 
thesis, we can usually control our imagination, and under 
control, imaginative activity can be a useful and valid 
way to interpret and appreciate artworks. In some cases 
the artist even requires imaginative activity for the 
proper interpretation of a picture.
Wollheim questions the value of imaginative activity
on the basis that (1) it will lead to an experience of
illusion; and (2) it will detract from the perceptual
experience of the work.
...we have a perfectly good explanation of 
how we perceive representations without 
invoking imagination. Indeed invoking 
imagination would only erode the 
explanation by casting its adequacy in 
doubt.
In general, many philosophers look upon imagination with 
suspicion because they believe that its functions cannot
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be described in any systematic way; this may be due to 
not attempting the task of understanding its functions.
I have introduced some of the reasons why Wollheim 
believes that imagination leads to the incorrect 
interpretation of pictures. It is implicit in what he
says that imaginative activity would contaminate the
9 nexperience of "seeing-in". Also, to set his theory 
apart from "seeing-as", he believes no role should be 
given to imagination in seeing pictures. For example, in
9 1
his discussion of a spectator who "centrally imagines" 
in order to understand a picture's content, he separates 
"seeing-in" from the activity of "centrally imagining". 
For Wollheim, when a spectator looks at a picture with an 
internal spectator (the imaginative projection of 
ourselves into a picture as spectators of the depicted 
scene from the inside) and uses imagination to identify 
with the internal spectator, "seeing-in" is inoperative. 
The spectator switches back to "seeing-in" after 
"centrally imagining". Wollheim argues that imagination 
is not part of our actual perception of pictures because 
it may upset the "twofold" experience of "seeing-in" with 
an experience of illusion (which can become delusion).
In fact, Wollheim believes that imagination dilutes 
our perception of pictures. Here, I think he means that 
with imagination, our perception of a picture moves from 
a clear, untainted perception to one in which the 
imagination's images change what we see into something
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the artist did not intend us to see. For example, I can 
look at a picture of a little girl and identify it as 
that. But using my imagination, that little girl might 
begin to look like my mother as a child- an 
interpretation not intended by the artist. Here, 
imagination, according to Wollheim, interferes with 
"seeing-in" because there is an incorrect identification 
of what is represented in the picture. But in my view 
this interpretation is not incorrect as long as the 
spectator is aware that the artist did not paint a 
picture of the spectator's mother as a little girl 
(though this could have been possible). Recognizing a 
resemblance between the image and my mother can be 
incorporated into a proper appreciation of the picture, 
except in the case of being carried away by an emotional 
experience linked to the memory of my mother rather than 
to the picture.
In his discussion of the spectator's incorporation of 
concepts and beliefs into his perception of the picture, 
Wollheim also stresses that the spectator does not use 
imagination. He points out that for Wittgenstein, seeing 
different aspects of, e.g. the duck-rabbit figure,
p p
demands imagination, but Wollheim appears to replace
imaginative activity with cognitive activity.
...Imagination can in good faith be denied 
a role in the expansion of our perception 
of representations just in case each step 
in the expansion receives the same 
explanation, and this reiterated 
explanation is in terms of a visual
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capacity, specifically seeing-in.
So, in the duck-rabbit example, I assume that he means 
that we can be told that there are both aspects in one 
figure, and with this information we can try to see both 
aspects alternately. The "expansion of perception" means 
that we recognize more of what is in the painting when we 
use concepts and beliefs to understand what is there.
Wollheim also denies that we use mental images to
"fill out" what we see on a canvas. Quoting Savile, he 
writes:
'We do not fill out the image at all. We 
rather come to amplify the description we 
are able to give of what is initially
manifest to us, and do that by reason of
knowledge about the subject that we bring 
to the picture from elsewhere.' Cast into 
my terminology, this means that a 
spectator, in advancing his pictorial 
understanding of a representation, may 
gainfully draw upon a background belief but 
without getting its constituent concepts to 
provide fresh descriptions under which he 
is then able to see what it represents.
In the above quote, Savile denies the use of imagination 
in filling out what we see, but Wollheim claims that his 
argument is unsuccessful because he does not offer a view 
which is strictly in terms of "seeing-in".
The trouble in Wollheim's account is his 
misunderstanding of how imagination can be engaged with 
pictures. Instead of imagination adding to our experience 
of the picture, he suggests that if we use imagination at 
all in looking at pictures without an internal spectator,
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we do not see what is depicted anymore, but perhaps some 
illusion instead, and this will not be attending to the
9 S
artist's representation.
But imaginative activity need not end in illusion, 
nor have anything to do with it. Imagination helps us to 
recognize what is there, not to replace what is there 
with something else. A picture of a peach may not 
register as a peach to me unless I imagine how it tastes 
(if this is how a peach is defined for me). Or a sketchy 
picture of a peach may not look like a peach at all 
unless I can try to match its appearance with my mental 
image of a peach. Here, my imagination has not replaced 
the peach-picture with my mental image of the peach. I 
have simply used my visualizing ability to recognize what 
is depicted. If Wollheim allows concepts and beliefs to 
aid pictorial understanding, why can't imagination as 
illustrated in the peach example also have a legitimate 
role?
We have seen that Wollheim acknowledges that 
background knowledge and beliefs are used by the 
spectator in understanding a picture. I have objected to 
his view because it leaves out other aspects of the 
spectator's experience. Wollheim also denies that such 
cognitive and imaginative activity coincide with the 
perception of pictures. Sometimes, and especially on this 
point, Wollheim's theory reads very much like the 
Presentational Theory, a view which he rejects in Art and
67
its Objects, Wollheim does hold that "Pictures can have 
as their representational content things they do not 
represent. But his description of pictorial experience 
does not allow for the spectator to imagine the 
undepicted content of a picture.
We cannot just see everything that the artist means 
to convey through his images. What we are meant to grasp 
is not always given, and therefore, not necessarily 
grasped through "seeing-in". Wollheim points to the 
"twofoldness" of "seeing-in" which facilitates 
recognition of what the painted images are of; but we may 
not be able to grasp the picture*s meaning exclusively 
through "seeing-in", and there are many instances in 
which this is the case. Though he suggests the need for 
"centrally imagining" with certain pictures, he does not 
take the view (which I suggest) that imagination may be 
used freely in the interpretation of every picture (on 
the condition that we control and limit this freedom 
where appropriate). This returns us to the point of the 
preceding paragraph.
Pictures often evoke imaginative activity in a 
spectator. A portrait from the shoulders up might invite 
the spectator to fill out the rest of the figure. For 
example, one can imagine how the figure*s dressing gown 
looks and what shoes are on the figure*s feet. A Dutch 
painting of a group of seated men depicted from the waist 
up might call for imagining what lies below what is seen,
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their legs and the floor. We can just know that the 
depicted figures have legs and sit in chairs, but it can 
be helpful to fill out the picture for ourselves. Often, 
what is depicted is unclear, as in a blurred photograph. 
Using imagination, we can picture what the painted image 
would look like if it was painted in perfect detail, in 
the same way that we can figure out the image of a 
blurred photograph. (We even use this imaginative skill 
to discern things we see around us.) What we see on the 
canvas provides clues which lead us to imagine how the
o 7
images would look if they were fully depicted.
There are other examples less obvious than these. As 
in my peach example, a picture of still life fruit 
covered in fresh dew invites us to imagine tasting the 
appetizing fruits. "Seeing-in" cannot account for an 
experience like this. Wollheim thinks that such 
experiences are inappropriate and even irrelevant to the 
artist’s intentions. But if imaginative experiences are 
evoked by a picture, and enhance the spectator’s 
interpretation, why should these experiences be 
considered inappropriate? I have pointed to how 
imagination can be part of the spectator’s response, but 
further support for this claim will be considered in 
Chapter 7.
Wollheim does acknowledge that artists often require 
us or invite us to use imagination in understanding what 
is represented, but he does not accept such activity as
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always useful or enhancing in the experience of seeing 
the picture. He discusses the "internal spectator" in 
which we project ourselves into the picture to watch what
is happening there or to identify with one of the figures
9 R
depicted, to "imagine this figure from the inside." 
Wollheim recognizes this imaginative activity, but he 
separates it from "seeing-in". He says that the 
imaginative activity of becoming an "internal spectator" 
will
...colour the way in which the spectator of 
the picture perceives the picture, and 
specifically the way in which he perceives 
what he sees in the picture, when, as he is 
next required to do, he reverts from 
imagination to perception.
His separation of perception and imagination is strained 
here. Typically, we perceive the picture when we 
imaginatively project ourselves into it because seeing 
what is there helps us to make this imaginative move.
Also, by continuing our visual perception of the picture 
when using imagination we therefore attend to the picture 
itself, rather than indulging in a daydream or the like.
Insofar as he allows for the "internal spectator", he 
says that only certain paintings invite the spectator to 
place himself in the picture. Wollheim*s description of 
"centrally imagining1* is both clear and fruitful. Here he 
points to how a spectator can increase his or her 
understanding of a picture by identifying with a point of 
view in some picture. This exercise, he claims, is
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planned by the artist so that particular paintings 
require spectators to complete the exercise in order to 
gain access to the picture's content. Through the two 
features of "centrally imagining" the spectator picks up 
more information about the picture, feeding it into the 
interpretation. "Cogency" is the transfer of the imagined 
experience back to the spectator, and "plenitude" is 
imagining something about the depicted protagonist's 
life.30
Velasquez's painting Las Meninas is used by both 
Savile and Wollheim to demonstrate the spectator's 
projective imagination. Before studying that example, we 
should consider the special kinds of pictures in which 
Wollheim's "internal spectator" is present.
Wollheim mentions Casper David Friedrich's nature
pictures, Manet's single-figure pictures, Hals's and
(maybe) Rembrandt's group portraits, and Jackson
Pollock's splatter paintings. Each artist's images invite
the spectator into the scene painted for one reason or
another. In Friedrich's pictures it is the point of view
he works into his nature pictures. A high viewpoint and a
low horizon with an unbroken view across, for example, a
landscape, position the external spectator into the
01
picture, perhaps standing at the top of a hill.
Certain single-figure paintings by Manet set off the 
spectator's imagination. Figures like the barmaid in the 
Bar aux Folies-Bergere and the woman in La Prune make us
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wonder about who they are and what thoughts lie behind 
their pensive, perhaps forlorn, faces. Manet invites us 
into their world to imagine what they experience, and 
this invitation is conveyed through the expression of
o o
their personalities to the audience.
Through these imaginings the spectator's
understanding of the picture increases. Here, Wollheim
does allow for imagining what is not actually depicted,
but he sets limits on this activity; in becoming an
"internal spectator", we must not allow imagination to
wander. The main condition here is that the imaginative
activity must concur with the artist's intention. In
Painting as an Art, he says:
...once the spectator of the picture 
accepts the invitation to identify with the 
spectator in the picture, he loses sight of 
the marked surface. In the represented 
space, where he now vicariously stands, 
there is no marked surface. Accordingly the 
task of the artist must be to recall the 
spectator to a sense of what he has 
temporarily lost. The spectator must be 
returned from imagination to perception.
Twofoldness must be reactivated. Otherwise 
the distinctive resources of the medium 
will lie untapped.
Though sometimes we cannot avoid imaginatively 
projecting ourselves into pictures, we are supposed to 
enjoy the images through seeing them, and seeing them in 
a special way. Here Wollheim has attempted to incorporate 
what he cannot deny, that pictures do evoke an 
imaginative response in the spectator. However, while 
projecting ourselves into the picture may give us a more
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intimate look at what is represented, once imaginatively 
there, not having the freedom to explore the space can 
make the move fruitless. MSeeing-inM sets unrealistic 
restraints on the artist and the spectator because while 
recognizing the use of imagination in the interpretation 
of pictures, it restricts its freedom.
Giving imagination a free rein can, in some 
instances, lead to imaginative experiences which have 
little to do with what is depicted. It can even lead to a 
misunderstanding rather than a better or fuller 
understanding of a picture. However, defining imaginative 
activity as useful only if we can identify with an 
internal spectator is too limiting on the spectators 
attempt to interpret and enjoy a work of art.
In Las Meninas, the spectator is invited into the 
picture's representational space to look at a canvas 
turned away from the external spectator which Velasquez 
has depicted himself as painting. The picture is a 
realistic one with little fanciful detail or fictional 
overtones. We are simply presented with the figures of 
the royal family, their entourage, and Velasquez, who is 
in the process of painting a canvas.
The image of the canvas takes up a quarter of the 
left side of the picture. With its back to us and its 
presence so dominant in the scene, we cannot help but 
imagine what it is that we have caught Velasquez in the 
middle of painting. On closer inspection, it appears that
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he is painting a portrait of the royal couple, Philip IV 
and Queen Mariana, whose figures are reflected in a 
mirror at the back of the room in the painting. Once 
"inside" the picture, "looking" at the canvas, we imagine 
how much progress Velasquez has made in the portrait- the 
style and the colours he uses. In the real picture almost 
all of the figures, Infanta Margarita, her maids, and 
Velasquez, are expressionless with their eyes focused on 
a point outside of the canvas. They seem to be looking at 
us, at the external spectator. Their gaze draws us into 
the space, where we wander, inspecting Velasquez*s 
unfinished canvas and the rest of the figures.
This imaginative leap is evoked by the nature of the 
images. But my description of the "internal spectator" 
reaches beyond what Wollheim will allow. According to 
Wollheim, we become internal spectators in this instance, 
but our imaginations are not permitted to play with the 
images depicted, nor to add to what is depicted. Such 
activity would not concur with the artist*s intention. 
Wollheim is really saying something like, look but don*t 
touch.
If Wollheim allows for cognitive activity, e.g. using 
biographical information about a figure in a portrait to 
aid pictorial understanding, why should imaginative 
activity not be allowed if a correct or not wildly 
incorrect interpretation is reached by the spectator? The 
cognitive information which we use in interpretation is
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not represented in the picture, but it still offers 
something to our interpretation. Knowing Velasquez's 
relationship with the King and Queen of Spain will help 
us to understand that the scene he painted may have 
actually occurred, and that it was not Velasquez's 
fantasy to paint a royal portrait. Imagining what that 
portrait looked like and perhaps the perspective he chose 
(based on what we do see in the picture) is an equally 
acceptable part of any spectator's interpretation. 
Wollheim has not provided sufficient reasons to exclude 
it. He also claims that the playful activity of the 
imagination leads to understanding pictures in a 
piecemeal fashion. But if we perceive the whole picture, 
what is to prevent us from imaginatively exploring its 
parts to gain a better grasp of the whole?
Furthermore, can Wollheim be certain that the 
artist's intention is so defined as to include only a 
particular imaginative stance? Once we have imagined 
ourselves in the picture, we cannot know for certain that 
the artist does not wish for a free imagination in the 
spectator. A theory that depends on the spectator seeing 
what the artist intended for him to see is more difficult 
to defend. Wollheim's examples demand a more precise 
response than we can pin down; it is not easy to foresee 
or predict what shape imaginative activity will take in 
response to as particular theme. For example, to claim 
that what the artist has depicted will determine how the
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spectator imagines himself as an "internal spectator" is 
to assume that the artist's images exercise nearly 
perfect control over the spectator's response. Wollheim's 
analysis of the way the spectator uses imagination is 
therefore incomplete in that it does not consider the 
variety of equally legitimate responses we can have.
In addition to "centrally imagining", Wollheim 
identifies the activity of the external spectator as 
"acentrally imagining". "Acentrally imagining" is 
imaginative access to a picture from the outside, from no 
particular point of view.^ Little consideration is given 
to it, but there is something about it in his debate with 
Savile and in Painting as an Art. He does not think that 
"acentrally imagining" is legitimate because it may
n c
"subvert" the spectator's perception of a picture. J 
Also, whereas "centrally imagining" is separate from the 
perception of a picture (what is imagined is then fed 
into the perception), "acentrally imagining" is reduced 
to a purely visual experience. I am not sure what he 
means by this, but he says that it is visual because this 
type of imagining has "no affective aspect" (whereas the 
"internal spectator" is able to imagine what the figure 
in the picture feels).
Despite the fact that "acentrally imagining" is 
described as visual, he still claims that it is 
inappropriate because it does not correspond to what the 
spectator sees when perceiving the picture. It offers a
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different perspective and one which lacks "twofoldness" 
so it is in conflict with "seeing-in". Thus, according to 
Wollheim, even this form of imaginative activity does not 
enhance but rather disrupts our interpretation of a 
picture.
I disagree with his objections to "acentrally 
imagining" for the same reason that I disgree with his 
conception of the "internal spectator". His arguments 
against imagination are based on his assumption that most 
kinds of imaginative activity cause an incorrect 
interpretation of a picture, and that such activity 
conflicts with "seeing-in". If "seeing-in" is the way we 
look at pictures, then imaginative activity may be 
inconsistent with the way it operates, but Wollheim does 
not argue convincingly that "seeing-in" is the way we 
experience pictures; he only presents the nature of 
"seeing-in" and how it works.
If we accept that "seeing-in" provides a satisfactory 
account of pictorial experience, then we may fail to 
recognize the fruits of imagination for the 
interpretation and enjoyment of pictures. In this way, 
then, "seeing-in" restricts the spectator's experience.
Still, finding similarities between various 
spectators' responses can contribute to reaching a rough 
description of what makes an experience aesthetic, or 
perhaps, how ordinary experience differs from pictorial 
experience. It is clear that perception is the essential
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requirement of the spectator- to look at the picture. 
However, this should not lead us to explain the 
spectator's experience exclusively in terms of it. When 
appreciating a picture, thought and imagination are also 
engaged by what we see. While perception is constant 
(unless we shut our eyes), imagination and cognition may 
become more or less active depending on the spectator and 
the kind of picture it is. So a mixture of these three 
mental and visual activities make up every spectator's 
response. Moreover, as I will show in subsequent 
chapters, it is possible to determine when imagination is 
too free for a reasonable interpretation to emerge. We 
can achieve this by the same method we use to determine 
how much background information is required or suitable 
in the spectator's response.
I advocate an approach that replaces a special visual 
capacity like "seeing-in" with a description of the 
several activities that come together in the 
interpretation of pictures. Also, I would like to 
emphasize that in my view "seeing-in" is a superfluous 
form of perception. It can be replaced with the idea that 
we use ordinary perception for interpreting 
representations, such visual perception perhaps involving 
a stronger element of imagination when looking at 
pictures than is required when I look at, say, my 
mother's face as she speaks to me. Pictures require more 
imagination because there is an artist who has created
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them. Sometimes pictures are just for the imagination. 
When an artist paints my mother's portrait, he is not 
trying to reproduce her face, but to depict it in a 
certain way. The difference between representation and 
reality lies in the artist's role, not in the claim that 
we see pictures in a special way which differs from the 
way we see everything around us.
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CHAPTER 4: NATURAL GENERATIVITY
4.1 Natural Generativity and Pictorial Representation
Schier's Natural Generativity is not a perceptual nor 
a linguistic theory of depiction but a functional, 
interpretative theory. It is, in my view, an improvement 
on both Wollheim's "seeing-in" and Goodman's semantic 
theory primarily because it elucidates the structure of 
pictorial experience. Though it does not sufficiently 
explain the character of pictorial experience, it can at 
least provide an answer to how we make pictorial 
interpretations.
In contrast to other depiction theories, Schier 
begins with two propositions which form the basis of his 
theory. Firstly, he believes that "an interpretation of a 
picture is an assignment of meaning or content to it." 
Secondly, he argues that "to interpret a picture it is 
not necessary to experience it in a given way."^ In 
abandoning the perceptual approach, he notes the 
inability for perception to do all of the work in 
interpreting depictions, and he replaces it with an 
inquiry into how we come to understand their content. He 
believes that a cogent account of pictorial experience 
will emerge from his theory.
In Deeper into Pictures, Schier poses a basic 
question about depiction:
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Just what do we have to add to my 
experience of S as a medley of colours in 
order to make it true that I see S as a 
picture of some object? In other words, 
what makes it true that I see S as a 
picture of 0?
Here, he points to the need to identify what makes 
pictorial experience pictorial, but rejects Wollheim's 
attempt to solve this problem through "seeing-in" as well 
as other attempts such as the Resemblance Theory and the
-3
Make-Believe Theory.
Schier claims that both "seeing-as" and "seeing-in" 
are theories which depend in part on resemblance. A 
drawback of these theories is that they imply that the 
experience of seeing a picture of a horse resembles the 
experience of seeing a real horse. He acknowledges that 
there is an overlap between the recognitional abilities 
triggered by seeing a picture of a horse and a real 
horse. In other words, a picture of a horse may engage or 
provoke horse-recognizing abilities.^ However, this does 
not make the two experiences necessarily similar in 
nature. Identifying what distinguishes these experiences 
is not Schier's concern in his argument for Natural 
Generativity, but I will argue that his theory is a 
starting point for understanding how we respond to 
pictures, and how these responses themselves differ.
Natural Generativity does not rely on the linguistic 
conventions which Goodman utilizes in his analysis of 
depiction as language. Schier believes that we naturally
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generate our interpretation of a picture according to 
minimal non-linguistic conventions. This natural ability, 
which is itself a property of seeing pictures, also 
enables an artist to create a picture. Therefore, Natural 
Generativity is an ability used by both spectators and 
artists.
Schier's theory claims that our ability to interpret
pictures depends on having succeeded in an initial
pictorial interpretation and on recognizing what is
depicted. He begins with this basic definition:
A. system of representation is iconic just 
if once someone has interpreted any 
arbitrary member of it, they can proceed to 
interpret any other member of the system, 
provided only that they are able to 
recognise the object represented.
Even if we fail to recognize what is depicted, if we had 
been able to then we would have succeeded in 
understanding the picture as representational. Natural 
Generativity is not natural in the sense that we are born 
with the ability to interpret pictures nor is it 
analytically true that an initial interpretation will 
lead to further successful interpretations. Schier holds 
that
...it is a natural fact about us that such 
initial successes are fecund and generate a 
general ability to interpret novel 
pictorial symbols...
In the next section I will examine Natural 
Generativity in more depth, however here we should note
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that through rigorous argumentation, Schier demonstrates 
how this ability facilitates the interpretation of 
pictures. A particular strength of his theory is that it 
demarcates the recognition of the meaning and content of 
pictures from the recognition of the objects depicted.
It is necessary, I think, to consider pictorial 
experience in relation to the picture, not in relation to 
the object depicted. (This is not to say that we ao not 
have an interest in the object depicted). Both Schier and 
Scruton (among others) have recognized this point, but 
only Schier has been successful in offering a theory of 
depiction which reflects this. Typically in art, pictures 
are created with the intention of showing us something 
from an original point of view, and they are assessed 
with that in mind. Pictures have the power to draw us 
into their worlds; for instance by presenting a thing in 
a particular or extraordinary way. We may appreciate a 
painting of a familiar landscape in a way entirely 
different from appreciating the landscape itself. There 
are several reasons which account for the difference in 
these responses.
To mention a few which only touch on this central 
topic in aesthetics, we consider the artist, style, 
period, subject-matter, etc. We contemplate the images as 
created by an artist with an apparent or not so apparent 
intention. The images may be suggestive, unleashing the 
spectator's imagination in a way that enriches the
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experience. But it is worth mentioning that we should not 
assume that the two experiences will always be completely 
different, in fact the response to the picture and the 
response to the natural scene may resemble each other.
For example, part of a spectator's response to a picture 
of a familiar landscape may be emotional. It may remind 
the spectator of where she grew up; the particular 
artistic rendering of the scene causing her to visualize 
her home, a flood of memories accompanying this.
Pictorial experience is not limited to just what the 
spectator sees in the picture. In addition to the visual 
experience, thoughts contribute to the picture's overall 
interpretation from the level of an initial recognition 
of the images to a deeper interpretation of them, perhaps 
including imaginative activity on the part of the 
spectator. The extent to which Natural Generativity gives 
an account of pictorial experience will, I hope, become 
apparent through an analysis of the theory.
4.2 Natural Generativity Examined
Schier locates pictures as members of an iconic 
system, yet he marks off real differences between 
pictures and language, namely the absence of the grammar 
and conventions that belong to linguistic systems. 
Pictures are icons in virtue of the fact that they are 
symbols, but not all icons are visual. His theory only
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concerns visual icons, depictions. To define depiction, 
he develops a theory of how we understand pictures- how 
we come to know that pictures represent things. Pictures, 
or "iconic modes of representation" have the property of 
"natural generativity". This property means that all 
icons can be interpreted as representational once an 
initial interpretation is made.^ Schier's theory of 
depiction could be construed as similar to Goodman's 
approach, but Schier rigorously defends Natural 
Generativity as a non-linguistic theory.
Generally, I think Schier is successful in putting 
forward a theory of pictorial representation which is 
free from the same kinds of rules and conventions that 
form the basis of Goodman's theory. Schier notes some 
similarities between pictures and language. Pictures can 
be used to communicate, and like sentences they can be 
bearers of truth-value. Also, once one becomes proficient 
in each system, linguistic or pictorial, one can 
interpret novel sentences and novel icons. The essential 
difference, he claims, is that to understand language we 
must understand its grammar- which is conventional- but 
we can understand a novel picture without having ever 
experienced its "parts", given that the spectator is 
"pictorially competent". Natural Generativity means that 
a spectator can understand that S depicts 0 just if the 
spectator recognizes 0. Therefore while we have to learn 
the names of objects to identify them, there is no
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pictorial vocabulary to learn for the interpretation of
O
pictures.
Pictures can be interpreted simply from the images the 
spectator sees. The process
...need in principle involve no more than 
searching the surface of the pictorial 
symbol for cues which in fact unlock one's 
ability to recognise the represented 
objects; this unlocking or triggering of 
one's visual recognitional capacity in turn 
leads spontaneously to an ability to 
ascribe content correctly to the 
picture...
Although pictures have no grammatical rules, natural or 
conventional, Schier does say that pictures have iconic 
and sub-iconic parts. For example, the sparkle in the eye 
of Ruben's picture of his mistress is a sub-iconic part 
of the eye icon in the overall image.^ These parts are 
meaningless without the whole of which they are the 
parts, but they are unlike letters of the alphabet 
because the meaning of letters is conventional. The 
upshot of these comparisons is that the meaning of 
pictures, unlike sentences, is not fixed by conventions, 
and we do not have to learn certain rules to make 
successful interpretations of pictures.
Schier acknowledges that there is a convention which 
is necessary to Natural Generativity though he argues 
that it is not linguistic. The only convention governing 
pictorial systems is the iconic convention he calls 
"Convention C". In Schier's terminology "Convention C"
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is: "If S admits a naturally generated interpretation p,
ii 11S means that p. If this convention is in place, then 
the naturally generated interpretation is the correct 
one, the spectator therefore correctly identifying what 
the picture depicts.
According to Schier, the role of "Convention C"
differs from that of linguistic conventions. In the case
of a linguistic system, there are separate conventions
governing the separate, meaningful parts of language, so
that grasping language depends on grasping these many
conventions, while
Convention C, by contrast, does not assign 
any particular meanings to anything; it 
doesn't operate on particular iconic signs 
to tell us that. Knowing that Convention C 
governed an icon would not, in itself, tell 
you what it meant; knowing the convention 
governing the meaning of a word is knowing 
what the word means.
Schier introduces another feature of Natural
Generativity which I will call Mechanism M. Artists
create the images of pictures with the intention that
they are to be recognized as of certain things (assuming
that such an intention exists). Mechanism M is that
feature of Natural Generativity which explains the
connection between our naturally generated
1 8interpretations and the correct ones. J Schier is not 
saying that S is a picture of 0 just because the artist 
creates S with the intention of S being of 0. S is an 
icon of 0 only if it is interpreted as being of 0 which
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depends on the spectator recognizing it as such.
Schier claims that we do not have to know the
artist's intention in order to see that S depicts 0. Here
he is correct in claiming that it is simply our ability
to recognize 0 that enables us to generate the
interpretation that S is a picture of 0. This approach to
the problem of the artist's intention avoids the shaky
view that the spectator's interpretation should match the
artist's intention and that this depends on knowledge of
the artist's intention. On Schier's view the spectator
makes a successful interpretation independently of such
knowledge.
It is the fact that producer and 
interpreter alike share a set of 
recognitional abilities and that they can 
apply these abilities to pictorial 
symbols that explains the correspondence 
of producer's intention and interpreter's 
intention.
One could attempt to argue that "C" and "M" are both 
conventions, and that they must be similar to lingusitic 
conventions. But Schier has predicted this objection; and 
in fact, he asserts that the difference between a 
lingusitic symbol system and a pictorial or iconic one 
lies in the nature of the conventions of each system (not 
that one system has conventions and the other does not).
He argues that the spectator and the artist do not 
have to acknowledge "C" and "M" but that "C" and "M" have 
to be "in place". Schier also notes that this is true of
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linguistic conventions, but he clarifies the distinction 
between the function of "CM and "M" and the function of 
linguistic conventions through a discussion of the nature 
of icons and iconic systems.
Icons, he claims, do not function in the same way 
that words do. What distinguishes the two is the fact 
that artists create icons. We expect words to be used in 
certain ways and understand them because of how they are 
used. These expectations are based on standard habits 
that are part of communication. On the other hand, with 
pictures
The artist experiments until he gets 
something which he can naturally understand 
on the basis of relevant recognitional 
abili ties.
Furthermore, an icon differs functionally from a word. A 
picture of Henry is not a picture of Henry in virtue of 
the fact that it is a configuration of lines and colours 
created by an artist who intends for the configuration to 
represent Henry. The picture must make a successful 
"performance", that is, it is not a picture of Henry 
unless it is interpreted by both artist and spectator as 
such. A word, too, must be understood in order to perform 
its function but the difference is that a word fulfills 
its purpose once it is accepted as designating something, 
while a picture "does not perform its function merely by 
making its function manifest".^
Schier's defence of his theory that pictorial
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conventions are non-lingustic is convincing. He has 
overturned the idea that pictures are interpreted like 
words or language. I support his view, primarily because 
I think the relationship between the artist and the 
spectator cannot be defined simply in terms of a 
systematic method of interpretation. Schier reveals the 
conventions which do exist when we interpret pictures 
without the effect of an inflexible definition of 
pictorial experience. He identifies a structure in the 
interpretation of pictures while avoiding the drawbacks 
of a narrow conception of pictures as symbols of 
communication.
Natural Generativity offers a plausible explanation 
of how we grasp the meaning of a picture, this being 
fundamental to analyzing pictorial experience. Once we 
have understood how an initial interpretation is 
possible, we are closer to understanding what is involved 
in our overall experience of any particular picture.
4.3 Natural Generativity and Pictorial Experience
Natural Generativity helps us to understand the 
nature of pictorial experience because it explains the 
connection between a depiction and what it depicts. 
Schier's theory defines the relationship between picture 
and subject in terms of how the spectator interprets a
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picture. "Seeing-in" fails to do this because, Schier 
says
It is not possible to explain this 
structure in terms of experiences which 
simply have as their objects the same 
elements- S and 0- as my pictorial 
experience.... the simple coincidence of 
'seeing S' and 'seeing O' cannot amount 
necessarily to an experience as of their 
being related in a certain way.
Natural Generativity is a starting point for an 
inquiry into pictorial experience but it may offer no 
more insight into the spectator's response besides 
identifying how pictorial interpretation is possible. 
Perhaps more than this is unnecessary. A theory of 
depiction may only need to define how a depiction is 
related to the object it depicts- further 
characterization of the spectator's response to that 
relationship lying outside of such a definition.
Schier does recognize that there is "more to
pictorial experience than simply knowing what a picture 
1 8
means". But he is also dissatisfied with an explanation 
of pictorial experience in terms of a visual 
experience.^ Through his objections to "seeing-in"
Schier concludes that a theory of depiction does indeed 
require an explanation of pictorial experience because 
otherwise it is inadequate.
Schier's argument for pictorial experience in terms 
of Natural Generativity begins with an extraordinary 
example. He asks us to imagine a blank canvas, a "magic
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canvas", which we naturally interpret as a picture of 
Marilyn Monroe. The magic lies in the fact that there are 
no marks on the canvas but we can nevertheless interpret 
the canvas as a picture of Marilyn Monroe. It is natural 
to ask how this is possible, and Schier's answer is that 
we receive subliminal visual cues that trigger Monroe 
recognizing abilities. Schier has chosen this particular 
example to demonstrate that pictorial experience cannot 
be defined solely in terms of a visual experience.
He argues that his characterization of pictorial 
experience as illustrated by the magic canvas "lacks the 
phenomenological constraint which Wollheim's twofold 
experience model i m p o s e s . T h a t  constraint is 
"twofoldness" which Wollheim claims is a unique 
phenomenological feature of "seeing-in". It is a way of 
seeing both the configurational and recognitional aspects 
of a picture in a single visual experience. Schier thinks 
that "twofoldness" is an incoherent concept, and that, by 
itself, it cannot define pictorial experience. The magic 
canvas is a pictorial experience in which "twofoldness is 
not invoked" because the surface of the picture is not 
marked. We interpret the picture as a depiction of 
Marilyn Monroe, so that according to Natural Generativity 
it counts as pictorial.
While I would agree here that "twofoldness" is not 
necessarily invoked every time we look at a picture (and 
therefore that it is not sufficient to define pictorial
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experience), I do think that "twofoldness" is a coherent 
concept, despite Wollheim's lack of explanation as to how 
two visual experiences can come together as a single one.
Schier's example may be too far-fetched to serve as a 
decisive blow against "seeing-in", but it at least 
illustrates two important points. Firstly, "seeing-in" is 
not adequately analysed by Wollheim. The upshot of this 
is that it does not follow that "seeing-in" is a 
sufficient condition for representation. I agree with 
Schier on this point: seeing Y in X "is just a fancy way 
of saying 'P sees S as a picture of 0'".^
His runic stones example illustrates this objection.
He imagines a tribe in which the native grandsons project
an image of their grandfathers onto a runic stone, in the
same way that we might discern a face in a stain on a
wall (an example of "seeing-in"), and this amounts to
seeing the grandfather in the stone. The native grandson
does this while attending to both the runic marks and the
appearance (projected) of the grandfather. Schier claims
that this experience is not an experience of seeing a
picture or a picture of the grandfather, even if the
) ?runic marks are intended to be seen in that way.
Secondly, "seeing-in", while perhaps providing part 
of an explanation of the spectator's visual experience of 
pictures, fails to tell us what pictorial experience 
consists in. Walton supports both of these objections 
(and attempts to improve "seeing-in" with his problematic
95
make-believe theory). He acknowledges the value of
"seeing-as", but he says that
Wollheim does not fully explain what 
seeing-in amounts to....what is that 
special visual experience? What is a person 
doing when she sees a dog in a design?
Schier's argument against "seeing-in" is intended to 
justify his move away from a perceptual account of 
depiction.
Schier supports the view that a spectator's 
interpretation (and experience) of a picture can be a 
visual experience, but with an essential condition 
attached:
...a visual experience of S is a pictorial 
experience if it specifically reflects or 
shadows the perceiver's naturally generated 
interpretation of S. Without specifying the 
specific nature of a pictorial experience 
E, I have simply said that its structure 
must track the structure of the naturally 
generated interpretation of S.
Here he offers a valid description of how pictorial 
experience can be defined according to Natural 
Generativity. He refrains from describing the content of 
that experience, maintaining that it will follow the 
structure of a naturally generated interpretation. This 
is a valid point, for it is reasonable to expect that a 
spectator will respond to a particular picture in 
predictable ways. A spectator may gradually arrive at an 
interpretation, rather than immediately grasping the
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picture's meaning, so that the interpretation itself is 
an activity; one which varies depending on the spectator 
and the picture. A description of the nature of this 
experience may not be required for Schier's argument for 
Natural Generativity, but I believe that this weakens 
Natural Generativity as a theory of depiction. Wollheim, 
for example, attempts to define the nature of pictorial 
experience through "seeing-in". However, both views only 
elucidate the structure of pictorial experience, and 
therefore neglect to give a more specific explanation of 
the content of pictorial experience. Though I have 
objections to "seeing-in", we have seen that Wollheim at 
least offers some description of different kinds of 
responses to pictures. This helps to fill out just what 
is constitutive of pictorial experience.
What kind of account might Natural Generativity be 
able to give of a typical spectator's response? I will 
try to illustrate this with the following example. When 
looking at a Stubbs painting of a horse, the spectator 
possesses an underlying understanding of the object as a 
picture of a horse, provided that the spectator is 
acquainted with pictoral systems and horses. The 
interpretation of the picture as a horse is thus 
naturally generated. Because of Mechanism M and 
"Convention C", the picture is understood as depicting a 
horse which is recognizable as such because the spectator 
knows what horses look like, and what one sees in the
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picture activates one's horse-recognizing abilities.
This part of the spectator's response might not occur 
in the order I have assigned it, but what is significant 
is how such an interpretation is possible in the first 
place. My description of the spectator's response leaves 
out details about how what the spectator sees in the 
picture leads to recognizing what the images represent 
(or any other interpretative components of the overall 
response to the picture). These particular components are 
worth examining in order to show that pictorial 
experience is not simply a visual experience. It i^ a 
visual experience in the sense that under normal viewing 
conditions a spectator can only interpret and enjoy a 
picture by perceiving it. (Keen visual attention to the 
images need not be constant, I think, since imaginative 
activity in the spectator might momentarily draw him or 
her away from such perceptual curiosity).
Further extended interpretative activity might take 
place. For instance, while looking at the horse picture 
the spectator might try to guess who painted the picture 
(before referring to the nameplate) confirming this guess 
by noting the similarity in style to other Stubbs 
paintings- clean lines, glossy paint and majestic equine 
figures. Possibly, he or she notices the difference 
between, say, a Gericault painting of a horse and a 
Stubbs painting of a horse. The spectator might then move 
to the images lying behind the figure of the horse,
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asking the question, Is it a manor house or just a barn? 
This attention might change if the spectator recalls, for 
example, that the horse pictured was the sire of a 
champion. Does the figure here look like a fine 
racehorse? An image of a racetrack and galloping horses 
flashes through the spectator’s mind.
My example illustrates the various ways in which a 
spectator might respond to a particular picture. Further 
explanation of the levels of interpretation might include 
additional questions posed by the spectator about the 
content of the picture, and perhaps even further 
imaginative activity related to that content which 
enhances the appreciation of the picture.
Schier has certainly acknowledged that pictorial 
experiences vary, and he claims that at least Natural 
Generativity can account for the structure of these 
various responses. However, while Natural Generativity 
lays the foundation for understanding the nature of 
pictorial experience, it lacks a consideration of just 
what the content of that experience is. Schier apparently 
believes that it is enough to define what counts as a 
pictorial experience. What is required is an explanation 
of how we respond to pictures, for this will contribute 
fundamentally to understanding the relationship between 
pictures and the objects they represent.
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PART II
CHAPTER 5: IMAGINATION
5.1 Introduction
We use the word imagination in many ways, and 
generally understand what is meant by it. It is a 
familiar word, and we have a familiar way of thinking of 
its uses, e.g. an imaginative person, an imaginary world, 
etc. However, this familiarity can be misleading. Our 
understanding of the concept beyond common usage is not 
extensive because, though we know what it means to say 
"Ginny is imaginative", we might be challenged if asked 
to define imagination. This reveals the perhaps overused 
nature of the concept: it is used to describe anything 
which is creative, unusual, odd, eccentric, or even 
suspect. Though the meaning of the term "imagination" has 
become vague, it can be used accurately to describe a 
wide range of diverse activities and experiences. In 
philosophy, many writers refer to the concept without 
properly defining it. In aesthetics, the term is 
certainly overused, so that it has come to mean almost 
the same thing as "creative". In this chapter, I hope to 
make apparent some of the problems involved in defining 
the concept of imagination and some of the misconceptions 
about the activities which are attributed to the
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imagination. I hope that a clear and coherent notion of 
imagination will emerge, one which will provide a 
foundation for the next chapter on imagination and art.
5.2 The Uses and Activities of Imagination
"Imagination" can describe several different kinds of 
activities. To do something "with imagination" is to do 
something in a creative, inventive or original way. We 
can "imagine that" the world is flat, thereby imagining 
something which is not the case. To "imagine something" 
may be to conjure up an image of something not present to 
the senses, e.g. a place, a person's face, a future 
event, or a non-image like imagining a feeling, or "what 
it would be like to...". We can imagine things which do 
not appear to us as images, and we can imagine things 
which do not appear as visual images^ to the mind's eye. 
Imagining Desert Orchid winning a race might be to 
imagine a dapple-grey horse ridden by a jockey and 
crossing the finish line by a nose. That image might be 
visual because we might "see" the horse and the jockey 
but this imagining might also include an auditory image 
of the sound of the cheering crowd, or an olfactory image 
of the earthy smell of the racetrack. Imagining without 
images, for example, imagining how it feels to lose a 
lover might necessitate imaginatively putting oneself in 
someone else's shoes.
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Imagination can be inventive, both voluntarily and 
involuntarily. One can construct fictional worlds through 
visualizing Utopia and Paradise and imagine new 
possibilities such as pink elephants or buying a new car. 
We can also be fooled by imagination, for instance, when 
we "hear" the footsteps of an imaginary burglar coming up 
the stairs. We can be confused by imagination, as when we 
cannot tell the difference between a memory image and a 
dream image: did it really happen or was it just a dream? 
There is a relationship between dream images and memory 
images. Dream images can be classified as_ memory images 
since when remembering dreams we engage ourselves in 
recalling the images of our dreams. Even when 
experiencing dream images which simply "come to us", they 
are still images of the past, i.e. having occurred in the 
past which includes our dreams. Also, our dreams may draw 
on our memory images.
With all of these various activities in some way 
indebted to imagination's powers, how can we reach a 
reasonably unified conception of imagination? The 
complexity of its functions makes this task tedious, but 
not impossible. I will argue that we can conceive of the 
activities of imagination as closely connected, and that 
they can be organized, though not systematically, into a 
spectrum of activities.
One might suggest that the common link between 
imagination's activities is that of the images it
104
produces, a power imagination alone possesses (in 
comparison to perception and understanding). In addition, 
because sight is the sense used most often, the images we 
have are therefore most often visual images. In turn, 
therefore, we commonly think of images in terms of visual 
images. We experience visual images in the form of 
internal images like mental images or external physical 
images like pictures, photographs, etc. It is unlikely 
that external, physical images can be anything but 
visual, but mental images can be both visual and non­
visual because we have four other senses besides visual 
perception. We can have olfactory, gustatory, tactual, 
and auditory images so that one can "see" a face in the 
mind's eye, and one can imagine the smell of lavender, 
the taste of mint-chocolate, the feel of suede, and the 
pitch of a piccolo.
Imagination can be described as the faculty which 
produces images, primarily visual ones, but this is not 
the definitive feature of all of its activities. The 
problem is that there are instances of imaginative 
activity which do not include images. Alan White puts 
this point succinctly: "Imagery is confined to the 
copyable and the picturable, but imagination is not." 
Though we commonly think of imagination as responsible 
for the images we have, there are many ways in which we 
use imagination that are non-sensory. We can imagine the 
solution to a problem, and have imaginary troubles or
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pains, but we can imagine these things without images 
though certain images might accompany them. For example, 
in imagining how one could solve a problem, such as how 
to manage paying a bill, one could imagine the steps to 
be taken to pay the bill, and in so doing one might 
visualize oneself moonlighting as a dishwasher. 
Similarly, an actor might imagine having a pain in his 
leg when there is no actual pain there. These are cases 
of deliberately imagining that something is the case. We 
can also have irrational imaginings or mistaken beliefs, 
such as when a hypochondriac imagines being ill. So 
though imagination is responsible for producing both 
visual and non-visual images, whether at will or 
passively, there is also a sense in which imagination
produces imaginings which do not make use of any kind of
. 4mental imagery.
It is clear that there are diverse activities linked 
to the imagination, but seeking something they all have 
in common may be a fruitless exercise. Still, the 
activities are related, so it is my task here to arrange 
these activities into some organized group. Through this 
I hope to achieve a unified concept of imagination which 
reveals the polymorphous nature of it.~*
The activities of imagination can be placed under 
four headings. Firstly, it aids our perception and 
understanding of reality. This is properly described 
through imagination as the faculty which facilitates
106
sense perceptions. In this capacity it synthesizes sense 
perceptions into images. Though this function is 
disputed, we can at least be certain that it is 
imagination which supplies images to perception, and that 
images are essential to perceptual knowledge. Imagination 
therefore is the mediating power between sense 
perceptions and concepts. This function is defined in 
different ways by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, 
Berkeley, Hume and Kant.
Secondly, imagination is the faculty which forms 
images either at will or passively (i.e. voluntarily or 
involuntarily). This heading covers generally any kinds 
of sensory images from the basic images of sense 
perception to images we conjure up, but not including 
images which are inventive or fanciful. Passive and 
active mental images are fleeting, have duration, appear 
in little or great detail, and can be described to some 
extent. Retinal images, after-images, hallucinations, 
illusions, and dream images fall into this category.
Retinal images and after-images are strictly visual 
images and are part of visual perception itself. Every 
time we look at something an image of what we see is 
formed on the retina which is like a screen on which the 
image appears. After-images are traces of perceptions. 
They are caused by bright light bleaching the 
photopigments of the retina with the effect of a block of 
colour with some shape perhaps resembling something just
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seen.
Mistaken perceptions are also in this category of 
sensory imagination, for example, mistaking a tree in a 
field as a man waving his arms, or the optical illusion 
of seeing a stick in the water as bent.
Hallucinations, too, must be understood as related to 
both perception and to imagination. They are caused by 
abnormal neuronal discharges, and can be artificially 
induced by stimulating part of the brain.^ Visual 
hallucinations appear to the subject in physical space in 
relation to other physical objects. When a person 
experiences a visual hallucination, what is seen may look 
so real that it is accepted as the real thing.
Involuntary images of another kind are those which 
simply "come to mind". It is common to have such imagery 
while reading a story or poem, and when someone relates 
an event to us. We also "call up" images, for instance, 
we can visualize images when requested to, or when trying 
to imagine what someone or something looks like. 
Visualizing is often called "picturing" because it can be 
compared to depicting. Visualizing is not like seeing 
because it is active rather than passive.
There is a close relationship between imagination and 
memory, but they are not interchangeable nor identical 
concepts. Rather, imagination is responsible for forming 
images which are stored in the memory. Memory images are 
a kind of passive imagery. They are spontaneous and often
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we cannot even control their force and impact. In Oliver 
Sacks's book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, 
there is the case of a woman with a brain tumor which 
seemed to be the cause of an uncontrollable flow of vivid 
memories of her childhood. Though she seemed to enjoy her
o
dream-like state, she could not release herself from it.
An image of recollection (which I believe is a kind 
of memory image) is called up deliberately, so in this 
sense the images of recollection are active images.
Memory and recollection images are distinctive because 
they are related to what has been experienced in the 
past. Remembering something does not require a memory 
image, but mental images often accompany recollection, 
helping us to remember an experience more clearly.
A third aspect of imagination is its inventive 
nature. Its activities in this category rely almost 
exclusively on its active, constructive powers. It is the 
faculty which enables us to think of and contemplate 
possibilities, especially by forming images of 
possibilities. Here the imagination is primarily 
creative, fanciful, unleashed and even unruly.
Imagination in this mode is particularly suited to the 
creative activity of the artist as well as the spectator 
involved in aesthetic contemplation. (Though in this 
aesthetic role imagination is also controlled to an 
extent.) Of course, imagination here may also be the 
source of the creative power of architects, cooks,
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engineers, and scientists.
There are a number of activities which fall under 
this heading, the most prominent one being the deliberate 
creation of fantasies, imaginary worlds, imaginary 
people, imaginary encounters, etc.^ Also, images can 
excite us into action through both visualizing our 
desires and visualizing the possible consequences of our 
actions (see Aristotle in 5.3). This activity of 
imagination is significant to moral behaviour because by 
imagining ourselves in another person*s shoes, we can 
develop feelings of sympathy and empathy which might in 
turn motivate us toward benevolent actions.
But in its inventive capacity imagination can work in
ways which are counter-productive and even harmful. For
example, I might hit a person whose aggressive behaviour
made me imagine that he was about to hit me when he
actually had no such intention. The imaginings of
paranoiacs can have a detrimental effect on the
individual and others. However, the inventive imagination
can be a skill: it is something which can be sharpened
and controlled, and, as I will argue later, it is a skill
1 nwhich should be cultivated.
Fourthly, there are uses of imagination which are not 
necessarily accompanied by images. In this capacity, it 
may be passive, active or inventive, but it does not 
conjure up or manipulate images. Inventively, imagination 
finds "unexpected and useful solutions to problems of all
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kinds. We can imagine dilemmas, doubts, fears, and 
other concepts and ideas. For example, I might imagine 
the dilemma where telling the truth meant that an 
innocent person would suffer, or imagine doubting a 
scientific hypothesis, or imagine fearing all people with 
red hair, or imagine a world without cars. People and 
things are described as imaginative, such as an 
imaginative accountant or an imaginative science project. 
Here the term imagination is used to express an inventive 
ability, originality or creativity, especially at a 
conceptual level.
My brief summary of the four kinds of imagination is 
intended to organize the many uses and activities of 
imagination into some kind of order. The headings are not 
meant to limit varying interpretations of the uses: I am 
open to some uses of imagination falling under more than 
one heading and to any exceptions which might not be 
suitably described as falling into any of the four 
categories. At this stage, an examination of various 
philosophers' views of imagination will lend some 
clarification to the general types of imagination 
identified above.
5.3 Theories of Imagination in the History of Philosophy
The concept of imagination in the history of 
philosophy has been a changing one. Imagination was
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favoured by philosophers as a "magical faculty" which 
produced the images essential to synthesizing perceptions 
into a unified conception of reality. It supplied images 
to thought and memory and provided the materials for the 
most fantastic of reveries. But imagination was also in 
disrepute among philosophers. It was cast aside as the 
unruly, irrational faculty which did not give us truths 
about the world, but only fictions and inaccurate 
representations of reality. In this section, I will 
review several accounts of imagination. My task here is 
not a critical one, rather it is to gain an understanding 
of the range of activities assigned to imagination.
Plato
Plato's account of imagination-^ relegated 
imagination to a mere instrument of imitation. He equates 
the image-maker to the artist who uses images to imitate 
reality. Imitations are three times removed from the 
truth. Like the shadows in the Cave, they are only 
representations of reality and thus cannot yield truth 
about the world. Images are imperfect copies of things, 
and because artists use images, they are accused of 
presenting false appearances. There is the Form of the 
bed, the material bed, and the painted image of a bed.-^ 
Essentially, the artistic image is an appearance of an 
appearance according to Plato. Thus, only the Forms are
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truthful while artists' images are deceptive.
Plato made other, more positive observations on 
imagination, and these fall into my second category of 
imagination's activities, defined as the non-inventive 
imagination which produces images both passively and in 
the service of thought and memory. Plato distinguishes 
between images, phantasms, and mental images (though he 
does not use this terminology). Phantasms are images we 
see in nature like the reflection of a tree in a still 
pool or a face in a mirror. We also receive phantasms in 
dreams and hallucinations.
According to Plato, we use mental images to
understand concepts.-*--* (This exercise of imagination
falls into my first category.) For example, Socrates
might employ metaphorical language to paint a picture,
through speech, of some point he is trying to make. The
images we have in response to verbal descriptions aid the
listener in understanding the ideas of the speaker. In
the service of reason, images are used to convey the
appearance of things and are then discarded. Thought
identifies objects through the images formed in
perception, but the images are understood not to convey
the truth about things. Plato writes that philosophers:
...make use of and reason about visible 
figures, though they are not really 
thinking about them at all, but about the 
originals which they resemble; they are 
arguing not about the square or diagonal 
which they have drawn but about the 
absolute square or diagonal, or whatever 
the figure may be. The figures they draw
113
they treat as illustrations only, the real 
subjects of their investigation being 7 
invisible except to the eye of the mind.
In this respect, Plato assigns a role to imagination in 
acquiring knowledge, but the images are used solely as 
temporary tools or "stand-ins" for reality.
Plato also identifies a relationship between memory 
images and opinion. In Philebus (39b,c), Socrates 
expresses the sense in which the painter of the soul 
forms internal images which aid rational thought. In 
making opinions Plato claims that we refer to past images 
retained by the memory. If these images provide an 
accurate record of past events our opinions are likely to 
be true, but memory can fail us, turning out false images 
which lead to false opinions. Once again, Plato contends 
that images can lead us away from the truth.
Aristotle
Aristotle raises imagination to a worthy place in 
both art and knowledge. Though imagination is not central 
to his aesthetic theory, imitation is regarded as a 
positive idea, so that artistic images are valued. They 
are valued because they express the true nature of things 
rather than being far from the truth.
For Aristotle, images put reason in contact with the 
sensible world. Unlike Platonic images, they have a
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central use in leading us to truth for they are not
1 9considered to be worthless copies of it. We can clearly
translate Aristotle's views on imagination from his
20discussion of phantasma and phantasia.
The role of imagination as a mediator between
perception and understanding is recognized by Aristotle.
Firstly, phantasia occurs in ordinary perception. By this
he means that in all perception we receive images (a view
echoed by later philosophers). In De Anima (428b)
Aristotle uses an example of the sun: "For instance, the
sun appears to be a foot across. Yet we are convinced
that it is greater than the inhabited world." The
appearance supplied by phantasia is of a small, bright,
round sun in the sky. This illustrates how appearances
accompany perception. However, Aristotle notes that
phantasia is not equivalent to perception because
phantasia operates when our eyes are shut, when dreaming,
and it can be false, while perceptions are always 
21veridical. Phantasia, when it accompanies perception, 
belongs to my first category of the activities of 
imagination since in this role it contributes to our 
interpretation of reality. Aristotle does not employ 
phantasia as the key to interpreting reality, rather it 
is one of the mental powers which make knowledge 
possible. It is present in perception and integral to 
thought. In fact, Aristotle believes that phantasia is 
essential to thought because it provides the material we
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use in thought. White clarifies the relationship between
phantasia, perception and thought:
Though phantasia is... different from 
either perception or thought, it is linked 
to them both in that it implies perception 
and is implied by thought.
Literally, Aristotle defines imagination as "a movement
9 q
coming about from the activity of sense-perception.
Here, the activities of imagination identified by 
Aristotle raise the question of the role of phantasmata. 
They are the products of phantasia and are the mental 
entities which accompany perception and thought. They 
occur (corresponding to my second category of 
imagination) in illusions; illness (probably 
hallucinations); and in moments of extreme emotion such 
as fear.^ Phantasmata can take the form of after-
o 5
images. We experience dream-like images in the time
just before falling asleep and when waking up. In
sleeping itself the dream-images we have are products of
phantasia. Interestingly, Aristotle identifies
phantasmata as responsible for the things we do when 
? 7sleepwalking.
Phantasmata play a role in memory and recollection 
for Aristotle. Though memory is distinct from phantasia,
O O
it requires phantasmata. Like thought, memory cannot
O Q
function without images. It acts as a storehouse for
or)
images but remains distinct from imagination. 
Recollection is distinct from memory because unlike the
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passive nature of memory images coming to us,
recollection is searching for an image, for Aristotle, it
q 1
is the search for a phantasma*
Aristotle*s main contribution to the uses of 
imagination is his emphasis on phantasia1s capacity to 
move us to action. In combination with desire, phantasia
o o
is responsible for animal locomotion. Because phantasia 
produces images of desirable or repellent things, the 
future, etc., based on these phantasmata we can regulate 
our behaviour to avoid what we see as a possible outcome
o o
of our actions. The human ability to deliberate and to 
act prudently relies on the images we have of things we 
fear or desire. This exercise of imagination accords with 
the third category in which we use it to envisage 
possibilities.
Aristotle also connects phantasia with pleasure. When 
thinking about certain things like memories, hopes, 
friendship and revenge, the phantasmata which accompany
Q /
such thoughts give rise to the pleasure we feel.
Aristotle does not refer to phantasia as inventive 
nor does he refer to individuals being especially prone 
to using phantasia (as in someone "being imaginative"). 
He does account for the active use of phantasia for 
example when we use phantasmata to deliberate before 
actions, or perhaps in trying to remember a past event, 
but he does not discuss the use of imagination in 
constructing fantasies, though he does recognize the
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usefulness of visualizing in the poet's creative 
activity.^ In Rhetoric, Aristotle points to the role of 
phantasia in setting a scene ‘'before the eyes" of an 
audience of tragedy00 or reader of poetry.
Aristotle's views are echoed to greater or lesser 
extent in Aquinas, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, 
Hume and Kant. Some of these philosophers are more 
sympathetic to the usefulness of imagination and some 
less so.
Aquinas
Aquinas assigns imagination the intermediary role 
between the data of sense and concepts for understanding, 
but the highlight of his discussion of imagination is his 
view of the creative imagination.
For Aquinas, phantasia or imaginatio (imagination) is 
one of four internal powers, and it is essential to the 
intellect since the acquisition of knowledge depends on 
the "material" of sense perceptions and imagination: 
"...it is impossible for our intellect to perform any 
actual exercise of understanding...except by attending to 
phantasms. The senses are the starting point of 
knowledge for Aquinas, but imagination is required to 
synthesize sense experience into the universal concepts 
which constitute knowledge. This synthesizing function is 
defined as turning the material of sense experience into
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images which are stored in the imagination. From these 
images the universal concepts of knowledge are abstracted
o Q
by the "agent intellect". Imagination is thus necessary
for interpreting reality, but also for thought and
reflection. (However, this is not to say that Aquinas
held that all thought is accompanied by images.)
Anyone can experience in himself that when 
he tries to understand something he forms 
for himself some images by way of examples 
in which he can see, as it were, what he 
is trying to understand.
Images take on religious importance for Aquinas 
because they are integral to understanding incorporeal 
bodies. Since there are no images of incorporeal bodies, 
we imagine them through images of real things (of which 
we can have images).^
Imagination is also active. This is perhaps Aquinas*s 
most astute observation; that imagination collects, 
modifies and combines its images. Umberto Eco calls it a 
"free rearranging of the elements of experience".^  
Imagination forms and plays with images, images of things 
which may not have come from perceptions. Because this 
ability to manipulate images can be likened to an 
inventiveness, it falls into the third category of 
imaginative activities.
Aquinas*s ideas on imagination are applied to his 
aesthetic theory of the creative imagination. The active 
character of the imagination is put to use in artistic
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creation, thus our creative capacity stems from the
imagination *s ability to manipulate images. Like nature,
artistic creativity is a process of combining things,
presumably images. By playing with images, an artist
arrives at something which matches his or her conception.
The artist can even produce something which is not found
in nature. For a model, the artist has only the image in
his or her mind to follow.^
Aquinas, like his contemporaries, is observant of the
possible perversion of the constructive power of the
imagination.
There are intellectual habits by which a 
man is prompted rightly to judge of the 
presentation of imagination (imaginatio).
When he ceases from the use of intellectual 
habit, extraneous imaginations arise, and 
occasionally some even of a contradictory 
tendency, so that unless by the use of the 
intellectual habit these are cut down or 
repressed the man is rendered less fit to 
form a right judgement.
But in spite of this, Aquinas moves us forward in terms 
of giving imagination a non-imitative role. He makes 
progress on Aristotle*s notion of imagination by 
expounding its creative powers.
Hobbes
Hobbes*s theory of imagination, while similar to 
Aristotle*s in pinning down the relationship between 
images and sensory perception and images and thought,
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extends beyond the passive imagination to the inventive 
activity of imagination and, like Aquinas, Hobbes 
recognizes the role of imagination in the experience of 
art.
For Hobbes, images are formed from sense impressions. 
After looking at something, and if the object is removed 
from before the eyes, an impression of it remains. This 
impression is the image formed by imagination (through 
sense perception).^  As time passes, images become weaker 
and faded, hence he calls imagination the "decaying 
sense". Faded, decaying images signify memory images, but 
Hobbes makes almost no distinction between imagination 
and memory. He says, "...Imagination and memory, are but 
one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers 
n a m e s . I n  this sense, imagination and memory are one 
and the same thing because all images, memory images as 
well as fresher images, reside in imagination. So the 
images of the past which are stored in the imagination 
differ from present images in their quality. He is not 
comparing the quality of images to the objects they 
represent, rather he is comparing new and old images, as 
it were. Memory of several things is called Experience by 
Hobbes . ^
Hobbes contrasts "Simple Imagination" with 
"Compounded Imagination", the imaginative activity of 
bringing several images together to yield a concept. He 
uses the example of bringing together the images of a man
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and a horse to form the concept of a centaur. The 
"Compounded Imagination" makes it possible to imagine 
non-existent things like centaurs, and to imagine oneself
AO
as, e.g. Hercules. Hobbes, like Aristotle, describes 
the kinds of images we have in different circumstances.
On after-images, he describes the images of the sun we 
can "see" after looking at it, and the geometric lines 
and angles that we can still "see" after staring at 
geometrical figures.^
In Leviathan, Hobbes writes four or five paragraphs 
on dreams and their images. Dreaming is defined as 
imaginings that take place during sleep. The content of 
our dreams necessarily come from sense perceptions and 
memory because we retain images through both, but 
imagination is not active during sleep because all of our 
organs of sense "are so benummed in sleep". ^  Since the 
senses are inactive in sleep, "a Dreame must needs to be 
more cleare, in this silence of sense, than our waking 
thoughts." The vivacity of dream-images causes us to 
sometimes confuse sleep with being awake (though when 
awake we can be sure that we are not dreaming according 
to H o b b e s ) . I n  fact, the images of dreams and 
hallucinations can have a stronger and more vivid 
presence than the objects themselves. * They can cause us 
to shriek in horror, and based on the images of something 
we desire or hate, we may take drastic actions. Thus, 
what we take from reality and turn into images can affect
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us like reality itself, and images have the power to 
cause more extreme behaviour than reality ever could.
Hobbes's view captures the sense in which images are 
new and different representations of reality, not copies 
of it. This marks a departure from theories of 
imagination before Hobbes which place images at the level 
of imitations of reality or surrogates for reality. So 
images for Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas do not affect us 
except as copies of real things.
We have observed imagination in Hobbes's views as 
integrated in sense perception, in memory, and in the 
kinds of passive sensory images we have in the form of 
after-images, hallucinations, and dreams. How are images 
related to thought in Hobbes's theory of imagination?
Hobbes uses thought and imagination interchangeably.
Images in succession are called a "Trayne of
Imaginations" which in turn is called a "Trayne of
Thoughts", or, "Mentall Discourse". He clearly identifies
images with thoughts:
All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques 
of those made in the Sense: And those 
motions that immediately succeeded one 
another in the sense, continue also 
together after Sense. ^
So images do not accompany thoughts, they constitute 
thoughts.
Hobbes distinguishes between "unguided" and 
"regulated" thought. The meaning is clear from his names
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for the two kinds of thought: "unguided thought", being
the passive images we receive in day-dreaming or dreaming
in sleep, and "regulated" thought, being the passive and
active images we have from desire (i.e. images of some
desire, or of the means to achieve some desire). He makes
the distinction as follows:
The Trayne of regulated Thoughts is of two 
kinds; One, when of an effect imagined, wee 
seek the causes, or means that produce it: 
and this is common to Man and Beast. The 
other is when imagining anything 
whatsoever, wee seek all the possible 
effects, that can by it be produced; that 
is to say, we imaginet-what we can do with 
it, when wee have it.
The active sense of "regulated" thought is described as:
...nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of 
Invention...a hunting out of the causes, 
of some effect, present or past; or of the 
effects, of some present or past cause.
Here Hobbes points to the inventive power of 
imagination; its power to envisage possibilities. He also 
discusses how thoughts and images facilitate having 
recollections. And, like Aristotle, he recognizes the 
ethical function of imagination: the power to provide 
images of the consequences of our actions. He calls these 
thoughts "Foresight", "Prudence", "Providence", and 
sometimes, "Wisdome".^
The role of imagination in creativity and in the 
pleasure taken in reading literature is recognized in 
brief moments by Hobbes. The artist is able to put things
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before our eyes, and it is both the images of tragedy and 
of literature that move us to emotion: "For not truth, 
but image maketh passion; and a tragedy affecteth no less 
than a murder if well acted.
Hobbes gives prominence to the powers of imagination. 
It provides us with images after our sense perceptions of 
the world; it is the stuff of our thoughts; and it 
enables us to be inventive both in thinking of 
possibilities for our own actions, and for the ideas
CO
behind great moments in history.
Descartes
Descartes recognizes the passive and active powers of 
imagination. It is one of our three faculties which are 
understanding, imagination, and sense, so in this 
capacity, imagination functions as the faculty that forms 
images. However, it does not occupy a central place in 
Descartes*s thought because he claims that it is prone to 
error and that it depends on the understanding for any 
contribution it makes to knowledge. While understanding 
can form concepts independently of imagination and can 
formulate concepts of universals, imagination is limited 
to particulars, that is, images of particular objects . ^  
Descartes hints at a connection between what he calls 
"ideas" and mental images. "Idea" means something like 
both an operation or act of the mind and the object or
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60content of an operation or act of the mind. He clearly 
rejects Hobbes's claim that images constitute thought and 
though he sometimes uses the term "idea" synonymously 
with "thought", he says that ideas are modes and forms of 
thought.^ Ideas, then, are not equivalent to thoughts
c. o
but the operations of imagination belong to thought. He 
says, "Of my thoughts, some are, so to speak, images of 
things, and to these alone is the title "idea" properly 
applied"^, but he is unclear as to whether or not 
"ideas" mean the same as images. He clearly states that 
ideas are not the same as cerebral images (pictures in 
the brain), but it does not follow from this that ideas 
cannot be mental images. However, he rejects Hobbes's 
view that our mental images resemble the real objects to 
which they correspond.^ Anthony Kenny tackles the 
ambiguity in Descartes, concluding that
...his ideas have some of the properties of 
material pictures, some of the properties 
of mental images and some of the properties 
of concepts." ^
Whereas images are significant to thought in
Aristotle, Aquinas and Hobbes, for Descartes images
sometimes aid understanding but can fail to be of service
to it because imagination often gives us untrue and poor
66copies of reality or images of fantastic things. Though 
in this respect Descartes recognizes the fanciful 
imagination, he is disparaging of this capacity because 
its images have little or nothing to do with truth or
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knowledge.
Descartes also observes that reading literature 
causes us to conjure up images of fantastic things, and
r ~j
that painters have particularly inventive imaginations. 
But he sees the proper function of imagination as that 
which produces the passive images of illusions, 
daydreams, dreams, moments of intense emotion and sense 
perceptions, rather than its active or inventive roles, 
though he acknowledges its capacity to construct
CO
images. Descartes is therefore unsympathetic to 
imagination *s creative powers, and his account represents 
a step backward from the views of Aquinas and Hobbes.
Berkeley
For Berkeley, reality exists for us only through our 
perception of it. When we perceive objects, we have ideas 
of sense which are objects of the mind. These ideas are 
objects "actually imprinted on the senses"; or "perceived 
by attending to the passions and operations of the mind"; 
or "ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination, 
either compounding, dividing, or barely representing 
those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways."^
There are other kinds of ideas, however, which are not 
given immediately through the senses. They are thoughts, 
passions, and ideas formed in the imagination.^
What is the relationship, then, between ideas of
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sense and other kinds of ideas? Berkeley at least says
that "...Ideas of imagination are images of & proceed
71
from the Ideas of S e n s e . " ;  and "Ideas of Sense are the 
Real things or Archetypes. Ideas of Imagination, Dreams
7 9
etc. are copies, images of these." What he means by the 
distinction is this: sense-ideas are what we call things, 
because they "have more reality in them" but they also, 
in a way, exist in the mind since they are perceived by 
it.73
By contrast, the ideas of imagination are faint, 
weak, unsteady, less vivid, less regular, and less 
constant than the ideas of sense. Ideas of sense have no 
dependence on the will, nor are they randomly excited, 
and they are "more affecting, orderly and distinct";
"more strong, lively" than ideas of the imagination.^ 
Furthermore, ideas of imagination are "raised up" in us 
by our minds while ideas of sense are imprinted on our 
minds by God.^
Berkeley also discusses the way in which we can tell 
the difference between the ideas of dreams and ideas of 
sense. The "visions" that come to us in dreams are "dim, 
irregular, and confused" and because they do not occur in 
real time, i.e. preceding or proceeding real actions,
7 fithey are easily distinguishable from sense experience.
Both sense ideas and ideas of imagination seem to 
take the form of images, and sense ideas can be pictures, 
namely, the "pictures" we have in visual perception.^ In
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addition to images which derive from sense-ideas,
Berkeley recognizes the constructive power of imagination 
which forms new images by "compounding** and "dividing"
70
ideas we already have. Finally, Berkeley attributes a
fanciful capacity to imagination. He observes that
imagination has the power to conjure up images of both
79real and fantastic things. 7
Because Berkeley distinguishes between ideas or 
images of sense and those of imagination, the former do 
not properly belong to imagination. Thus, according to 
his account of imagination, such ideas would not even 
fall into my first category. The ideas of imagination and 
dreams, however, do fall into my second and third 
categories. It is difficult to evaluate the importance of 
imagination for Berkeley since he separates imagination *s 
ideas from perception, but his account certainly lacks 
the disparaging tone of Descartes*s, and therefore we 
might assume that Berkeley is not critical of 
imagination’s creative and inventive powers.
Hume
Hume’s theory is the most thorough of the pre-Kantian 
theories of imagination. Like many of them, it says 
little of the creative or artistic imagination, but he 
gives a thorough account of imagination as a mediator 
between sense and knowledge, and as the image-making
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faculty which forms ideas from sense-impressions•
Like Berkeley, Hume distinguishes between ideas of
sense and ideas of imagination and thought. He calls the
former, "impressions" and the latter "ideas"; the
difference between the two being one of degree (a
difference also observed by Berkeley).
Those perceptions which enter with 
the most force and violence we may 
name impressions; and under this name 
I comprehend all our sensations, passions 
and emotions, as they make their first
appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean
the faint images of these in thinking and 
reasoning. u
Images, according to Hume, are weaker and less vivid 
copies of the real objects we perceive. This point, which
is one entertained by many pre-Humean views, is suspect
because images, though often representational of reality 
and resembling real objects, appear to us as having their 
own individuality. Against Hume, we know that many images 
we have can be more vivid than reality thus having a 
stronger effect than the real things they represent. So, 
ideas are defined as images, images which are important 
to our understanding of the world.
Imagination operates according to three principles: 
resemblance, contiguity in time and space, and causal 
connection. The ideas that are formed through imaginative 
activity are particulars and universals. Therefore, 
through images we can have both an idea of a particular 
cat and the universal idea of cat. When we see
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resemblances between things, we can match the image to 
the idea of it.
Contiguity and causal connection are related by Hume 
to imagination1s fundamental power to retain images. Our 
belief in the continuous existence of objects and their 
existence independent of ourselves seems to depend on 
imagination’s powers. Were it not for the image of a cat 
we could not hold the concept in memory, which acts as a 
reference point when the real cat is absent. Imagination 
connects experiences together causally, and with the help 
of memory, identifies objects, orders images of them, and
O 1
unifies experience with its images.
Furthermore, memory and imagination work side by side 
in the ordering and unifying of experience. Memory orders 
ideas in time (and space) according to the order in which 
the sense-impressions were received. Imagination 
contributes to this ordering by unifying the ideas using 
the three principles of resemblance, contiguity, and 
causal connection. Imagination turns present sense- 
impressions into ideas, and memory serves to fill in the 
gaps by providing memory ideas, i.e. calling up past,
o o
vivid images. A
Thus, Hume makes images central to understanding; in 
fact, as White points out, he often equates the mind with 
imagination, but Hume does try to distinguish memory, 
reason, understanding and imagination in a narrower
o o
sense. J The other functions of the mind are dependent on
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the images which come from sense-impressions.
The clearest difference noted by Hume is 
imagination's potential waywardness.^ It can be, 
surprisingly, both rational and fanciful, since Hume 
makes no distinction between imagination and fancy. 
Imagination can also be inventive, creating fictions and
O C
fantasies.
Finally, a most important use of imagination for Hume 
is its role in our ability to feel sympathy and pity for 
others.
As we ourselves are here acquainted with 
the wretched situation of the person, it 
gives us a lively idea and sensation of 
sorrow....A contrast of any kind never 
fails to affect the imagination, especially 
when presented by the subject; and it is on 
the imagination that pity entirely 
depends.
Hume's account of imagination mediates between a 
positive and negative analysis of its powers. On the one 
hand, images play an essential role in our understanding 
of reality. On the other hand, he recognizes 
imagination's creative and inventive potential, in spite 
of the frivolity of this mode.
Kant
Kant's analysis of imagination reflects the other 
theories of imagination examined here, but he adjusts the 
concept for his own system. Imagination is the
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"Einbildungskraft", the maker of images or pictures of
things. It is also a "faculty of a priori synthesis":
By its means we bring the manifold of 
intuition on the one side, into connection 
with the condition of the necessary unity 
of pure apperception on the other. The two 
extremes, namely sensibility and 
understanding, must stand in necessary 
connection with each other through the 
mediation of this transcendental function 
of imagination, because otherwise the 
former, though indeed yielding appearances, 
would supply no objects of empirical 
knowledge, and consequently no 
experience. ° '
In this transcendental mode, the imagination is 
productive. While not a different faculty, but rather a 
different function of imagination, the empirical or 
reproductive imagination is active and constructive. The 
empirical imagination’s task is to identify objects 
(through images) as of a certain type. These images form 
a series according to a rule ("schema"). Kant calls this 
the "association of representations". So it appears that 
the empirical imagination is involved more in the 
ordering of images rather than in synthesizing
Q O
perceptions into images for the intellect. Imagination, 
in both of these functions, lies between sense experience 
and the intellect, and differs from them in its power to 
construct images of experience.
Some interpretations of Kant's analysis are 
misleading because they attribute the Humean role of gap- 
bridger and unifier of sense and knowledge to Kant's
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concept of imagination. In the Subjective Deduction of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant calls imagination a 
faculty which has the power to construct experience in 
conjunction with the powers of sense and intuition. But 
as Schaper points out, Kant already identifies three 
faculties- sense, understanding, and reason which leaves 
no room for imagination as a separate faculty. This is 
the clue which, along with the evidence that Kant omitted 
the Subjective Deduction from his second, revised edition 
of the Critique of Pure Reason, shows that imagination is
O Q
not a separate faculty working alongside the others. 7 
Imagination is not the image-making power which 
constructs ideas out of the impressions of external 
objects. It is involved in concept-application and the 
recognition and recollection of separate experiences but 
imagination is not a presupposition of experience.
Kant's analysis, without being entirely clear on the 
function of imagination, succeeds where Hume's analysis 
fails. Imagination for Hume plays a role in 
distinguishing between objective and subjective 
experience. It functions as the interpreter, through its 
images, of immediate experience. The problem in Hume's 
account lies in his description of the difference between 
experience of real objects and images of them as one of 
degree (vivacity and liveliness). This analysis of images 
is incoherent so his distinction between objective and
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subjective experience is unsuccessful. Schaper points out
how Kant's analysis corrects Hume:
...if a role for imagination in the 
analysis of the presuppositions of 
experience is to be found in the 
recognition of objects, and of an object as 
being of a certain kind, as the identity 
condition requires, thought or 
experience of such particulars cannot be 
constituted by experiences filled out or 
supplementedQby images formed in the 
imagination.
Kant in particular brings out myriad uses of 
imagination in both non-aesthetic and aesthetic 
experience. The creative power of imagination in relation 
to the aesthetic is discussed at length in the Critique 
of Judgement. Sparshott reflects this well when he says 
that in Kant "Imagination is exercised everywhere... but 
in the fine arts its exercise is as it were celebrated
Q1
and emphasized." I will address Kant's work in this 
area in more depth in Chapter 6.
Sartre
The theories of imagination of Sartre, Ryle and 
Wittgenstein diverge from the preceding theories 
discussed because, for them, imagination does not consist 
in the production of images as mental entities. They do 
not interpret mental images as pictures in the mind's 
eye, mental copies of perceptions or sensations, and 
though they do not reject the notion of pictorial
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imagery, they emphasize that mental imagery need not be
QO
pictorial.
Sartre, Ryle, and Wittgenstein consider imagination 
in significantly different ways, but they do have in 
common a shift from imagination as the essential faculty 
for synthesizing perceptions into ideas to imagination as 
a secondary mental process with specific uses which does 
not provide first-hand information about reality. Thus 
their accounts mainly identify the uses of imagination 
assigned to my second, third, and fourth categories.
In the Psychology of Imagination (1940), Sartre 
observes that images are not equivalent to thoughts nor 
do images accompany thoughts, but they are a subclass of
Q  O
thoughts. J His starting point differs in this way from
earlier philosophers: imagination does not go hand in
hand with thought, nor is it the same as thought. This
appraoch contrasts imagination with perception. He asks
how "seeing" objects of imagination is like or unlike
94seeing objects in the external world. In this way 
Sartre focuses on the visual imagination rather than on 
its non-sensory activities such as "doing something with 
imagination".
Though he rejects the notion of mental images as "a 
detached bit, a piece of the real world"^, he discusses 
kinds of mental images like voluntary or involuntary 
imagery of people, places, etc. These images are not 
copies of perceptions but constitute an imaginative
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consciousness of things. He calls the identification of 
images with copies of perceptions the "illusion of 
immanence" and refers specifically to Hume in this 
respect.^ Hume's misconception of images is explained as 
follows:
The fact of the matter is that the 
expression 'mental image' is confusing.
It would be better to say 'the 
consciousness of Peter as an image' or 
'the imaginative consciousness of 
Peter'....The imaginative consciousness I 
have of Peter is not a consciousness of the 
image of Peter: Peter is directly reached; 
my attention is not directed on an image, 
but on an object.
Sartre wants to revise our notion of image from a mental
image to a form of consciousness. He calls imagination
the "image function" of consciousness.^ For Sartre,
mental images are therefore related to perceptions while
not being mental copies of them. In fact, they are
defined as:
...an act that is directed towards an 
absent or non-existent object, as if it 
were an actual body, by means of a physical 
or mental content, but which appears only 
through an "analogical representative" of 
the pursued object.
Furthermore, he points out that the images of imaginative 
consciousness are not seen or perceived in the way that 
the physical images of pictures are, and they are not 
located in space. Sartre explains the nature of mental 
images through a discussion of the "material" (i.e. 
perception of the object) of mental images where he uses
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an analogy to physical images to clarify his point.
Physical images, like the images of paintings, are 
called "quasi-images", hence, "The material of a portrait 
is a quasi-face."100 These remarks are made when he 
describes the process which occurs when looking at a 
portrait (of Peter), and how we contemplate the quasi­
image (of Peter) using our mental image (of Peter) for 
1 01comparison. Here, Sartre reveals the differences 
between seeing Peter, seeing a portrait of Peter, and 
having an imaginative consciousness of Peter.
We can tell whether or not the portrait is a good
likeness of Peter through a process which seems to be
something like "seeing-as".
This quasi-face is moreover accessible to 
observation: naturally I do not refer the 
new qualities I see in it to the object I 
am looking at, to this painted canvas. I 
project them far beyond the picture, on the 
true Peter....When I say fPeterfs eyes are 
blue1, I imply: ’provided this painting 
represents him at all faithfully*. ^
Sartre points out that in perception ("perceptual 
consciousness") we can only see specific, individual 
"instances" of Peter either as himself or in the physical 
image of a portrait, but that our mental images can 
represent Peter generally. In other words, mental images 
can show us Peter in different ways, for example with a 
sunburn, but the particular image of Peter with a hat on 
might be the mental image I always have when I think of 
him. The mental image of Peter with a hat on can
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therefore be how I represent him generally to myself (my 
example)•
What changes in the process of turning the material
of the perception of the object into imaginative
consciousness is the material itself. Sartre says:
As the imaginative consciousness rises in 
degree, the material becomes increasingly 
impoverished....This means that there is 
an essential poverty in the material of the 
image, namely, that the object intentioned 
through the material grows in 
generality
For Sartre, mental images are not mental objects, but 
we do have them, and use them at will (as in the Peter 
example) or in any kind of visualizing. However, we 
cannot know anything true about them, since introspection 
in his view is fruitless because of the nature of 
imaginative consciousness. Mental images are not like the 
real things they are related to through perception, 
rather they are a consciousness themselves.
Ryle
Ryle discusses his views on imagination in The 
Concept of Mind (1949) and On Thinking (1979). I will 
concentrate on the first text, though it must be noted 
that he revises his views in On Thinking mainly by 
downplaying the connection between imagination and make- 
believe, and by emphasizing the inventive imagination.
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Like Sartre, Ryle concentrates on the visual 
imagination. He, too, denies introspection as a useful 
method for probing the nature of mental images, primarily 
because mental images are not mental objects which we can 
see, hear, taste, smell, or touch. Ryle makes some astute 
observations on how we do not experience mental images. 
Firstly, he contrasts seeing and visualizing, remarking 
that we can only see when our eyes are open and when 
there is l i g h t . W i t h  this point he eliminates the 
possibility of seeing any visual mental images we have 
when our eyes are shut- the after-images of closed 
eyelids, the dream images of sleep, and any constructed 
mental images we have when we close our eyes. Secondly, 
"seeing'1 is not a species of seeing, nor is "hearing" a 
scream in a dream a kind of hearing a real scream. 
"Seeing", "hearing", "smelling", "tasting", and "feeling" 
mental images are not real sensations of any sort. They 
are not sensations at all because mental images are not 
real things. Therefore, experiencing mental images is not 
the same as having ordinary perceptions of real objects.
The main problem in his discussion of imagination in
The Concept of Mind is his view of imagination as make-
believe. He holds that imagining is a kind of pretending,
as illustrated in his definition of imagination:
There is no special faculty of Imagination, 
occupying itself single-handedly in fancied 
viewings and hearings. On the contrary,
'seeing' things is one exercise of the 
imagination, growling somewhat like a bear 
is another; smelling things in the mind's
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nose is an uncommon act of fancy, - 
malingering is a very common one...
He also says, "There is not much difference between a
child playing at being a pirate, and one fancying that he
is a pirate."107
I agree with White who argues that Ryle is wrong on
this point (see Chapter 17 in his The Language of
Imagination). There are similarities and differences
between imagining and pretending, but they are very
different activities. The main difference is that in
pretending, for example, to be Blackbeard, we are acting
in ways we think pirates do, whereas in imagining to be
Blackbeard, we imagine what it is like to be a pirate and
we may have imagery of a pirate. Imagining may be part of
the activity of pretending, but it is not necessary to
pretending nor is pretending necessary to imagining.
Imagining what it is like to be Blackbeard may be helpful
to someone who pretends to be Blackbeard, but one can
wear the costume and act the part with no imaginative
activity before or during the act of pretending.
Imagining and pretending can be voluntary activities;
however, imagining can be involuntary while pretending is
always a deliberate activity, usually with some purpose
behind it. Pretending is always a kind of performance and
is itself a performance, while imagining is not a 
1 08performance. Imagination cannot always be controlled, 
while pretending, because it is deliberate, can be
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c o n t r o l l e d , P u t  another way, imagination can "run 
away with us". We can get carried away when pretending, 
but under normal conditions, we control our actions.
The main similarity is that both imagining and 
pretending have to do with the unreal. The activities of 
both involve conjuring up, acting, and engaging in 
things, people, and places which are often not real. 
Since I cannot be Blackbeard the pirate, I can at least 
try to look and act as he would. This similarity may be 
behind Ryle*s close association of the two activities.
In On Thinking, Ryle revises his view of that 
association in his chapter on thinking and imagination. 
He argues that thinking and imagination should not be 
contrasted as if imagination necessarily operates 
separately from thinking. The tendency to separate the 
two is rooted in the classification of imagination and 
intellect as two different faculties. Ryle aims to close 
the gap between the two while not making imagination a 
species of thinking.
To illustrate his argument, Ryle compares the 
intellectual projects of novelists, historians, and 
scientists. He maintains that what they do involves a 
collaboratory effort between imagination and thinking. 
For example, a historian can portray Napoleon*s battles 
in accurate detail, but tell the story of his battles in 
an imaginative way, e.g. by not just reporting facts but 
by using metaphorical language to communicate facts.
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Likewise, a scientist uses his scientific knowledge to
create an invention, but such creation requires
originality, innovation, exploration, and
resourcefulness. Ryle therefore stresses the creative
power of imagination and its active role with thought in
112both scientific and artistic enterprises. He seems to
have almost entirely dispensed with his definition of
imagination as make-believe.
But imaginativeness is not more of a 
necessity for make-believe than it is for 
advancing knowledge, or winning a campaign, 
or writing a history.
Ryle*s later remarks on imagination show that it is 
not a mysterious faculty; it has a particular role to 
play alongside our other mental powers.
Wittgenstein
Though Wittgenstein remarks on some of the ways in 
which we use imagination, he is interested in the concept 
from this point of view, "One ought to ask, not what 
images are or what happens when one imagines anything, 
but how the word imagination is used."-^^ He is 
particularly struck by the fact that we use the same 
language to talk about our mental images that we use to 
talk about the objects they correspond to. He asks, "How 
do we compare images?"^^; and "How do I know from my 
image, what the colour really looks like?"^^^ He also
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asks us to consider certain questions related to 
imagination, like, ,M What does a correct image of this 
colour look like?" and, "What sort of thing is it [an 
image]?"; Can I learn from this [image]?*H7 We can 
describe our images and are often doing so when 
describing our mental picture of something to someone. In 
this way Wittgenstein says that we communicate what we 
imagine so that someone can understand what something 
looks like, e.g. in describing the mental picture of a
I 1 Q
room. xo Wittgenstein suggests that there is a difference 
between "seeing" and seeing when he says that having a 
mental image of the colour red is not the same as seeing 
red in front of us.
Are mental images pictorial according to 
Wittgenstein? Sometimes our mental images are pictorial, 
but against the pictorial nature of some mental images he 
says, "An image is not a picture, but a picture can 
correspond to it."^^; and * "The image must be more like
1 9 0
its object than any picture." His view seems to be 
that mental images resemble the real things they 
correspond to but they do not necessarily resemble 
pictures of the real things they correspond to. There 
can, of course, be some kind of resemblance, e.g. the 
four-leggedness of a horse, in all three kinds of 
representations, but Wittgenstein is clear that the 
mental image does not function like a physical picture. 
The mental image, the real thing, and a picture of the
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real thing are distinguishable: "Thus one might come to
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regard the image as a super-likeness." x However, he
contrasts the experience of a meaning with that of a
mental image, concluding that the content of the
experience of imagining, "...is a picture, or a
description."122 argUes that
The concept of the 'inner picture* is 
misleading, for this concept uses the 
'outer picture' as a model; and yet 
the uses of the words for these concepts 
are no more like one another than the 
uses of 'numeral' and 'number*.
He warns against introspection: "Do not try to analyse
your own inner experience."124
We can conclude from his remarks that mental images
can be both pictorial and descriptive. This is
illustrated when he says that we can imagine an animal
19 5angry, frightened, unhappy, or startled. This captures
the possibility of pictorial or descriptive imagery. I
can visualize a startled deer, or I can imagine that a
deer is startled.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I refer to Wittgenstein's
discussion of "seeing-as". To review, he connects
imagination to "seeing-as" in this way:
The concept of an aspect is akin to the 
concept of an image. In other words: the
concept 'I am now seeing it as....' is
akin to 'I am now having this image.
"Seeing-as" is described as seeing which demands 
imagination, and "seeing-as" and imagination are subject
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1 27to the will. ' In this context, he may mean something 
like "hearing as" when he remarks that it takes 
imagination to hear "...something as a variation on a 
particular theme."128 gg certain kinds of sensory 
activities use the imagination. He also notes that we can 
do sums in the imagination-1- that we call up images of 
people we knowXJ ; and that we can visualize: "I could 
easily imagine the kind of thing such a picture would 
[show] us."^-*-
Wittgenstein refers to our non-sensory imaginative 
powers. Scattered throughout Philosophical Investigations 
are requests to imagine possibilities: "Imagine a 
language with two different words for negation." ; "We
can imagine human beings with a 'more primitive*
logic. "132 . an(j "imagine this case. .
He does not make any references to imagination as
especially inventive or fanciful, though imagination can 
be inventive for Wittgenstein in the sense that we use it 
to think of possibilities.
5.4 The Spectrum Model
The previous section has provided an overview of 
various philosophers' ideas of imagination throughout the 
history of philosophy. I have deliberately refrained from 
extended critical analysis of these views since my 
intention here has not been to show the merits of one
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view over another but to illuminate the variety of 
activities of imagination and to illustrate how different 
philosophers have recognized and designated these 
activities.
We have seen that discussion on the topic of non- 
aesthetic imagination has shifted from its image- 
producing and epistemological functions in theories prior 
to Ryle, to a fundamental rethinking of the question,
What is it to imagine? Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, 
Berkeley, Hume and Kant recognize some kind of essential 
role for imagination in the synthesis of sense-experience 
into ideas for thought and understanding. All of the 
philosophers reviewed here acknowledge the passive and 
active powers of imagination which are responsible for 
illusions, dreams, hallucinations, after-images, images 
which "come to mind", visualizing, and the particularly 
creative, fanciful, and unruly images of fantasy.
It seems that only Hume, Ryle, and Wittgenstein 
explicitly acknowledge the non-sensory (non-image 
forming) use of imagination which facilitates our 
creative ability. In this respect, we can only guess that 
the other philosophers assume that, by definition, 
imagination produces images in all of its activities; 
however, this is not to say that all of the philosophers 
would agree that all thought is accompanied by images. We 
know that for most of the philosophers discussed above, 
"image" means "visual image" though they recognize that
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the imagination produces appearances of "smells", 
"tastes", etc.
Do the many activities of imagination have something 
in common, something which links all of them together?
On this point I agree with Francis Sparshott who has 
analyzed the spectrum of imagination's uses and concluded 
that
The idea of imagination, then, combines 
cohesiveness and diversity. It runs 
together a number of different themes and 
distinctions, some very general in scope 
and some quite specific, easily relatable 
and habitually thought in relation to each 
other, but such that a systematic relation 
among them seems teasingly hard to 
establish.
But this should not lead us to apply the family 
resemblance model here. That model would suggest a 
complex web of similarities between the various 
activities but without a common thread running through 
them. It could be said that there is a wide gap between 
imagination in its capacity to synthesize sense 
perceptions into images and the act of imagining a 
possibility, and therefore that all we can say about 
imagination's varied uses is that they all share a set of 
characteristics. However, I do not believe that the 
family resemblance model captures the true affinity 
between the activities which belong to our idea of 
imagination.
I am tempted to identify imagination's inventive and
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creative power as the thread which runs through the 
variety of activities of imagination. But though this 
would explain how we tend to think of imagination in the 
familiar sense, it does not have a place in the 
epistemological and passive functions of imagination.
The ability to envisage things (real or unreal) 
whether or not they are before us could be said to link 
together imaginations various activities. The passive 
images of after-images, illusions, hallucinations, and 
dreams give us appearances of things which are not 
actually perceived or before us to be perceived. Also, 
the active images of visualizing give us appearances of 
people, places, and things whether actual or not.
The envisaging power of imagination is particularly 
common in the third category identified above in which we 
imagine possibilities, solutions, and alternative worlds 
through the use of images. Finally, even in its non­
imaging capacity, imagination's creative power enables us 
to think up possibilities; to envisage things in ways 
different from what we are familiar with, and for 
example, to imagine ourselves in a situation we are not 
actually in at present. In all of these ways imagination 
provides an experience of something beyond actual 
experience as it were.
Sparshott, though not identifying the envisaging 
capacity of imagination as a common thread, suggests that 
it is an aspect of imagination common to various ways we
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speak of imagination. He says that to "use imagination" 
could be to envisage a different world which is an 
activity relevant to decisions regarding practical 
actions; "To be imaginative" is a talent to imagine 
alternative worlds; and "To be fanciful" is to be prone 
to envisage alternative worlds for non-practical 
purposes, as when we day-dream. Sparshott remarks (and I 
include this as a reminder) that our envisaging power 
need not make use of imagery.
Still, this power common to the many ways we use 
imagination (and indeed a power which often first comes 
to mind when we wonder what it means to use one’s 
imagination), is not one which has a place in the first 
category of imagination. Sparshott is correct, then, in 
suggesting that we cannot establish a common thread 
running through the activities of imagination. But I 
believe that there is a useful model which illustrates 
how imagination's activities are related more closely 
than by mere resemblance.
Imagine a spectrum which represents the activities of 
imagination as bands of colour merging and overlapping 
into each other. We could organize the activities from 
left to right beginning with imagination's 
epistemological mode through to its more active uses, and 
finally, far to the right of the spectrum, imagination in 
its most inventive mode. The "colours" on the spectrum 
would only correspond roughly to the four categories. The
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inventiveness of imagination would be represented in 
order of intensity from left to right, while non-sensory 
imagination would be represented in the right-hand side 
of the spectrum along with the active uses of 
imagination. In this way the non-sensory imagination is 
represented as a creative, inventive activity even though 
it does not include the use of images. The spectrum model 
shows how the various uses of imagination merge into each 
other because they are connected, in most cases, by 
imagery of some kind, and how the inventive imagination 
stems from imagery.
5.5 The Activities of Imagination and their Relationship 
to Art
It is convenient to discuss imagination in terms of 
its non-aesthetic and aesthetic activities. The first 
type is imagination used to interpret reality, to 
visualize, to dream, to envisage possibilities. In regard 
to the second type, a particular kind of imaginative 
activity is especially useful for artistic endeavors: 
fancy. For the artist, imagining a certain idyllic 
landscape can contribute to the creative process. For the 
spectator, imagining oneself in such a picture can be to 
‘'walk'* through the fields, "feeling" the dew in the air, 
and "smelling" the wildflowers. It is this free aspect of 
imagination which can be applied in our experience of
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art. By contrast, we can pin down the epistemological 
uses of imagination and argue that imagination underlies 
the formation of intelligible concepts from sense 
experience. Also, as the mental power which provides 
images for thought and memory, it plays a significant if
not essential role in understanding.
But a sharp division between these two types is 
misleading. Why, afterall, do we believe art and 
imagination to be inseparable? One way of approaching the 
matter is this: it takes imagination to create and 
appreciate works of art, but imagination does not require 
art to carry out any of its functions. Sparshott sums up 
this difference when he calls the fine arts arts the 
imagination. The way in which he explains this point 
provides a springboard for my argument that the 
activities of imagination cannot be divided into 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic, for the very reason that 
most of the activities of imagination can in some way be
used in the creation and appreciation of art works. I
will maintain that the imaginative activity used in 
perception, thought, understanding, and memory is the 
same as that we use in artistic experience. For example, 
the free activity of imagination used for envisaging 
possibilities is the very same imaginative activity used 
in combining and arranging images in novel ways on a 
canvas.
Two points in Sparshott*s view are worth mentioning
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here. Firstly, the fine arts are arts of the imagination 
in the sense that art provides both artist and percipient 
with interesting and novel viewpoints. This is due to 
imagination opening our minds to new prospects through 
its ability to envisage things otherwise. Secondly, works 
of art are appreciated, which is to say that when we 
contemplate works of art, we do so through looking at 
pictures, listening to music, or reading poetry. 
Therefore, Sparshott argues, our immediate and direct 
interest in art "lies in the values yielded in 
cognition". He connects this second aspect of art to 
imagination wherein it can "formulate, frame, and 
consider objects of sensation and cognition other than 
those directly anchored in the reality presented to the 
percipient."136
In Imagination, Mary Warnock suggests that there is a 
tendency to separate imagination as it is used in 
perception and understanding from imagination as used by 
critics and aestheticians to describe the activity of 
art-making and art appreciation. She attempts to 
establish a connection between the two kinds of 
imagination through a discussion of Hume and Kant, and 
then through Wittgentein and "seeing-as1*. Though I do not 
agree with some of her conclusions, her remarks in 
respect of the connection are insightful.
Forming mental pictures, creating or 
understanding works of art, understanding 
the real world in which we live, are all of 
them to some extent dependent on the same
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1 “37mode of thought.
Both Sparshott and Warnock to an extent support my 
view that the powers of imagination I have defined as 
present in perception, visualizing, dreaming, 
fantasizing, inventiveness, resourcefulness, etc. are 
also employed in the special activity of aesthetic 
creation, contemplation, and appreciation. In Chapter 6 , 
I will attempt to establish, in more detail, the close 
relationship between imagination and art. Though the 
activity of imagination is not of a different sort in 
aesthetic experience, it may be more free, which in turn 
may account for the heightened nature of aesthetic 
experience.
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CHAPTER 6: IMAGINATION AND ART
6.1 The Role of Imagination in Aesthetic Experience
In the last chapter I found that certain aspects of 
the concept of imagination emerged in common from 
theories as diverse as those of Aristotle and Sartre. The 
imagination1s power is both active and passive. Its 
product- the image- appears to us in experiences ranging 
from visual perception to the most fantastic dreams. My 
attempt to link imagination *s various activities together 
was not fruitless: the spectrum model organizes these 
activities in a way which displays their closeness.
A question to consider at present is the nature of 
the relationship between imagination as it is used in 
ordinary experience, underlying the formation of concepts 
from sense impressions, and imagination in aesthetic 
experience, in the perception and interpretation of art. 
It is, I think, clear that the same activities of 
imagination are used in ordinary and in aesthetic 
experience. Therefore, the same mental power is at work 
when we perceive and interpret things in the world and 
works of art (the latter also being things in the world, 
but also representing other things, ideas, and fictions).
I believe that there is a difference in the ways in 
which the activities of imagination are put to use in 
ordinary and aesthetic experience. Many philosophers hold
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the view that imagination's role in ordinary experience 
is to synthesize sense impressions into ideas for 
understanding and knowledge. Here imagination is 
essential to interpreting our perceptual experience, that 
is, to make objects intelligible. Imagination has the 
same task when we approach objects aesthetically: we must 
understand what they are a_s objects, and this is 
accomplished with the aid of imagination. I cannot 
appreciate a painting as a representation until I 
understand it as a painting-type-object. Imagination is 
present at two levels of recognition: the recognition of 
the painting as an object in the world; and the 
recognition of the painting as a representation. 
Imagination is therefore essential in all experience at 
the level of recognition. However, the demands of art 
require special effort from imagination, and these 
demands illuminate a difference between the way 
imagination works in ordinary and aesthetic experience. 
Such demands will be consistent with the characteristics 
of aesthetic experience as defined in Chapter 1.
To reiterate my remarks there, the experience of art 
generally begins with an interest in the sensuous aspects 
of art characterized by the contemplation and 
appreciation of such objects in and for themselves, and 
the pleasure arising from that contemplation. This kind 
of experience most often demands the concentration of the 
percipient's interest on the object as an object of
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sensuous contemplation rather than an interest in the 
object's usefulness or function. Generally, I believe 
that aesthetic experience is marked by a heightening of 
the senses, or as Kant put it, an "animating" of the mind 
by our experience of beauty in nature or art. It is this 
heightening of the senses which, I believe, leads to a 
feeling in the percipient of pleasure, enjoyment, the 
sublime, or even horror. However, aesthetic interest 
often moves beyond the contemplation of the sensuous or 
formal properties of an object, and this can involve the 
interpretation of the work, asking questions about it, 
like why the female figure in the picture is depicted as 
sullen. In the interpretation of a work imagination is 
often active, and this heightened activity may sustain 
the percipient's interest and enjoyment of a work.
Aesthetic experience, then, has two special features 
which differentiate it from our general experience of 
objects: (1) the interest in the object is directed to 
its aesthetic attributes- beauty, ugliness, form, colour- 
rather than for its function; (2) aesthetic experience is 
a sensuously heightened state resulting in some kind of 
feeling like pleasure or wonder. Furthermore, imagination 
is more potent in aesthetic experience than in ordinary 
experience. Certainly in the latter we stretch 
imagination to its limits, for example, in technical 
invention, but art most often requires an extension of 
imaginative activity in order to grasp the ideas and
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forms presented in works of art. Artists often create 
works of art with the intention of challenging 
imagination in this way.
I have argued that imagination is present in ordinary 
experience at least to the extent that it is used to 
interpret objects as cats, tables, etc., and that it is 
apparent that we use imagination to solve problems, 
invent excuses, or to have daydreams. But the properties 
of art can often only be grasped through a heightened 
activity of imagination. The creation and appreciation of 
art often depends on this special, animated quality of 
mind which is not always present in ordinary perception.
A stronger thesis in this respect would be that in order 
to experience art properly, that is, to contemplate, 
interpret, and enjoy art aesthetically, an extension of 
imaginative power is essential. Or succinctly, that this 
imaginative power is a necessary condition of aesthetic 
experience. Imagination would then play a constitutive 
rather than just a central role in the creation and 
appreciation of art. I do not wish to take my argument 
this far, since the appreciation of many works of art 
does not require imagination at all (except to recognize 
them as objects in the world). For example, it does not 
take imagination to appreciate the fine composition of 
Poussin's The Baptism of Christ. We can see that the 
figures wearing colourful cloaks are arranged from right 
to left before a pool in the immediate foreground, with a
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background consisting of a landscape of distant hills on 
which smaller figures sit.
I do not claim that imagination facilitates the 
"suspension of disbelief" necessary for understanding 
fiction. And, as I have said above, the extension of 
imaginative activity is not a condition of interpreting 
pictures as_ depictions. In the case of literature and 
pictorial representation, I think that we can simply 
understand that these objects represent reality in 
certain ways for our enjoyment. We do not need to make- 
believe when we read novels or look at pictures. As I 
have shown in Chapter 4, Schier's theory of Natural 
Generativity argues that we have an understanding of 
pictures as depictions without invoking a special kind of 
perceptual or imaginative capacity. What I do maintain is 
that imaginative activity, in particular, can play a 
central role in the appreciation of art, and that many 
works of art awaken imagination, requiring it to stretch 
itself to its limits.
An understanding of imagination's activity in 
aesthetic experience must transcend the metaphor of its 
"free rein" in this context. Words like "awakening", 
"quickening", "animating", and "heightening" come to mind 
when describing the state of mind of the percipient.
These terms can be useful to convey the sense in which 
art affects the imagination but I believe that they fail 
to say concretely how we use imagination in particular
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ways when creating or contemplating works of art. Perhaps 
we have been too content to understand imagination in 
metaphorical terms, and if this is true it may explain 
the vagueness which is found everywhere in discussions of 
how imagination pertains to art. In what follows I will 
examine discussions of imagination and art to establish 
clearly the connection between them.
6.2 What Does Imagination Have to Do with Art?
Philosophers of the Enlightenment assigned a role to 
imagination in discussions of aesthetics, though it 
seemed to be only a power working alongside perception 
and knowledge rather than a faculty playing a key part in 
aesthetic experience. Consistent with his doctrine of the 
"internal senses", Hutcheson placed the "aesthetic 
senses" ("absolute beauty", "relative beauty", "harmony", 
"design", and "grandeur" and "novelty") under the heading 
of the "pleasures of imagination". Following Hutcheson, 
Addison*s Pleasures of Imagination distinguished between 
"primary pleasures" and "secondary pleasures". "Primary 
pleasures" refer to the pleasures of objects of sense. 
"Secondary pleasures" refer to ideas (perhaps images) of 
objects of sense which are not before the eyes; objects 
called up in memory; or fictitious objects. So, "primary 
pleasures" concern only natural beauty while "secondary 
pleasures" concern the imitative arts, or fine arts.^
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Kant extended the concept of imagination in aesthetic 
experience by giving it a special place in reflective 
judgements, and specifically, in judgements of taste. The 
importance of imagination to aesthetics reached a peak in 
Kant's third Critique. After Kant, Schiller and Schelling 
also recognized imagination's connection to the 
aesthetic. Schiller, closely following Kant, attributed a 
"free play" of imagination to the artist as opposed to 
giving it a mere epistemological role. Schelling, who was 
a direct influence on Coleridge and other Romantics, 
celebrated imagination as underpinning experience itself 
and art, thereby dissolving the distinction between 
nature and art.
Imagination was the key concept for art criticism of 
the Romantic period, exemplified by Coleridge's theory of 
creativity, Wordsworth's poetry, and partly by Ruskin's 
views of painting and architecture. In Romantic thought, 
imagination was the peculiar power which closed the gap 
between humanity and nature; in Wordsworth's Prelude it 
was "reason in her most exalted mood".^ More recently, 
imagination enjoyed an important place in Collingwood's 
The Principles of Art. Here, he develops a theory of art 
as imagination, which has been heavily criticized for, 
among other things, ignoring artistic medium.
Nevertheless, it is significant that Collingwood devotes 
all of Book II in his text to a theory of imagination, 
discussing its epistemological role in theories from
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Descartes to Kant. Collingwood1s effort illustrates 
perhaps the first attempt after Kant to establish in a 
deliberate way the connection between imagination and 
art. Since Collingwood, imagination has been discussed in 
relation to art in brief moments, some of which I will 
address in 6.6.
Before examining these views more closely, there 
remains the question of what is characteristic of 
imaginative activity in relation to aesthetic experience. 
At a fundamental level, to experience a work as such 
often requires an "imaginative leap", and this applies to 
the full range of the arts. For instance, in the dance, 
"Swan Lake", to recognize that the dancers represent 
swans or cygnets, and to see their movements as evoking 
the graceful movements of swans, may require imagination. 
An understanding of the story represented through 
movement and music may be grasped only by understanding 
the fictional world created by the dancers. The same 
capacity is used in the recognition of actors as 
characters playing out actions of another person, living 
or fictional, from the present or past. In literary 
fiction, we are asked to make perhaps the greatest leap, 
i.e. to enter the imaginary world of the story or poem in 
order to follow the narrative as if it were real. In 
literary fantasy, we are challenged to imagine the 
characters and places therein: imagery is the writer*s 
way of "taking us through" the story. In film,
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imagination helps us to move from the real world to the 
unreal world of the film. Such imaginative leaps are not 
uncommon; it is habit for us in our attention to works of 
art. When we sit in a theatre, or cinema or enter an art 
gallery, we often make the switch to an imaginative mode 
of awareness.^
The artist, in creating a work of art, is creating
c
something like a virtual reality or a possible world. It 
may be a world in which we could live, not differing 
greatly from our own experience, or it may be an 
alternative reality in which there are no straight lines 
or in which there is no light. Imagination has the 
capacity to envisage alternative possibilities and 
alternative worlds in non-aesthetic experience, for 
example, in mechanical inventions. This capacity enables 
us to be creative, inventive and to think up new ideas 
and solutions to problems. The creation of imaginary 
worlds requires the use of imagination by the artist- a 
use of imagination which is partly responsible for the 
originality of a work of art. Hence, the capacities of 
imagination are exploited by the percipient and artist 
alike, and these capacities belong to the imagination as 
it operates in both aesthetic and ordinary experience.
Sparshott remarks that "... perception is to the 
real, imagination to the unreal and the possible."^ We 
cannot take his neat formulation as it stands because 
perception would have to be part of any kind of
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imaginative perception, but it does point to the kind of 
imaginative mode of awareness which characterizes the 
aesthetic response. We could conclude that if artists 
create imaginary worlds, then only imagination will 
enable us to interpret these imaginary worlds. This claim 
may be questionable since some percipients may claim that 
they do not use imagination in their interpretation and 
appreciation of art. In my "Swan Lake" example, one might 
choose not to imagine the dancers as swans, but to see 
them only as graceful human figures dressed in white. 
(Though one could argue that not using imagination here 
is to fail to grasp what the dancers* movements express.)
Art may not give us challenging stuff for the 
imagination, but it can at least represent a departure 
from the normal. Art reaches out to the imagination 
because it presents what is not immediately part of our 
perceptual experience. Art sometimes offers us what is 
familiar, but it has the special capacity to present 
something other than the familar objects of perception.
It is a gateway to the new and unexplored. This is 
particularly true in the context of paintings. For 
example, Claude’s Landscape with Psyche at the Palace of 
Cupid (The Enchanted Castle) represents another place, 
another time, and a scene that is not mere imitation but 
a construct of the painter’s imagination based on 
mythical characters. This Claude landscape is perhaps 
less inviting than his others: instead of wanting to
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explore the glorious scene we may wish to keep a distance 
from the mysterious castle and the foreboding tinge to 
Psyche*s melancholy. For the spectator, the landscape 
offers a glimpse into another world, another time and 
place created by the artist. The images also suggest an 
emotional background to the picture: a narrative about 
Cupid and Psyche. Or in the case of a typical classical 
landscape, the spectator may decide to project him or 
herself into the depicted scene for an imaginative wander 
through the green slopes, pausing at the pond and finally 
entering the gazebo for restful contemplation of his or 
her surrounds. It is only through the picture's 
invitation that the spectator is allowed to enjoy the 
imaginative contemplation which is a departure from the 
spectator's own situation. Like fiction, paintings are, 
in my view, particularly suited for imaginative 
journeying.^ (This point will be taken up at length in 
Chapter 7).
In aesthetic experience we are shaken out of 
passivity into a mode of awareness in which the 
imagination is reactive and active. Reactive, in 
responding to cues from the artist which start us on our 
imaginative journey, and active, in forming images as 
part of the activity of that journey. I have suggested 
that the peculiar nature of imaginative activity in 
aesthetic experience is its freedom from the constraints 
of practical reason, and that this freedom precipitates
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imagination's contemplation of works of art. It is also 
the challenges of art that unleash imagination to give it 
free rein, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, in the 
percipient's aesthetic response. This freedom is often 
essential not only for interpreting the work, but for the 
actual enjoyment we take in contemplation. We should 
allow as much freedom to imagination as maximizes our 
pleasure in the aesthetic object.
Some works of art require imaginative activity in 
order to experience them appropriately and to the fullest 
extent. For instance, the figure looking out the window 
in Casper David Friedrich's Woman at a Window forces the 
spectator to imaginatively project him/herself into the 
position of the figure to "see" what "she" is "looking" 
at. This imaginative projection involves the spectator 
with the picture to a greater degree, thus enhancing the 
overall appreciation of it. But in cases where free 
imaginative activity is not a prerequisite for an 
appropriate response, free imaginative activity is not 
necessary to maximize our enjoyment of the work. It does 
not require imagination to appreciate the technique, 
colour or composition of Constable's Salisbury Cathedral 
from the Bishop's Grounds. We do not feel a need to 
project ourselves into the picture, nor to imagine 
anything about the landscape in order to appreciate the 
picture appropriately. We might "take a walk" in the 
landsacpe, or imagine the feeling of standing below the
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great height of the cathedral with its spire reaching 
into the sky, but these imaginative experiences are not 
called for by the picture.
Where free imaginative activity is essential, there 
will be some constraints that the percipient must 
observe. When the work ceases to be the center of 
attention, the percipient must control his or her 
imaginative activity so that it returns to the work of 
art. We can be "spirited away" by imagination to an 
indulgent experience of our own in both ordinary and 
aesthetic experience, and in ways which border on the 
unpleasant, as in calling up horrible memories. 
Imaginative activity in the contemplation of works of art 
leads to an enhancement of the percipient's aesthetic 
experience through the greater pleasure it brings, but if 
misused, imagination detracts from the work by impeding 
our attention to the work itself, and by experiencing the 
work inappropriately, according to the general response 
expected by others, including the artist or author.
The degree of freedom in our imaginative activity is 
under the artist's control by way of cues or suggestions 
in the artist's work. In this way we can know how much 
imagination to bring to our experience of a work.
Certain characteristics of imagination in aesthetic 
experience have emerged. Firstly, I claimed that 
imagination's capacity to see things as otherwise- to 
envisage possibilities or alternative worlds- enables the
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recognition of the unfamiliar presented in art. We are 
able to make an imaginative leap into the world created 
by the artist. Secondly, I argued that this capacity of 
imagination is especially suited to art because it 
represents a departure from the normal. In other words, 
once we have made the "leap", imaginative activity in the 
percipient is catalyzed by the work, so that imagination 
has a significant role in the aesthetic response.
Thirdly, I characterized this activity as free, that is, 
free from the constraints of practical knowledge, so that 
imagination in its freedom can grasp anything from 
horrific fictions to Escher*s boggling designs. Finally,
I claimed that when imaginative activity is present in 
aesthetic contemplation, it is partly responsible for our 
enjoyment of the work of art. So we take pleasure in the 
free activity of imagination which thus leads to an 
overall enhancement of our aesthetic experience.
My emphasis on imagination *s capacities here helps to 
establish a coherent connection between imagination and 
art. I now turn to Kant*s Critique of Judgement which 
will give further import to the role of imagination in 
the aesthetic response, namely through his assertions 
about the free play of imagination and the resultant 
pleasure which underlies aesthetic judgements.
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6.3 Kant's Harmonious Free Play of the Faculties
I have argued that the imaginative power at work in 
aesthetic experience does not differ from that in 
ordinary experience, but I have also suggested that it is 
more free in aesthetic experience. I must now establish 
the character of this freedom.
Kant does not have a theory of imagination as such, 
but there are key discussions of the power (or faculty) 
of imagination in both the Critique of Pure Reason and 
the Critique of Judgement. In the former text, he assigns 
imagination the role of synthesizing intuitions into 
ideas for the understanding which reveals the 
relationship between the two faculties, and it is this 
relationship which changes in the role assigned to 
imagination in the Critique of Judgement.
For Kant aesthetic judgements are related to 
cognitive judgements, despite his claim that aesthetic 
judgements do not bring objects under concepts while 
cognitive judgements do. In making any judgement, 
cognitive or aesthetic, two necessary conditions hold: 
the application of the categories of time and space.
Also, according to Kant, the faculties of imagination and 
understanding work in harmony with each other but the 
nature of this harmonious activity differs in the two 
kinds of judgements. Because aesthetic judgements are 
related to cognitive judgements, I will first consider
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Kant's view of how we acquire knowledge about the world.
We perceive a world of appearances of which we can 
have knowledge while behind the world of appearances lies 
a realm of things-in-themselves. In interpreting the 
world of appearances we are given intuitions of objects 
through our senses. Imagination serves the understanding 
by performing a threefold synthesis in which it produces 
schemata for the categories of the understanding. This 
consists in the synthesis of the apprehension of 
intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination 
and the synthesis of recognition in a concept whereby the 
understanding's categories subsume an object under a 
concept. Thus, in acts of cognition, the imagination 
serves the understanding by "preparing" the manifold of 
intuitions for the application of concepts by the 
understanding. Because imagination and understanding 
mutually assist each other, they are in a harmonious 
relationship, and it is only through this harmony that we 
can acquire knowledge about the world. Through it, we can 
interpret imagination's power as positive but 
constrained. It is positive in that it facilitates the 
interpretation of the world, but constrained in that it 
is subservient to the understanding in this role. It has 
a particular function for the ends of cognition, one 
which is harnessed to the laws of the understanding.
Judgements of beauty are not cognitive judgements, 
and therefore they call for a different relationship
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between the imagination and understanding in their
harmony (though it must be noted that Kant does say that
judgements of taste rest on indeterminate concepts).
If we wish to discern whether anything 
is beautiful or not, we do not refer the 
representation of it to the Object by 
means of understanding with a view to 
cognition, but by means of the imagination 
(acting perhaps in conjunction with 
understanding) we refer the representation 
to the Subject and its feeling of pleasure 
or displeasure. The judgement of taste, 
therefore, is not a cognitive judgement, 
and so not logical, but is aesthetic.
Aesthetic judgements are characterized by a feeling in 
the subject rather than the cognition of an object by the 
subject. That feeling is the pleasure felt by the subject 
when experiencing an object "disinterestedly" but with an 
appreciation for its form. Hence, the judgement of taste 
is subjective- it cannot have objective validity in the 
sense that cognitive judgements do. Kant argues that, 
though our judgements of taste are subjective, when we 
make a judgement about the beauty of an object we assume 
the agreement of others with our appraisal of the object. 
In other words, aesthetic judgements claim universal 
validity. The main thrust of his argument is that there 
is a particular frame of mind which occurs in persons 
making aesthetic judgements. He believes that the 
aesthetic response is grounded in a harmonious free play 
of the imagination and the understanding. In cognitive 
judgements the imagination serves the understanding,
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presenting objects for the application of concepts. In 
aesthetic judgements the harmonious activity of the two 
faculties is "free". Kant*s metaphor of "free play" is 
helpful. We can imagine the two powers being given a 
looser rein not in the interests of acquiring knowledge 
but for the free contemplation and enjoyment of an object 
in and for itself.
Despite the vagueness of "free play", Kant does 
provide an explanation of his idea which is concrete 
enough for our purposes here. The freedom of imagination 
here is freedom from the constraints of the rules of the 
understanding which are required for cognition. The 
mental state which underlies cognitive judgements also 
underlies aesthetic judgements except that in the latter 
no concept is applied to the object. In Kant*s 
terminology, the synthesis of apprehension and the 
synthesis of reproduction occur without the synthesis of 
recognition taking place. So the harmony of the two 
powers exists such that the general conditions for 
acquiring knowledge are met, but without the application 
of a concept.^ Though an order is imposed on the 
manifold (which is necessary to grasp an object at all), 
the understanding^ activity is different because it does 
not complete the role assigned to it in cognition. Kant 
says:
The cognitive powers brought into play by 
this representation are here engaged in a 
free play, since no definite concept 
restricts them to a particular rule of
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cognition. Hence the mental state in this 
representation must be one of a feeling of 
the free play of the powers of 
representation in a given representation 
for a cognition in general. 1
In judgements of beauty, the understanding is subservient
to the imagination. Imagination is thus free from the
rules of the understanding, that is, free from the "laws
of association" which exist in the application of
concepts to objects in cognition. We do not need a
concept of what a thing is _to be, what it is, to
appreciate it aesthetically. Schaper suggests that
‘Imagination considered in its freedom* can 
be read as stressing the independence of 
aesthetic appraisals from the rules and 
criteria that are conditions for the 
objective validity of empirical 
judgements.
In aesthetic judgement, imagination's relationship to 
the understanding is one in which it stands in "free 
conformity" to its laws, or what Kant calls "conformity 
to a law without a law".^ The imaginative activity which 
underlies judgements of taste is not "reproductive", as 
it is when subject to the laws of the understanding, but 
is "productive", "exerting an activity of its own".^
Many questions are thrown up by Kant's remarks on the 
freedom of imagination. First, one might ask how an 
object can affect the mind in such a way as to produce a 
free play of the faculties rather than the mere harmony 
which underlies cognitive judgements. Kant's idea of
181
formal finality presents an answer to this. The finality 
of an object is its end or purpose according to Kant, and
he maintains that there can be finality apart from an
1 s
end. Objective finality consists in a thing’s function 
or natural purpose while subjective finality is 
"purposiveness without purpose". The formal finality of 
an object affects the mind resulting in a feeling of 
pleasure in persons making judgements of taste. Whereas 
objective finality is indicated by the correlation of an 
object’s existence and its function, formal finality is 
indicated by the pleasure felt in response to an object’s 
appearance (form). Something about the appearance of an 
object activates the imagination and the understanding 
into a harmonious free play. A new question arises in 
this context: where in fact does this pleasure "come 
from"?
While there is a causal relation at work in 
pleasurable aesthetic judgements, the pleasure is not 
caused by the form of the object. Though the source is 
the formal finality of the object itself, the feeling of 
pleasure is precipitated by the harmonious free play of 
our mental powers. Hence, the formal finality of the 
object is a finality which, in Guyer’s words, is "nothing 
more than its disposition to produce the harmony of the 
facuities".^  xn this respect, then, the unity of the 
manifold is represented not by a concept but by the 
feeling of pleasure . ^
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That aesthetic judgements are grounded in a harmony 
of the faculties which meets the conditions for cognition 
in general (yet without a concept), is the very reason 
for our feeling of pleasure; thus the feeling of pleasure 
is identified with this free harmonious activity. The 
feeling of pleasure is what gives rise to judgements of 
taste about an object. We can find evidence for this in 
the First Introduction of the Critique of Judgement, 
where of the harmony of the faculties Kant says that, 
"this relation...effects a sensation which is the 
determining ground of a judgement, and which is therefore 
termed a e s t h e t i c . G u y e r  makes the valuable point that 
we should not view this feeling of pleasure as momentous, 
though it can be, and he puts forward a reasonable 
interpretation that the harmony of the faculties and 
feeling of pleasure from it is a "unified but temporally 
extended psychological state" and therefore an activity, 
not an act.^ This interpretation fits with aesthetic 
contemplation as just that- thoughtful reflection on 
nature or art which leads to enjoyment and a feeling of 
pleasure.
The "free play" of the faculties forms the basis of 
the aesthetic response for Kant: we perceive objects of 
beauty as having formal finality, take delight in their 
form, and make aesthetic judgements which reflect the 
pleasure derived from the peculiar activity of the "free 
play". Furthermore, this peculiar activity is universal
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and therefore provides a foundation for the
o rv
intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgements. w In
the Introduction to the Critigue of Judgement, Kant says:
For the ground of this pleasure is found 
in the universal, though subjective 
condition of reflective judgements, namely 
the final harmony of an object (be it a 
product of nature or of art) with the 
mutual relation of the faculties of 
cognition, (imagination and understanding,) 
which are requisite for every empirical 
cognition.
The ability to experience aesthetic pleasure is the form 
of the judgement itself, stripped of conceptual content, 
and the harmony of the faculties underlies this ability.
In his deduction of pure aesthetic judgement, Kant 
holds that aesthetic judgements claim agreement from 
others who make aesthetic judgements about the same 
object. Agreement between judgements of taste is possible 
because we are all rational beings; the necessary 
conditions of rationality hold for all of us. He is not 
saying that we will all agree in our aesthetic 
judgements, but that we expect that our judgements about 
beauty are universally valid. The condition of this 
universality is what Kant calls the "common sense". This 
idea will reveal the significance of the harmony of the 
faculties to Kant’s deduction. On this point Guyer 
maintains that for Kant the feeling of pleasure from the 
harmony of the faculties as universal is the "deepest 
condition on aesthetic judgment, the condition of its
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possibility as a form of synthetic a priori judgment.*
The harmony of the faculties is a condition of all 
experience for Kant whether it is subjective or 
objective. It is therefore an a priori condition of 
knowledge and, as we have learned, the "free play" of 
imagination and understanding is an a priori condition of 
aesthetic judgements. We can therefore conclude that 
aesthetic judgements are dependent on cognitive 
judgements because the harmony of the faculties underlies 
both cognitive and aesthetic judgements. Though we do not 
conceptualize the objects of our judgements of taste, the 
general conditions of knowledge apply.
Judgements of taste, then, are founded like cognitive 
judgements on a mental state common to everyone making 
such judgements. Kant*s argument about the "common sense" 
begins with the assertion that our judgements of taste 
depend on everyone having a "common sense", and he then 
asks if we can presuppose it in everyone. He confusingly 
refers to the common sense as a principle, a feeling 
(Section 20), and as the ability to make judgements of 
taste (Section 40).^ Generally, I think it is safe to 
think of the common sense as that which facilitates 
judgements of taste in respect of their subjective 
universality, this "common sense" being the subjective 
feeling we have in judging objects aesthetically.
Though his argument for the communicability of 
feeling in his deduction is troublesome, we can at least
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take from it the importance of the concept of "free 
play". Not only does he claim that aesthetic judgements 
are grounded in the harmony of the faculties, but it is 
this harmony which underpins the idea of the "common 
sense", that is, that which enables us to make judgements 
of taste in the first place and to ascribe universal 
validity to them.
The freedom which characterizes the relationship
between the imagination and the understanding in
aesthetic judgements is a freedom from the conditions of
cognitive judgements, specifically a freedom from the
application of a concept to an object, without an
interest in the end, purpose or function of an object.
Schaper provides a clear example of this.
We have to distinguish between, say, my 
consciousness of the Acropolis when I 
make a perceptual claim about it and my 
consciousness of the same building when,
I take delight in my perception of it.
Kant's claim about the freedom of imagination need not be 
obscure if we think of this freedom in contrast to the 
"task" assigned to imagination in cognitive judgements.
We can interpret this simply as the frame of mind we take 
on when approaching an object aesthetically; where the 
form of the object "quickens" our imagination and 
understanding into a free reflection on the object purely 
in virtue of its aesthetic qualities. According to Kant, 
"free play" is a necessary condition for the aesthetic
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response. In addition, Kant's concept of artistic genius 
demonstrates imagination's creative power and its 
indispensibility to the artist.
6.4 The Artist's Imagination and Aesthetic Ideas
Because the beauty of nature figures prominently in
Kant's "Analytic of the Beautiful", it could be the case
that the concept of "free play" is not applicable to art.
On the contrary, I interpret Kant as recognizing nature
and art as both stimulating "free play", though with
special conditions attached in the case of art.
In Section 51 Kant says:
Beauty (whether it be of nature or of art) 
may in general be termed the expression of 
aesthetic ideas. But the proviso must be 
added that with beauty of art this idea 
must be excited through the medium of a 
concept of the Object, whereas with beauty 
of nature the bare reflection upon a given 
intuition, apart from any concept of what 
the object is intended to be, is sufficient 
for awakening and communicating the idea of 
which that Object is regarded as the 
expression.
In Section 45 Kant does say that art objects also 
stimulate the "free play" of the faculties through their 
formal finality. But the special conditions arise from 
art as an intentional product of human creation. These 
conditions slightly alter imagination's role such that it 
is constrained (though still free) by the tasks it will 
meet in the interpretation of works of art. For example,
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though Kant does not say this explicitly, the artist 
often guides the participants imagination through the 
medium whether it is images, words, ideas, or movement.
Artistic genius for Kant is a talent or capacity for 
producing art "without a trace appearing of the artist 
having always had the rule present to him and of its 
having fettered his mental p o w e r s . F i n e  art, the 
product of artistic genius, is not learned or produced 
according to a set of rules with a conceptual basis. 
Rather, it is exemplary, that is, it is an original 
product, not an imitation. Kant therefore maintains that 
the "primary property" of fine art is its originality. 
Artistic genius, then, is contrasted with a talent for 
imitation. What the artist produces is imaginative and 
new rather than a copy of something else.
Kant clarifies the difference between taste and
genius, claiming that we need taste for making judgements
about beautiful objects but genius for producing works of
art, though he later shows why even taste is required by 
? 7the artist. The creativity of artistic genius seems to
be blind in that the artist*s ideas just come to him or
her without an understanding of their source. But there
is a creative and critical process in artistic production
which requires taste.
By this the artist, having practised and 
corrected his taste by a variety of 
examples from nature or art, controls his 
work and, after many, and often laborious, 
attempts to satisfy taste, finds the form 
which commends itself to him. Hence this
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form is not, as it were, a matter of 
inspiration, or of a free swing of the 
mental powers, but rather of a slow and 
even painful process of improvement, 
directed to making the form adequate to his 
thought without prejudice.to the freedom in 
the play of those powers.
Kant goes on to identify the faculties of mind which
constitute artistic genius, asserting that "soul" (Geist)
is the "animating principle of the mind" which "sets the
mental powers into a swing that is final, i.e. into a
play...". This turns out to be the imagination or as he
puts it, "the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas.
Aesthetic ideas are fundamental to Kantfs discussion of
fine art. They are counterparts of rational ideas in that
they hold the special place of being sensible
representations which
...strain after something lying out beyond 
the confines of experience, and so seek to 
approximate to a presentation of rational 
concepts the semblance of an objective 
reality. But, on the other hand, there is 
this most important reason, that no concept 
can be wholly adequate to them as internal 
intuitions.
So, aesthetic ideas can express rational ideas, i.e that 
which lies beyond sensible experience. The imagination's 
power to represent aesthetic ideas is used by the artist 
in the creation of works of art. In this context, Kant 
recognizes a connection between art and different levels 
of reality where the artist, facilitated by free 
imaginative activity, represents a rational idea through
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a work of art.
In imagination1s productive capacity, at the height
of its creative powers, it can create a "second nature
out of the material supplied to it by actual nature”
which "affords us entertainment where experience proves
too commonplace”. Kant says:
The poet essays the task of interpreting 
to sense the rational ideas of invisible 
beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, 
eternity, creation, etc. Or, again, as to 
things of which examples occur in 
experience, e.g. death, envy, and all 
vices, as also love, fame, and the like, 
transgressing the limits of experience he 
attempts with the aid of imagination which 
emulates the display of reason in its 
attainment of a maximum, to body them forth 
to sense with a completeness of which 
nature affords no parallel; and it is in 
fact precisely in the poetic art that the 
faculty of aesthetic ideas can show itself 
to full advantage. ^
In this creative activity of the imagination, Kant calls
the constituents of aesthetic ideas "aesthetic
attributes” , which are "secondary representations of the
imagination". He illustrates the concept of an aesthetic
attribute through the example of Jupiter*s eagle as
representing the rational idea of the kingdom of heaven.
An aesthetic attribute, by expressing a rational idea
through a representation
...gives imagination an incentive to spread 
its flight over a whole host of kindred 
representations that provoke more thought 
than admits of expression in a concept 
determined by words.
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Aesthetic attributes can be interpreted as the concrete 
images of poetry or the images of pictures by which the 
artist expresses the rational ideas which are part of the 
work itself. For example, in the above quote about the 
poet, the poet can express the ideas of hell, eternity, 
death, etc. through the concrete imagery of poetry.
Aesthetic ideas and aesthetic attributes exemplify 
the imaginative nature of art. Their function is one of 
"... animating the mind by opening out for it a prospect 
into a field of kindred representations stretching beyond 
its ken."^ In the activity of artistic genius, 
imagination leaves familiar territory, stretching itself 
into a creative mode which engenders the originality in 
fine art.
The nature of artistic creation and that of the 
aesthetic response is characterized by imaginative 
activity which is thought-provoking though not for deeply 
conceptual ends. The artist does have the concept of the 
artistic object to be created, but the finished work of 
art does not express a determinate concept, but rather it 
expresses a rational idea through an aesthetic idea, 
which thus activates the imagination and understanding 
into "free play".^
Kant is careful to stress imagination’s relationship 
with the understanding here. The imagination’s freedom 
must be "in accordance with the understanding’s
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conformity to law" because apart from this "lawfulness
without a law", imagination is as it were too free.
For in lawless freedom imagination, 
with all its wealth, produces nothing 
but nonsense....Taste, like judgement 
in general, is the discipline (or 
corrective) of genius. It severely clips 
its wings, and makes it orderly or 
polished; but at the same time it gives it 
guidance, directing and controlling its 
flight, so that it may preserve its 
character of finality. °
Here taste could be taken as analogous to understanding's 
role in the subjective purposiveness of the harmony of 
the faculties whereby it controls the imagination though 
only to the extent that it provides a "lawfulness without 
a law".^ Kant concludes Section 50 with the requirements 
for art as imagination, understanding, soul and taste (in 
that order).
6.5 A Further Interpretation of Kant
In Kant's attempt to discover how aesthetic 
judgements are possible, a cogent theory of the aesthetic 
response has emerged. The formal finality of a beautiful 
object stimulates the mind in such a way as to set the 
imagination into a free harmonious cooperation with the 
understanding, a cooperation which resembles the activity 
of the two faculties in accomplishing the cognition of 
objects, yet without actually arriving at a cognition. 
Instead, the activity of the faculties in the experience
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of beauty causes a feeling of delight or pleasure in the 
percipient. This harmony as characteristic of the 
aesthetic response explains our aesthetic experience of 
art and nature. It explains how we can approach things 
aesthetically, that is, apart from the ends to which 
objects are assigned in cognition.
If the aesthetic response is necessarily marked by 
the primary role given to imagination1s powers in the 
artist and the percipient, how does imaginative activity 
show itself in individual experiences? Or, how can we 
interpret Kant to describe how we use imagination when we 
interpret works of art? Kant offers some explanation 
here, but his terminology makes an accurate 
interpretation tedious.
Imagination frees our minds to look at objects with a 
view to thinking about them without relevance to their 
function. To imaginatively approach Ribera’s Dream of 
Jacob is to appreciate the delicate, peaceful image of 
Jacob asleep and maybe to feel a sense of wonder about 
the masterly portrayal of Jacob’s dream of the heavenly 
ladder as a golden beam of light above his head. The 
angels are barely visible so perhaps we must imagine them 
descending the golden ladder. We can take this idea a 
step further by referring to aesthetic attributes in 
order to understand how imagination contributes to both 
the artist’s creation and the spectator’s interpretation 
of what is expressed in a work of art.
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In artistic genius, imagination is responsible for
the originality characteristic of fine art, as opposed to
products of imitation which are created according to an
existing set of rules. Imagination in this creative
activity breaks these rules by making rules of its own.
Also, imagination is the faculty of mind responsible for
aesthetic ideas. Works of art are constituted by
aesthetic ideas, and therefore the artist's imagination
is the source of individual works of art. Aesthetic
attributes, as constituents of aesthetic ideas, are the
concrete images which express the rational ideas of the
work. Imagination is the source of the concrete images in
poetry and painting, as illustrated by Kant's examples of
Jupiter's eagle and Frederick the Great's poem. In the
latter example it becomes clear what Kant means when he
says that the soul which animates poetry and rhetoric is
founded on their aesthetic attributes, or on the sensible
images in them. Aesthetic attributes
...give the imagination an impetus to bring 
more thought into play in the matter, 
though in an undeveloped manner, than 
allows of being brought within the embrace 
of a concept, or, therefore, of being 
definitely formulated in language. °
The concrete images of poetry or rhetoric evoke
imaginative reflection on what is generally expressed in 
the poem or speech, and Kant maintains that it is a kind
OQ
of free, indefinite, imaginative reflection. In the
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thoughtful contemplation of the King's poem Kant says
that memories and sensible images come to mind.
...he kindles in this way his rational idea 
of a cosmopolitan sentiment even at the 
close of life, with the help of an 
attribute which the imagination (in 
remembering all the pleasures of a fair 
summer's day that is over and gone- a 
memory of which pleasures is suggested by a 
serene evening) annexes to that 
representation, and which stirs up a crowd 
of sensations and secondary representations 
for which no expression can be found. 0
On a free interpretation of Kant, I would maintain that 
he would support the view that the artist's imagination- 
imaginative thoughts, mental images, memories, memories 
of dream images, and the like- contributes to the 
creation of his or her works. Such images may not always 
hold a central place in the conception of a particular 
work, but they may be the source of certain works of art. 
Similarly, and perhaps more commonly, we may be led into 
a state of imaginative reflection through the images 
presented in the language of literature or the 
configurations in a picture. More images may come to mind 
spawned by the immediate images of the work, and these 
secondary images could be related to the percipient's 
memories or own fantasies. Secondary images are directly 
related to the work (though imaginative reflection which 
is unrestrained would no longer constitute an appropriate 
response to the actual work of art).
I am not suggesting that Kant's free harmony of the
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faculties provides a model for a typical aesthetic 
response, but overall I think that we can take from Kant 
the coherent and positive assertion that imaginative 
activity underlies both the aesthetic response and the 
artist's creativity. Thus imagination is the foundation 
of the creation, appreciation and evaluation of a work of 
art.
Imagination in aesthetic experience is free, that is, 
free from the constraints of practical purposes or 
intentions directed at the accomplishment of a task. It 
can enjoy this freedom by exploring what a work of art 
offers to it, and we gain pleasure through this 
experience. Kant has supplied us with an answer to how 
imaginative activity can be free, and with his ideas 
taken on board, we can turn to other philosophers who 
have valued the imaginative component of artistic 
activity.
6.6 Imagination in Coleridge, Ruskin, and Collingwood
Coleridge
After Kant, Coleridge, Ruskin and Collingwood made a 
full-fledged attempt to formulate a coherent theory of 
imagination in relation to the artist and percipient.
Like Kant's theory of imagination, it is necessary to 
keep in mind that each of their accounts of imagination
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are dependent on their own philosophical systems. This, 
however, will not prevent us from discovering the value 
of their views, as well as further support for my overall 
argument concerning the place of imagination in art.
The critical theory of Romanticism reveals its
indebtedness to German Idealism, and therefore harkens
back to Kant, though Coleridge*s ideas differ from
Kant*s. Blocker notes the continuity and discontinuity
between their accounts of imagination.
Coleridge accepted Kant*s theory of the 
productive, spontaneous, and constructive 
imagination necessary to all experience, 
but then went on to apply this concept to a 
different field of application, the 
aesthetic apprehension and organization of 
experience, to which Kant would not have 
accorded the same objectivity.
Coleridge's recognition of imagination as the power which 
enables the artist, the poet in particular, to create 
works is especially relevant to my inquiry. Though his 
theory of imagination is convoluted by its idealism, it 
is at least clear that imagination is the prime tool for 
artistic productivity. Furthermore, Coleridge (as well as 
Wordsworth and Shelley) regarded imagination as the power 
replacing reason for understanding nature.
In Biographia Literaria Coleridge creates a system in
which imagination is given the role of
...unifying or reconciling the self and 
nature on three different but analogous 
levels. These three reconciliations are 
represented by perception, art, and 
philosophy.
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For Coleridge, imagination operates at the level of 
understanding the world and in the creative activity of 
the artistic process. He identifies two kinds of 
imagination, "primary" and "secondary" imagination. 
"Primary" imagination is the "prime agent of all human 
Perception" while "secondary" imagination differs from it 
"only in degree" and is an "echo" of it, "coexisting with 
the conscious will, yet still as identical with the 
primary in the kind of its agency....It dissolves, 
diffuses, dissipates, in order to r e c r e a t e . T h e  
imagination in its "primary" mode seems to be the power 
whereby we apprehend nature. But it is the "secondary" 
mode which is the source of artistic creativity.
A point of central importance in Coleridge*s theory 
of imagination is his distinction between imagination and 
fancy. He describes fancy in contrast to imagination in 
that it
...has no counters to play with, but 
fixities and definites. The Fancy is indeed 
no other mode than a mode of Memory 
emancipated from the order of time and 
space; while it is blended with, and 
modified by that empirical faculty of the 
will, which we express by the word CHOICE.
But equally with the ordinary memory the 
Fancy must receive all its materials ready 
made from the law of association.
This view of fancy finds its foundations in David 
Hartley*s associative theory. Discussion of this theory 
would require a digression into theories of literary
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imagination which are not relevant here. But what is 
significant in Coleridge1s distinction is that he gives 
fancy a role which is inconsistent with most other 
philosophical views. Fancy is typically associated with a 
free, light-hearted, and even frivolous exercise of 
imagination. In this way it is contrasted with the 
exercise of imagination involved in cognition. However, 
Coleridge not only seems to associate fancy with an 
associative power in cognition, but he also separates it 
entirely from both primary and secondary imagination.
Still, as indicated by M. H. Abrams, fancy is
involved in artistic creativity, though Coleridge
delegates its role to the lesser of the two modes of
poetry. This lesser mode is produced through
...particulars of sense and the images of 
memory, and its production involves only 
the lower faculties of fancy,
Understanding,1 and empirical * choice*. It 
is therefore the work of ‘talent,* and 
stands in rank below the highest...
Reason and imagination are involved in the higher , 
"organic" mode of poetry.
So in Coleridge we find a description of primary and 
secondary imagination as productive and creative: 
firstly, in "creating" the world of nature through our 
apprehension of it and secondly, in creating works of
A C
art. Coleridge is never more specific than this, though 
this is enough, along with an understanding of his 
forerunners, to capture the fundamental role of
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imagination in both the synthesis of intuitions into 
concepts and as the creative power peculiar to artistic 
activity. Also, a similarity emerges between the ideas of 
Kant and Coleridge, namely, that imagination is the 
source of artistic genius, and thus the source of 
originality in art.
Ruskin
Ruskin*s views are also embedded in his own theory of 
art criticism, but he had more specific things to say 
about imagination and art than Coleridge, namely, he 
attempts to give an account of the modes of imagination 
involved in the spectator*s appreciation of paintings.
In his conclusion to The Stones of Venice he says:
...one of the main functions of art, in its 
service to man, is to rouse the imagination 
from its palsy, like the angel troubling 
the Bethesda pool; and the art which does 
not do this is false to its duty, and 
degraded in its nature. It is not enough 
that it be well imagined, it must task the 
beholder also to imagine well. '
Ruskin asserts that there is an imperative on the artist 
to use imagination. The spectator responds to the 
imaginative content of works of art; a response which 
leads to the enjoyment of a work. Ruskin even contends 
that without the active use of imagination, the spectator 
will not contemplate the work properly nor even enjoy it. 
He points out that in this activity the artist must guide
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the spectator*s imagination through the work for 
otherwise the imagination may "wander hither and 
thither". Also in his conclusion he remarks that it is 
the artist*s responsibility to leave just enough to the 
spectator*s imagination to stimulate that activity 
without leaving everything to the imagination. The idea 
of the artist guiding the spectator*s imagination is also 
raised by Savile in his discussion of Laocoon (see 
Chapter 7). It is reasonable to expect the artist to have 
some control over the spectator’s response since the 
artist is the author of a picture’s images. Whether such
control is essential is a separate question.
Ruskin formulated his own theory of imagination, 
focusing on the beholder’s share in aesthetic experience. 
He identifies three "forms" of imagination justified by 
his view that "art works are reflected on by mind and are 
modified or coloured by our imagination."^ The first 
form of imagination combines images or creates new ones 
by combining them. The second form, the penetrative 
imagination, is also active but it seems to be more 
explorative or adventurous by penetrating the work 
through perceptual cues from the artist. Ruskin 
identifies a third form of imagination in which it is in
a contemplative mood. It is described as a kind of 
suspension from the work, yet still active in 
contemplating the work itself. Here, imagination deprives
...the subject of material and bodily
shape, and regarding such of its qualities
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only as it chooses for particular purpose, 
it forges these qualities together in such 
groups and forms as it desires, and gives 
to their abstract being consistency and 
reality, by striking them as it were with 
the die of_an image belonging to other 
matter.•.
In all three modes imagination is actively engaged with 
the work of art through the images provided by the 
artist.
These "forms" of imagination roughly correspond to 
the kinds of imaginative activity in the spectrum model 
discussed in Chapter 5. Imagination appears to play with 
pictorial images- combining them creatively and maybe 
forming new ones (what I have called secondary images). 
At a more active level, the imagination is explorative, 
freely responding to the images of the picture. By 
grasping them the spectator can project himself into the 
world of those images and explore the relations between 
them or the ideas they express. In its most heightened 
mode, imagination is inventive, creating its own images 
to fill out what is already in the picture, and for 
visualizing, e.g. the movement of horses, the mist of a 
stormy sea, the cries of victims, or roars of a lion.
There are two more noteworthy points in Ruskin*s 
account of imagination. Firstly, in contrast to Kant and 
Coleridge, he discusses the spectator’s imagination in 
relation to skill. The imagination of the spectator must 
be cultivated and improved; we are not simply blessed 
with the ability to explore paintings imaginatively.
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It is nevertheless evident, that however 
suggestive the work or picture may be, it 
cannot have effect unless we are ourselves 
both watchful of its every hint, and 
capable of understanding and carrying it 
out...
This emphasis on the spectators imaginative skill is 
valuable because it suggests that we should explore what 
the artist presents to us, but this might also lead to an 
overemphasis on the beholder's share, so that we set out 
to enrich our own experience to the point of selfishness, 
or hedonistic rather than properly aesthetic pleasure.
Other remarks by Ruskin suggest this possible 
overemphasis, especially when he places the value of a 
painting on its power to evoke the spectator's 
imagination. For example, he compares Fra Angelico's The 
Annunciation with Tintoretto's painting on the same 
theme, praising the latter for its imaginative, 
suggestive power, but of the former he says, "All is 
exquisite in feeling, but not inventive nor 
imaginative.
Secondly, Ruskin believes that only some painters
possess imaginative power, e.g. Turner and Tintoretto,
which enable them to perceive and reveal "Divine essence"
through art.
Now, in all these instances, let it be 
observed that the virtue of imagination is 
its reaching, by intuition and intensity of 
gaze (not by reasoning, but by its 
authoritative opening and revealing power), 
a more essential truth than is seen at the 
surface of things. ^
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The relevatory power of the artist's imagination is 
connected to the penetrative imagination because,
"The power of every picture depends on the penetration of 
the imagination into the TRUE nature of the thing 
represented...".-*^ By contrast, the unimaginative painter 
only possesses a skill for composition. "*"* Though he 
recognizes the importance of imagination to the artist, 
he may be guilty of overemphasis in this context as well.
While imagination is not the core of Ruskin*s theory 
of art as it is for Coleridge, he devalues many important 
works on the basis of lacking imaginative content. This 
is limiting, and moreover, his account of imagination 
becomes more difficult to grasp when described in 
connection with artistic genius. On this point, there are 
rough similarities between artistic genius in Kant, 
poetic genius in Coleridge, and the artist's imaginative 
power in Ruskin.
On the other hand, Ruskin's ideas on imagination 
illustrate some of the ways in which we exercise 
imagination in response to paintings, and here his 
description of imagination's powers is more coherent.
Collingwood
In Book II of Principles of Art Collingwood sets out 
to define the terms he uses in Book I where he expounds
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his view of art as imaginative expression. Here he 
develops a theory of imagination after considering the 
background of the concept in philosophers from Descartes 
to Kant. Briefly, this theory is closely tied to Kant*s, 
and he notes this similarity when he says that 
imagination "is an 1indispensible function* for our
it 5knowledge of the world around us. The main difference 
between the two accounts lies in the terms Collingwood 
uses, namely "feeling" to indicate any kind of sensation, 
and "consciousness" to indicate the power which modifies 
and converts "crude feelings" (sense impressions) into 
imaginations (ideas). Imagination forms the idea from the 
feeling, though to carry this out it is dependent on the 
power of consciousness, which is an activity of thought. 
In this sense then, all experience is permeated by 
imagination.
Because this theory of imagination provides the 
foundation of Collingwood*s view of art as imaginative 
expression, we should bear in mind that "artistic 
imagination" has a special meaning for him.
Collingwood puts forward the view that aesthetic 
experience, artistic activity, is the expression of 
emotion, and he describes this expression as a "total 
imaginative activity" which he in turn calls art.^
This "total imaginative activity" is rooted in his theory 
of imagination. The following passage illustrates this 
connection:
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Every imaginative experience is a sensuous 
experience raised to the imaginative level 
by an act of consciousness; or, every 
imaginative experience is a sensuous 
experience together with a consciousness of 
the same. Now the aesthetic experience is 
an imaginative experience. It is wholly and 
entirely imaginative; it contains no 
elements that are not imaginative, and the 
only power which can generate it is the^ 
power of the experient's consciousness. °
Like Ruskin, Collingwood regards imagination as necessary 
in the aesthetic response. But Collingwood furthermore 
maintains that art necessarily depends on the imagination 
of both the artist and the beholder.
He defines art as a product of imagination when he 
says that a
...work of art need not be what we should 
call a real thing. It may be what we call 
an imaginary thing....But a work of art may 
be completely created when it has been 
created as a thing^whose only place is in 
the artist's mind.
He goes on to say that "Music does not consist of heard 
noises, paintings do not consist of seen colours, and so 
f o r t h . T h e s e  remarks have tagged Collingwood as an 
originator (with Croce) of the Ideal Theory which asserts 
that the creation of an artwork is basically complete in 
the artist's imaginative conception of it. It is 
unfortunate that Collingwood took his psychological model 
of artistic expression so far because there is a variety 
and richness of ideas in Principles of Art which has
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perhaps been neglected. Besides some of the interesting 
distinctions he makes between art and craft, art and 
amusement art, and imagination and make-believe, his 
examples of the imaginative component of artistic 
activity are revealing.
Some of Collingwood1s examples on imaginative 
activity can be useful for understanding the connection 
between imagination and art, but they must be bracketed 
off from some of his more questionable views. In what 
follows, I will consider his theory of art as imagination 
and claim that, firstly, it offers insight into how 
artists use imagination to create works of art, but that 
it is weakened by a tendency to devalue the critical and 
often spontaneous process of art-making as it is carried 
out through a particular medium. Secondly, I argue that 
Collingwood places artistic activity into a psychological 
framework which he does not explain sufficiently. The 
result is a vagueness in his theory stemming from an 
insufficient connection between imagination and 
expression. I conclude by asserting that, despite these 
weaknesses, his ideas support my argument for the 
connection between art and imagination.
His remarks about music deserve particular attention 
because his view of art as imagination is, I think, more 
tenable in respect of this art form. The musician’s 
imagination, in my view, must be a skilled one (which 
does not mean that musicians require visual imagery, but
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that they have the ability to imagine melodies and 
harmonies). In fact, the orchestrator may have to be even 
more skilled in order to imagine combinations of sounds 
and ways in which to arrange them.
But some musicians work step by step, playing every 
sound on a piano as they hear it, or transcribing that 
sound each time into notation. Collingwood, by contrast, 
claims that any tune composed by a musician is fully 
composed in the musician's mind and complete in that 
conception. He claims that the notation of a piece is not 
the music at all, "The actual making of the tune is 
something that goes on in his head, and nowhere else."^ 
He also says that though music is written down in 
notation that, "...the musician's tune is not there on 
the paper at all. What is on the paper is not music, it 
is only musical n o t a t i o n . C o l l i n g w o o d  is correct in 
this because it is only the subsequent playing of the 
tune from the notation which, as a combination of audible 
sounds, is a piece of music. However, it can be claimed 
that musical notation is secondary to the musician's 
creative process but it does complete the process, making 
the tune permanent, as it were. Also, it is unlikely that 
what a musician "hears" as a completed work in his head 
will match what is written in notation and then played.
Collingwood seems to say that the actual art-making 
itself is an activity which is carried out by the 
artist's imagination, and therefore such creation need
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not depend on a medium for its completion. However, I do
not think that he means to say that the artistic medium
is irrelevant and unnecessary to art. Though his ideas
are open to the first interpretation, he does at least
acknowledge how the imaginative experience and the art-
product come together.
There are two experiences, an inward or 
imaginative one called seeing and an 
outward or bodily one called painting, 
which in the painter*s life are 
inseparable, and form one single 
indivisible experience, an experience which 
may be described as painting 
imaginatively. J
But it is not clear just what he means by "painting 
imaginatively". Elsewhere he describes the artist’s 
experience as "psycho-physical1*, however this does not 
entirely clarify the nature of imaginative expression.
Blocker sheds some light on this issue by
approaching Collingwood*s view as fixed in his theory of
imagination. Blocker offers a positive reading, asserting
that the merits of his view lie in the insistence on the
artist’s expression as embodied in and inseparable from
the actual work of art. We can thus only grasp this
private experience through the external, public medium.
Evidence for this can be found in Collingwood*s chapter,
"The Artist and the Community'*, where he discusses the
difference between merely looking at a subject
aesthetically and the act of painting it.
The painter puts a great deal more into his 
experience of the subject than a man who
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merely looks at it; he puts into it, in 
addition, the whole consciously performed 
activity of painting....he records there 
not the experience of looking at the 
subject without painting it, but the far 
richer and in some ways very different 
experience-of looking at it and painting it 
together.
Collingwood attaches a particular significance to the 
artistic medium, and here, lifts it out of its role as a 
mere facility for artistic expression.
But in spite of this, Collingwood perhaps exaggerates 
the role of imagination and the inner experience of the 
artist. Returning to music, there is another feature of 
it which Collingwood overlooks. A complicated tune can 
exist in one's imagination but the performance of a 
notated piece is inevitably an interpretation of the 
composer's original work. If Collingwood used classical 
music as his model, it is the case that many works are
played true to the notation though even here the
conductor reads into the piece something more than what 
is notated. A better example against Collingwood's claim 
is the case of improvisational jazz in which every
performance of a standard piece is a new and original
composition in itself. Every improvised performance of 
"I've Got Rhythm" is therefore an original composition so 
that it is the performance of it which is the work of art 
(though based on Gershwin's original tune). Collingwood 
might have responded that however spontaneous the 
improvisation, an imaginative idea of the musician's
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improvising precedes the actual playing of the 
instrument. This could be true, however implausible it 
seems, but the question remains of how we can know 
whether the musician did have such an imaginative 
experience; a question even the musician may be unable to 
answer. By placing the creation of a work in the artist's 
mind, Collingwood grounds art in a psychological 
framework of which we can know very little.
My views on the imaginative activity in the aesthetic 
response are also, to an extent, psychologically based. 
However, I am not putting forward a psychological model 
for the aesthetic response, but rather trying to 
elucidate the ways in which we approach works 
imaginatively. At least in the case of the beholder, we 
need not be concerned with questions as to the source of 
the artist's creativity; whether it is subconscious or 
not; how the actual conceptual process takes place, etc. 
The work of art is simply before the beholder, and it is 
that alone to which the spectator, listener or reader 
responds. What Collingwood says about the beholder's 
imagination is for that reason more convincing.
For Collingwood, it is through imagination that we
take in works of art in the first place.
When we listen to a speaker or singer, 
imagination is constantly supplying 
articulate sounds which actually our 
ears do not catch. In looking at a 
drawing in pen or pencil, we take a 
series of roughly parallel lines for the 
tint of a shadow.
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On music he says that, "The music to which we listen is 
not heard sound, but that sound as amended in various 
ways by the listener’s imagination, and so with the other 
arts."^ Collingwood is advocating his own version of a 
theory of imaginative perception, linked to his theory of 
imagination. Imagination is the tool used by the 
percipient to first recognize a representation, and then 
to actively experience it by "always supplementing, 
correcting and expurgating" what is perceived, (in fact 
he believes that we use imagination to supplement our 
perceptions of ordinary objects as well as to supplement 
our perceptions of art objects.) Works of art are only 
experienced as a "total imaginative activity" through 
which both artist and percipient express emotions; hence 
his idea of art as both imaginative and expressive.^
I disagree with Collingwood1s claim that all art 
requires imaginative perception namely because 
imagination is not necessary to appreciate all works of 
art. Aside from this, Collingwood1s idea of imagination’s 
capacity to supplement our perceptual experience of art 
works is relevant to the kinds of imaginative activity I 
have identified above. His theory is perhaps most 
interesting when it points to specific ways in which we 
use imagination. In the following quote he describes 
imaginative "tactile and motor" projection:
...what we get from looking at a picture
is not merely the experiencing of seeing
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and partly imagining, certain visible 
objects; it is also, and in Mr. Berenson's 
opinion more importantly, the imaginary 
experience of certain complicated muscular 
movements.
The imaginative experience of putting oneself into a 
picture does amount to imagining oneself moving about a 
depicted scene. It is an experience in which the 
"...*plaine1 of the picture1 disappears... and we go 
through it...", metaphorically speaking.^ On poetry he 
is also specific, describing poetic imagery of sounds, 
sights, "tactile and motor experiences", and scents which 
the poem brings before our minds.^
Finally, though he may give too much of a role to
imagination in aesthetic experience, he understands the 
way in which imagination can be said to be present to 
some degree in all experience. I do not advocate the view 
that imaginative activity is the core of human 
experience, but I have indicated through my spectrum 
model that we can assign imagination a role in the 
synthesis of sense perceptions into knowledge, and 
recognize a connection between this use and the more 
active ones such as visualizing, in particular the 
visualizing we might exercise in response to a work of 
art. Collingwood*s theory brings to the fore the sense in 
which imagination in artistic expression is rooted in a
use of imagination in understanding. The upshot of this
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is a continuity between the uses of imagination in 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic experience.
6.7 Imaginative Experience in Art and Life
In this section, I move from imaginative activity in 
the aesthetic response to return to the relationship 
between imagination in aesthetic and ordinary experience. 
Here I emphasize that there is no fundamental difference 
between aesthetic and non-aesthetic imagination (though I 
have asserted that imagination is most free when 
contemplating objects aesthetically or interpreting works 
of art). This continuum in our concept and use of 
imagination reflects a more general continuum between art 
and life. In the philosophy of both John Dewey and Ronald 
Hepburn this continuum is at the heart of their aesthetic 
ideas.
Dewey
In Art as Experience, Dewey recognizes this 
continuity in his criticism of the concept of 
"disinterestedness'1 in aesthetics. Though the concept has 
been misinterpreted in Kant, there is still a tendency in 
aesthetics to brand aesthetic experience as subjective. 
Aesthetic experience as subjective is marked mainly by an 
individual's aesthetic contemplation of an object rather
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than an interest in what we can learn from it. Dewey 
objects to the implications of this portrayal of 
aesthetic experience, maintaining that it is not 
disinterested contemplation but "attentive observation" 
in which we are not detached from the object: "There is 
no severance of self, no holding it aloof, but fullness 
of participation."^ In his treatment of aesthetic 
interest he integrates aesthetic experience into ordinary 
experience such that aesthetic experience, though still a 
heightened sensuous and imaginative experience, is not 
detached or disinterested.
The continuity between art and life can be explained
through the imaginative component of artistic activity.
Dewey reveals this continuity in his discussion of how
imagination constitutes the "human contribution" (the
psychological aspects and elements of aesthetic
experience) to art, and how the inventive activity of
imagination is responsible for both technical and
artistic invention. On the "human contribution" Dewey
asserts that
Possibilities are embodied in works of art 
that are not elsewhere actualized; this 
embodiment is the best evidence that can?be 
found of the true nature of imagination.
Imagination presents new possibilities, a departure from 
the ordinary or habitual, through works of art. For the 
artist, this means interpreting nature in new and 
inventive ways through imagination1s powers. This is
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reminiscent of Kant’s idea of imagination’s ability to 
create a ’’second nature" through works of art.
As to the value and effect of putting imagination to
use in this way, Dewey says:
"Revelation" in art is the quickened 
expansion of experience. Philosophy is 
said to begin in wonder and end in 
understanding. Art departs from what.has 
been understood and ends in wonder. ^
To illustrate Dewey's ideas, consider an artist painting 
a still life picture. The artist perceives the bowl of 
fruit as composed of different fruits of various shapes, 
sizes and colours. When painting the scene the artist 
might try to capture the essence of the fruit by 
emphasizing its sensuous characteristics through the 
paint, transforming an ordinary scene into a sensuous 
experience for the spectator. As spectators, we see the 
fruit as a conception arising out of the artist's 
imaginative and creative powers; a conception which 
causes us to appreciate an otherwise typical scene in a 
novel way.
Art objects as well as created objects are products
of imagination in the sense that imagination is used by
both artist and inventor.
Some existent material was perceived in 
the light of relations and possibilities 
not hitherto realized when the steam 
engine was invented.
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But while this creativity is common to technical and
artistic invention, the imaginative component of the
latter is the function of the work such that it
...operates imaginatively rather than 
in the realm of physical existences...
The formed matter of esthetic experience 
directly expresses, in other words, the 
meanings that are imaginatively 
evoked...
For Dewey, then, imagination is the source of human 
creativity whether for the ends of art or not. But the 
special imaginative capacity for approaching things in 
new and striking ways is that which sets art apart from 
ordinary objects and allows the percipient to grasp the 
imaginative content of works of art. For example, an 
artist might imagine a tree as shaped like a wizard. The 
artist then paints the tree in a way which suggests this 
particular shape to the percipient. Through this visual 
suggestion, the spectator might interpret the tree as a 
great, cloaked wizard who represents the mystical powers 
of nature. Dewey, like Kant, Ruskin, and Collingwood, 
remarks that our imaginative experience must be tied to 
the object itself so that the experience is "saturated 
with qualities of the o b j e c t . I n  the tree example, the 
artist provides a visual cue for the imagination, so that 
the imaginative experience arising from our perception of 
the picture is directly tied to the picture.
Imagination links art and life through its activity 
of spiriting us away from the real toward new experiences
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which help us to understand our own situation. We can 
learn something through the imaginative activity which 
characterizes aesthetic experience. This assertion might 
provide support for the argument that we should endeavor 
to explore works of art imaginatively whenever possible 
in order to discover as much as we can, though this need 
not relegate the work to a mere prop for knowledge.
Hepburn
In his article "Art, Truth and the Education of 
Subjectivity", Hepburn tackles the possibility of truth 
in art and the relevance of the subjective nature of 
aesthetic experience to knowledge. In my reading of 
Hepburn's argument, imagination seems to be the key to 
our understanding of the "truth" of the work itself.
The spectator is prompted not only to 
react, but also (importantly) to act.
If he is to appropriate the insight, 
the 'truth', his mind has to make leaps- 
leaps from individual episode, painted 
figure or object, musical phrase, to 
larger and different realities, and to 
discern the bearing of one upon the 
other.
He gives a concrete example of this in the "perceptual 
leap from smudges and blobs of paint to the depth and
70
brilliance of a sunlit landscape. ' I interpret this 
leap of mind as enabled by imagination. If this is true, 
then imagination enhances our interpretation of a work of
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art through its recognitional and explorative activity, 
thereby revealing something about the subject to us. 
Hepburn1s ideas are reminiscent of Ruskin's relevatory, 
artistic imagination, and the active participation of the 
spectator* s imagination. Also, the **perceptual leap" 
echoes Collingwood*s perceptual imagination in which it 
fills out the images we see on the canvas. The concrete 
images of poems and the symbolic images of paintings stir 
imagination into this activity.
Our understanding of the meaning of a work extends 
from the recognition of what the images represent to a 
revelation of something about the world or about human 
nature. Through our imaginative concentration we 
appreciate ideas in the work but we may also learn 
something new. Kant expressed this in his idea of the 
expression of rational ideas through aesthetic ideas, 
though he may not have agreed that we learn from the 
rational ideas expressed in art. I do not think that we 
should treat art as a "message-bearer", but art is not 
always a pretty picture for delightful contemplation. Art 
undoubtedly challenges the imagination. Through 
imaginative reflection we can discover the meaning of a 
work and its relevance to life.
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CHAPTER 7: IMAGINATION AND PICTORIAL REPRESENTATION
7.1 Elliott and Savile on the Imaginative Response
Few aesthetic theories would deny the place of 
imagination in the experience of art. Many artists expect 
the spectator to use imagination in contemplating a work, 
and many artworks evoke an imaginative response from the 
spectator. I have explained the role of imagination in 
aesthetic experience in Chapter 6, but in this chapter I 
would like to focus on the role of imagination in 
pictorial representation. Specifically, I will examine 
the operations of the imagination in the spectator*s 
response to pictures, and to what extent imagination adds 
to or enhances the spectator*s appreciation of pictures. 
My explanation of the role of the imagination for 
understanding, interpreting, and appreciating pictures 
includes an argument for the relevance of imagination to 
the spectators response. The ideas of both R.K. Elliott 
and Anthony Savile are particularly useful in defending 
the place of imagination in pictorial experience.
In Chapter 3, I argued that Wollheim*s theory of 
pictorial representation, "seeing-in", does not provide 
an adequate explanation of how pictures represent their 
subjects, nor how we experience pictures. The concept of 
"twofoldness11 which defines the experience of "seeing- 
in", while plausible, is not explained fully enough by
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Wollheim to elucidate the nature of pictorial 
representation. I claimed that we cannot understand 
pictorial representation as merely a visual experience, 
which is the primary way in which Wollheim explains 
pictorial experience. Though Wollheim does acknowledge 
the use of imagination in the spectator*s response, he 
limits the use of imagination to a few kinds of pictures 
by particular artists (since they are, he claims, created 
with the intention of evoking imaginative activity in the 
spectator). His ,,central" and ,lacentral" imagining are 
useful terms for explaining what it means to imagine 
“from within" a picture and "from without", but his 
discussion of imagination in this context generally sets 
parameters for the use of imagination. Instead of 
explaining the various ways in which imagination is often 
essential to our very understanding of many kinds of 
pictures, Wollheim restricts its use, in case the free 
rein of imagination detracts from our appreciation of the 
work itself.
R.K. Elliott*s article, "Imagination in the 
Experience of Art" and Anthony Savile*s book, Aesthetic 
Reconstructions, both present strong arguments for the 
relevance of imagination to the experience of art. They 
concentrate on the imagination *s engagement with 
paintings, and to what extent it is free in its 
engagement. While it remains a separate question whether 
or not the spectator can control his or her imaginative
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experience or set imagination free at will, it is 
undeniable that we do use imagination to some degree in 
the contemplation of artworks. Both Elliott and Savile 
hold this view, but Elliott calls for complete freedom of 
the imagination, even to the extent of fantastic 
imaginings. On the other hand, Savile argues that an 
imaginative response is only appropriate when it is under 
the control or, in a sense, directed by the artist.
Elliott
While Elliott’s view is appealing for the 
possibilities it offers to the spectator’s imaginative 
involvement and enjoyment of a painting, a sense of the 
work itself may be lost. On the other hand, limiting 
imaginative experience to the expectations of the artist 
may be unrealistic and may repress the imaginative 
activity which can enhance the spectator’s overall 
aesthetic experience of the work.
Elliott sets out to prove that the aesthetic 
objectivist*s argument against imagination in the 
experience of art is unfounded. The objectivist argues 
that the spectator should only be concerned with the 
objective features of the work and nothing external to 
that. In a painting this will consist almost exclusively 
of its formal features like lines and colours. On this 
view, attention to what is not grasped in the perception
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of the picture leads to a private experience which is not
related to what is depicted by the artist. The
imagination is the culprit, according to the objectivist,
because its activity may distract the spectator's
attention away from the images perceived in the picture.
Elliott argues that perception and imagination work
together in the spectator's experience of a painting. In
response to Chagall's The Falling Angel, he writes
An image of movement comes momentarily into 
contact with the depicted angel, but he 
[the spectator] cannot hold it there long 
enough to be quite sure that it was ever 
present at all. Imaginal attention has 
involved him in the ecstasies of the 
represented time, but he is still 
bound by perception to a static object.
A sort of struggle ensues between the 
real and the imaginal for1possession 
of the visual impression.
"Imaginal attention" involves both perception and 
imagination. The spectator must continue perception of 
the picture while allowing the imagination freedom to 
experience the images. Throughout this experience, visual 
attention is continuous so that the spectator continues 
concentrating on what the picture rather than 
daydreaming. This point becomes more important when 
Elliott suggests that the spectator may even allow 
him/herself to be "spirited away" which is to be involved 
with the picture without identifying with anything 
actually depicted in it. Through intense concentration on 
the picture, the spectator can conjure up further images
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which enhance the depicted images. The new images are not 
depicted, they exist only for the individual, yet they 
are related to what is perceived in the picture. For 
example, one can imagine the action following what is 
depicted in Griinewald's The Buffeting (also called The 
Mocking of Christ). The figure of Christ is about to be 
dealt a heavy blow by a figure whose arm is raised with 
his hand in a fist. The action of fists falling on the 
helpless figure can be imagined with little effort.
Furthermore, Elliott claims that the spectator's 
"imaginal self" projects itself into the picture's world 
wherein the spectator identifies with the figure about to
o
strike Christ. Here imaginative projection involves the
spectator in an activity which extends beyond visual
perception. Elliott's explanation of how visual
perception and imagination work together is succinct. The
spectator's visual attention remains on the figures in
the picture while he or she imaginatively identifies with
the action therein.
In some sense an image of a blow came into 
contact with what was seen, but it was 
achieved by adding to it an imaginal 
dimension of inwardness, thus circumventing 
the need to_get a change into the visual 
impression.
Imagining can coincide with visual attention, in fact 
both are often dependent on each other for their success.
While this kind of response is natural (we might 
react similarly if faced with such impending action in
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real life), Elliott takes the imaginative response a step
further wherein the spectator actually creates new
images. These new images are relevant to what is depicted
since they originate in the spectator’s intense
concentration on the picture, yielding a richer
experience. The experience may be enhanced by the
imagination’s activity, but it is unlikely, I think, that
direct attention to the picture itself will continue. The
spectator may still be concentrating, but probably on
images which may no longer be related (and only causally
connected) to the picture. The implication of being
"spirited away" would seem to be just that: spirited away
from the picture. Elliott is right in claiming that
concentration may coincide with an imaginative response.
However, while he acknowledges the possibility of
concentration shifting away from the picture itself, he
does not sufficiently address this problem. It is argued
that the spectator attends to the picture even in a state
of rapture:
...the state of rapture is not a 
progressive drifting away from the work. It 
seems to have a double movement: an 
expansive moving out from the work along 
the lines of relevance, and a turning back 
upon the work which concentrates the 
additional ideas and images around it like 
a nimbus.
A state of rapture can be a relevant response to a 
painting, and the work should be judged accordingly. If 
the spectator interprets a painting and responds to its
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images to such an extreme, the painting has at least 
engaged the spectator's attention and moved him/her. But, 
I think, the most that can be said about the connection 
between the depicted images and the state of the 
spectator is that the images affected the response. 
Whether or not the state of rapture is appropriate 
depends on how intimately related this state is to the 
picture- however, this relationship is not easily 
defined. In any case, Elliott thinks that this kind of 
response is appropriate because he claims that 
imagination obeys a rule of relevance. In particular, it 
is the fanciful imagination which is “orderly" so as not 
to detract from the work."*
So on Elliott's view the imagination may enhance our 
appreciation of the picture without diminishing our 
aesthetic experience. In fact, imagining which is related 
to the work can result in more concentration, hence more 
interest in the work.^ It is the spectator's 
responsibility to control the imaginative response, but 
even if under control, can he or she also allow it the 
freedom required to reach the state of rapture or the 
spiriting away that Elliott refers to? As long as such 
control is determined by the spectator, there is a 
conflict between keeping imagination in check and giving 
it free rein.
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Savile
By contrast, Savile suggests that the imagination may 
be given free rein as long as it is under the artist1s 
control. The artist controls the spectator's response 
through the images presented, which Savile argues are 
created with an intention that we can guess and sometimes 
know. This limits the role of fantasy in the imaginative 
response so that when a spectator becomes involved in a 
fantasy, it enhances the experience only if the artist 
requires this for a proper interpretation of the picture. 
The fantasy is an appropriate response as long as it does 
not lead the spectator away from the work and into a 
private experience irrelevant to the represented or 
unrepresented content of the picture.
Savile comments on fantasy in his analysis of
Gotthold Lessing's Laocoon or On the limits of Painting
and Poetry. Lessing argues that an imaginative response
to pictures should be cultivated because it keeps the art
alive for us; the imagination makes the work fresh for
the spectator even after repeated viewings of the same
picture. Lessing believes that the imagination is engaged
by paintings when, for example
We tremble beforehand, about to see Medea 
at her cruel deed, and our imagination goes 
out far beyond everything that the painter 
could show us at this terrible moment.
Lessing is concerned with the emotional appeal of
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pictures, and it is the images that the spectator sees
which have the power to engage the imagination. Of
painting he writes:
Now that alone is significant and fruitful 
which gives free play to the imagination.
The more we see, the more must we be able 
to add by thinking. The more we add thereto 
by thinking, so much more can we believe 
ourselves to see.
On the premise that works of art evoke imaginative 
activity, Savile describes how the imagination works at 
different levels in its interaction with a painting. The 
purpose of his description is to explain what he thinks 
Lessing means by the use of imagination by the spectator. 
Through his examination of Lessing*s views, he provides a 
clear and detailed explanation of the role of imagination 
in the spectator*s response. The context of Lessing’s 
work to which Savile is responding is narrative art, in 
particular, paintings. Therefore, on his view, these 
modes of imagination may only be applicable to narrative 
pictures, but I will argue that much of what he says can 
be applied to other types of paintings as well.
Savile is careful to emphasize two features of the
spectator’s imagination at each level of its interaction 
with a picture. In its activity, the imagination must be 
checked while at the same time allowed the freedom 
required for a full experience of the work, and he
recognizes the paradox between control and freedom of the
imagination, taking control to be the more important
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activity. Fantasy can lead to an inappropriate response
to a picture so imagination must coexist with attention
to the work. It must resist (through the spectator's
will) becoming so free that it actually detracts from the
work, perhaps causing a misunderstanding of the
representation. By contrast, when applied prudently its
activity can add to our overall appreciation of the work.
Savile is sceptical of responses involving fantasy:
...where phantasy is encouraged by a work 
of art and is of the kind controlled by the 
artist, it is not something that speaks in 
favour of the work qua art. We think it too 
weak at a certain point to hold our 
attention in its own right, or else we see 
it as implicitly abandoning pretensions to 
artistic consideration altogether, and 
serving some more dubious end. In either 
case we regard the invitation to this 
exercise of imagination as a defect and 
not a strength. y
While I agree with Savile, I am also sympathetic to 
Elliott's view. Pictures will not always evoke fantasy 
and fantasy will not be the appropriate response to all 
pictures, but a response which involves fantasy need not 
detract from the work qua art. Also, however, the problem 
remains of how to distinguish clearly an appropriate 
response from one which is not directly concerned with 
the picture's content. I will turn to Savile's 
description of imaginative activity before addressing 
that question.
Savile sketches out three levels or modes of 
imagination in its interaction with a painting- the
233
exploratory, projective and ampliative levels. At these 
levels, the imagination is "fantasy-resistant", yet more 
freedom is allowed at each of the different levels. 
Different kinds of narrative pictures call for different 
levels, and it depends on the picture as to which level 
will be used by the spectator. Savile emphasizes that not 
all pictures will evoke imaginative activity, and it is 
often only at the artist's (intentional) invitation that 
a picture will evoke (and sometimes require) the role of 
imagination.
7.2 Exploratory Imagination
The exploratory imagination facilitates the 
spectator's initial recognition and interpretation of the 
images in the picture. The spectator explores the images 
on the canvas in order to understand what they represent 
and how they come together to make up a unified 
composition. Savile offers the example of the exploratory 
imagination as it is applied to Goya's picture of a monk 
with a garrotte around his neck. It is not immediately 
apparent to the spectator that the garrotte is just that, 
but by exploring the image of the band around the neck 
together with the figure, we come to see that the monk is 
in fact dead, and the horrid nature of what is 
represented then dawns. Savile says:
The shock we experience is delayed, and
delayed because imagination (or less
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comittally, thought) has had to explore the 
possibilities in making sense of the signs, 
and had to travel beyond what it directly 
and immediately recognized.10
Here exploratory imagination is an important ingredient 
in our contemplation of the picture; without it we would 
not see the picture as representing a dead monk and would 
therefore have an incomplete understanding of the picture 
(we might even misread the picture altogether).
It is essential for the understanding of some 
pictures that we imaginatively explore what the images 
might represent- like putting together the pieces of a 
puzzle. Narrative pictures seem to be particularly suited 
for such explorative activity. In epic scenes such as 
Poussin’s The Triumph of David and The Plague at Ashdod, 
we must both visually and imaginatively explore the 
various figures and their actions in order to piece 
together the story portrayed and how it relates to the 
literary sources which have inspired these paintings.
Some pictures (besides the narrative pictures with which 
Savile is primarily concerned) demand imagination for us 
to see even what the images are of, and then how they are 
related to the other images in the picture. We can 
imagine obvious examples, such as surrealist pictures 
whose meaning is not evident until one is able to see how 
the wierd images represent or symbolize things we can 
recognize. For example, almost any of Magritte’s pictures 
take some figuring out in order to appreciate them
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properly. Examples in more traditionally representational 
works are also numerous. The red blobs of paint in many 
of Constable*s landscapes are unrecognizable as depicting 
anything at all, but with the help of imagination we can 
understand these red patches to represent clothing on a 
small figure in the picture.
What operates in these instances is not simply keen 
visual attention. It may not be enough just to see the 
red patch: seeing the patch is essential to the 
explorative imagination's task, but seeing the red patch 
only facilitates the task, it does not complete it. We 
may make an unconscious interpretation, but often we have 
to reflect imaginatively on what that red patch could be, 
and that involves coming up with different possibilities. 
In the Poussin examples, we imagine what the represented 
figures are doing, and in this reflective activity we may 
also understand their actions according to the narrative 
represented through the whole composition. This is the 
sense in which recognizing the images is like putting 
together a puzzle; by understanding the parts of the 
picture, we can come to an understanding of the whole.
We may more easily grasp explorative imagination by 
comparing it to a real life situation in which our 
imagination aids our understanding of things we see. For 
example, if I come upon a man holding a knife and leaning 
over what appears to be a murder victim, at first I take 
the leaning figure to be the murderer but on closer
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inspection I realize that he is crying and that he 
resembles the victim. I consider the possibility that the 
crying man is a guilt-stricken murderer, but decide this 
is probably not the case and therefore conclude that he 
is probably a relative of the victim, perhaps his 
brother. The meaning of the event before me has become 
clear after some imaginative reflection on it. Here, as 
well as in the Constable example, the imagination is 
active in coming up with possibilities to solve the 
problem at hand.
Savile does not think that exploratory imagination
adds to the represented content of a picture, rather it
just helps us to discover what the artist has depicted.
The artist controls the spectator's imagination through
the images on the canvas.
Once its aim is described as finding a 
full and rich account of what the painter 
has depicted, the result of our exploration 
is bound to the signs that the artist 
lays down. 1
This kind of imaginative activity, while free in order to 
explore the images given, is tethered to the images that 
are there, so any additional images which are conjured up 
may not be appropriate to our interpretation of a 
picture. For example, when considering Constable's red 
patch, it would be a misreading of the picture to 
visualize my own modern, red jersey instead of imagining 
what the red jersey worn by the depicted figure might
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look like. Constable would not have intended for me to 
imagine my own clothing and indeed it would have little 
to do with his representation. Savile is clear on this 
point: what we see in the picture guides the 
imagination’s activity at this level. However, he does 
not sufficiently address the fact that we respond to 
pictures differently, imagining what we will. In fact, 
one might argue that my image of my^  red jersey actually 
contributes to recognizing the red patch as a piece of 
clothing, and this in turn facilitates my recognition of 
the red and brown patch as a figure in the painting. 
Savile does recognize that different spectators bring 
their own individual cognitive stock to each particular 
picture they approach. This is a significant point to 
remember since we cannot expect the same response from 
every spectator.
Savile does not consider a serious objection to his 
claims about the artist's control. It is true that the 
artist can control the spectator's imagination to the 
extent that the artist's images evoke it in the first 
place. So, naturally, what the spectator imagines will be 
connected to the picture. However, the artist cannot 
control the spectator who thinks of her own red jersey, 
nor the spectator who uses a portrait with a likeness of 
her mother to give her the opportunity to indulge in a 
reminiscence. Savile has responded to this objection in a 
roundabout way. He has set limits for what imaginative
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activity is relevant and what imaginative activity is 
not. If we use imagination in its exploratory mode to 
understand the picture according to the artist’s 
intention, and we are successful in this goal, then not 
only has imagination been relevant, but it may have even 
facilitated our very understanding of the picture.
This problem remains for Savile: even if certain 
imaginative experiences can be identified as irrelevant 
to a picture, as spectators we may be unable to prevent 
irrelevant responses if the imagination is allowed 
freedom. Here we might return to Elliott’s view that it 
is the spectator's responsibility to check the 
imagination so that it never moves too far away from and 
always returns to the represented or unrepresented 
content of the work.
7.3 Projective Imagination
At the projective level, the spectator can imagine 
what is not depicted but is otherwise represented in the 
picture. We use imagination in this way to project 
ourselves into the picture in order to get a sense of 
what is happening in the depicted events. Wollheim refers 
to this imaginative activity as becoming an "internal 
spectator". By projecting oneself into the picture, the 
spectator may play the role of an internal spectator, and 
even play the part of participant, as for example, the
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soldier about to strike Christ in The Buffeting. In the 
latter case, the spectator imaginatively experiences the 
movement of raised fists as they follow through into 
blows. Here Savile cites Elliott's example, remarking 
that in identifying with the soldier, we imaginatively 
feel his pleasure. Furthermore, the projective 
imagination adds to our understanding and enjoyment of 
the work. By becoming participants in the action as it 
were, we add this experience to what we take in when we 
comtemplate the picture. Hence we come to understand the 
meaning of the images more fully and that in turn 
enriches our appreciation of the work.
Here the picture's images merely suggest a particular
scenario, rather than depicting the action as such. It is
left to the spectator's imagination to respond to the
visual suggestion and to enter the picture's world.
Savile claims that in this mode the projective
imagination remains within the artist's control, and he
argues that this response is allowable because such a
1 )response is both common and predictable. Imagination is
unspontaneous in this mode because we cannot help but
respond to the picture by projecting ourselves into the
scene in some capacity. Also, he claims that imagination
is in a passive state because it only operates in
response to cues in the form of the artist's images.
...it is relatively passive in its 
operation in that it has little choice in 
regard to its actual content up to the 
point at which predictability ends....As I
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have put it, the events that encourage 
projective imagination are in the clearest 
cases those which the mind is inclined to 
think through to its term.
It is true that we will respond according to the artist's
pictorial suggestions. This is certainly the case with
Caspar David Friedrich's Ruckenfigur paintings, those
which typically depict a single figure (sometimes two or
more) in a natural scene. Here there is usually a figure
with his or her back turned to the viewer so that the
figure in the picture is a spectator of the landscape,
seascape, forest, or other scene. This positioning of the
figure invites the external spectator to identify with
it. Koerner, in his excellent book on Friedrich, writes:
Carus cites the motif of a beholder iri the 
picture: 'a solitary figure, lost in his 
contemplation of a silent landscape, will 
excite the viewer of the painting to think 
himself into the figure's place'. In this 
vision of staffage as a surrogate for the 
viewer, or as bridge between our world and 
the painted image, we can discern one 
obvious interpretation of Friedrich's 
Ruckenfigur. Where classical staffage 
aspires to humanize landscape, inscribing 
it into a plot and determining its value 
according to an artificial hierarchy of 
types, the halted traveller works to 
naturalize us as viewers, enabling us to 
enter more fully into the landscape. ^
Friedrich's Woman before the Setting Sun draws the 
spectator into the very position of the woman with her 
back turned and her arms stretched forward, beholding the 
splendour of the setting sun which throws a warm orange 
glow across the landscape. Here we simply project
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ourselves into the place of the passive figure where we 
take part in no "action", just mere contemplation of the 
depicted scene. In this way we come to appreciate both 
the figure's point of view and are invited to contemplate 
the natural scene from a point of view different from 
that of external spectator.
With Friedrich's pictures we are passive spectators 
inside and outside of the picture, but this is not always 
the case when the projective imagination operates. In his 
account of this level of imagination Savile is open to 
the objection that despite the guidance of imagination 
through the artist's images, the free imagination may 
wander away from identification with the picture's 
characters (though this may not happen in the initial 
projective experience). In the Griinewald example, though 
it would be inappropriate to the representation to do so, 
I might imagine what happens after the blows are dealt, 
i.e. even after I have already added to my experience of 
the picture my imaginings of the action of the fists 
falling on Christ. I would agree with Savile that it 
would only be relevant to imagine the action as it 
follows through, but it might be natural, once 
projectively fixed in the scene, to imagine what happens 
next. We might even take part in the future events that 
we imagine will occur in the picture.
My point here is not that this would be the right way 
to respond to the picture, but only that this kind of
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fantasy-response is both possible and unpredictable on 
the part of the artist, Savile justifies the projective 
imaginative response of The Buffeting by claiming that 
such a response is "sufficiently common and 
predictable".-^ But by extending that imaginative 
response, I have cited a possible imaginative experience 
which shows that the projective imagination is not 
"fantasy-resistant". This shows that the artist is not in 
complete control, so the spectator has a responsibility 
to check imagination's activity.
Also, at the projective level imagination is allowed 
more freedom and therefore becomes more active. Unlike 
Savile, I believe that the imagination is always active, 
some pictures causing it to become active to some degree, 
and some spectators controlling the imaginative response 
more or less than other spectators. By active I mean 
explorative and/or inventive as in the Constable example 
above. The imagination does not merely follow visual 
clues set out in the representation, making an automatic 
interpretation; it entertains possibilities for what is 
depicted.
7.4 Ampliative Imagination
According to Savile, the imagination is most free at 
the ampliative level. The ampliative imagination shares 
characteristics with the projective imagination, namely
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that it is in the artist's control and is "fantasy-
resistant", but it is active and enjoys more "inventive
freedom" than the projective imagination. It is active in
its capacity to control and intensify its activity
depending on the images in the picture, but it is also
active in imagining what is not shown in the picture. In
other words, the spectator imagines things that are
suggested by but not depicted in the picture. While this
activity is also characteristic of projective
imagination, the ampliative imagination does not place
the spectator as passive or active participant in the
picture. Savile refers to Laocoon itself where the
spectator imagines how the scene depicted in the picture
came about. Savile argues that even this mode is in the
artist's control, despite its spontaneous and inventive
nature at this level.
Ampliative imagination and thought is on a 
free rein within boundaries that the artist 
sets, and as its detailed elaboration is 
felt to enrich the work, so the working out 
of what those details should be within the 
imposed limits inevitably calls back the 
viewer to the canvas from which he started 
out.1
The spectator returns to the picture afterall, not 
distracted by the new images he or she experiences.
Ampliative imagination is particularly suited for 
narrative pictures and vice versa, but non-narrative 
pictures might also evoke this imaginative mode. A 
portrait of Napoleon on a horse looking courageous and
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proud might lead the spectator to visualize Napoleon 
going bravely into battle on that very horse. One might 
continue visualizing Napoleon fighting, then emerging 
triumphant. This response, while freely imaginative, 
would be appropriate since imagining such deeds would be 
relevant to the stature of Napoleon presented in that 
particular portrait. Similarly, a picture of Napoleon 
after his defeat at Waterloo might conjure up images of a 
gruelling battle in which he emerges not as a hero, but 
as a dejected man. Here the images sparked by the 
particular portrayal of Napoleon help the spectator to 
see him in a certain light. In fact, this kind of 
response would fit in well with the artist's 
expectations.
Savile remarks that ampliative imagination is not 
evoked by all pictures, nor is it necessary to use it in 
order to understand every picture's content. However, he 
argues that there are instances in which it is all 
important to use this mode of imagination. Namely, in 
narrative works of art in which the story is "common 
knowledge" for spectators, it will be natural to use 
ampliative imagination to place the depicted scene into 
the story that is familiar. In this respect we appreciate 
the picture all the more because we can understand how it 
fits into the story. If the picture makes no sense in 
relation to this familiar story, then we may judge the 
representation to have failed in its task to tell us part
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of a story. Savile*s own example of Fra Angelico*s
Annunciation illustrates this point. Part of the picture
shows the Archangel forcing Adam and Eve from the Garden
of Eden. Savile suggests that
It would probably be ground common to 
Lessing and the modern viewer to say that 
the presence of the Expulsion in the scene 
brings sharply to our mind a question that 
few other Annunciations do: "Why is it that 
man needs the promise of redemption that 
the angel brings to Mary?" Now Lessing 
might go on...so we think of Eve's original 
acceptance and eating of the apple, of 
Cain s murder of his brother, of the 
adoration of the calf and so on, as we know 
them in the story, and thus imagination 
works graphically beyond the represented 
scene to enrich Angelico*s painting as it 
presents itself to us. °
Following up this remark about how ampliative imagination 
adds to our appreciation of the work, Savile argues (I 
strongly agree with him on this point) that the use of 
imagination in this way (whether graphically or not) 
takes the spectator beyond the appearance of the picture 
to understanding its content in a deeper way. The 
understanding of a picture only begins with the visual 
experience of its surface; pictorial experience includes 
the activities of visual perception, thought, and 
imagination.
At all three levels the imagination is free but 
Savile assumes that we can know what kind of response the 
artist expects, and that there is a correct response 
which matches the artist*s intention, but it is unclear
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how the spectator is kept in the artist’s control. While 
the actual images in a picture determine imagination *s 
own images in response to it, e.g. projective images, 
they may also cause an experience unrelated to the 
picture.
Besides this problem, Savile*s view suggests a one­
sided conception of art. The artist creates an artwork 
which is influenced by his or her cognitive stock. But 
although an artwork is created sometimes with a specific 
intention or a purpose related to the artist*s 
expectations of the spectator, the spectator also brings 
his or her own cognitive stock and emotional state into 
the experience of a particular artwork. Savile suggests 
that an "informed spectator" will respond to a picture in 
a way which the artist expects. "Informed" here means 
that the spectator will have at least some knowledge of 
the narrative which forms the backdrop for the picture*s 
images. But not all spectators are so informed. We cannot 
be certain that a picture’s images wholly direct the 
spectator’s response because the factors affecting it are 
so variable. With respect to this, Susan Feagin remarks 
that readers actively engage in imaging in response to 
literature, but that the author is at the "mercy" of them 
because the nature of their imaging is not entirely 
predictable. 7 What Savile requires of the spectator may 
therefore be unrealistic.
Furthermore, Savile implies that there is a correct
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response to any particular picture. This view is 
problematic. Firstly, it is difficult if not impossible 
to identify the exact nature of the artist’s intention. 
Even if we could ask the artist, he or she may not always 
be sure what the intention is. He may also fail to fulfil 
it or it may be inadequately described. Suppose for 
example that we decide to rely on a simplistic notion of 
the artist's intention, e.g. "to depict realistically a 
seascape in a storm". Are we then to expect that the 
spectator's experience will consist only in recognizing a 
seascape in a storm and that everything beyond this is is 
incorrect? Identifying a response as "correct" can be 
misleading, though we do notice mistaken interpretations. 
It is not a matter of a right or wrong response, but of a 
variation of responses which would be considered 
appropriate to the particular picture. Narrative 
paintings such as those with biblical or mythical 
allegories, paintings with action scenes, and paintings 
depicting fantastic fictional worlds such as those by 
Bosch, are all more likely to evoke imagination. By 
contrast, portraits, scenes of domestic life, and natural 
scenes are less likely to evoke imagination, though even 
these types of pictures can stir the spectator's 
imagination. Not all pictures will evoke any or all 
levels of imagination, but some will evoke one level, two
levels, or we may use all three levels in our
90contemplation of a picture. v
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7.5 The Relevance of Imagination in Pictorial Experience
In this section, I will examine some examples of 
relevant imaginative responses to discover whether or not 
limits must be set on them. Both Elliott and Savile have 
tried to tackle this problem. Both base their views on 
the belief that the imagination does interact with 
artworks and that its use can enhance the spectatorfs 
experience. The imagination must be free to add to this 
experience, but how free?
Elliott has tried to show what counts as an 
imaginative response, but he does not spell out how the 
imagination is to "work along lines of relevance". On 
Savile*s view, the artist's images determine what the 
spectator experiences so in a sense the artist is 
responsible for it. Savile's exploratory, projective, and 
ampliative modes of the imagination explain various ways 
of engaging with pictures, but it is still uncertain 
which responses he would allow, apart from finding 
fantasy ill-suited for appreciating artworks. He does, 
however, put forward a valuable general guideline: 
imaginative activity is permitted in so far as it 
supplements the spectator's experience in a way that 
contributes to either a basic understanding of the images 
or to a further interpretation of them.
I agree with this, especially because it justifies
249
both the artist's appeal to the spectator's imagination 
and the use of free imaginative activity when viewing 
pictures. However, I think that further explanation is 
required for determining which responses are relevant to 
particular pictures.
It is difficult to pin down exactly when an
imaginative response changes from appropriate to
inappropriate, since there may be a grey area between the
two. Though Feagin is concerned with imaging in response
to literature, her remarks on the problem of relevance
are applicable here.
There are restrictions on what imaginings 
are appropriate but they do not include a 
unique identification of what is imaged: 
the written text makes it determinable 
though not determinate what imagings are 
relevant. 1
Thus, we can possibly identify conditions under which an 
imaginative response would be relevant but there are no 
necessary conditions governing this response. As laid out 
by Savile, the imagination can move from a basic level of 
recognition to interpretation and a more active state in 
which it becomes inventive. My description of imaginative 
responses follows a similar line. There appears to be a 
range of responses reaching from a weaker to a stronger 
play of imagination. Various factors determine this 
range, including the artist's intention, the cognitive 
stock of the artist and spectator, and the type and 
subject-matter of the picture (e.g. stick figure,
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naturalistic landscape, impressionist still life, 
narrative scene, portrait, etc.) Also, not all spectators 
imagine well or vividly, just as not all paintings evoke 
an imaginative response.
The basic interpretation of the images given may 
require little imagination in naturalistic or, 
alternatively, simple pictures. The simplest kind of
picture to interpret might be a stick-figure, a house and
) 0a sun above. But this is not to say that simple or even 
naturalistic pictures always require less imagination 
than, say, a surreal painting might. Beyond mere 
recognition, a still life painting may cause a stirring 
of imaginary sensations- smelling the citric aroma of a 
depicted orange or the taste of biting into a succulent 
peach. These responses are certainly appropriate because 
still life paintings, in addition to being an exercise in 
composition, tempt the spectator through realistic 
depiction.
At another level, the imagination may be required to 
decipher the activity in a picture (like Savile's 
explorative imagination). We may not see children playing 
in a village square if we cannot "see" a ball being 
thrown back and forth or caught (having been depicted as 
in mid-air). The spectator may also fill out the images 
perceived, for example, imagining what lies beyond the 
frame- where a river flows to in a landscape, or what the 
rest of a satin gown looks like in the portrait of a
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seated woman. We place images on the edges of what is 
given and complete the picture for ourselves. This is a 
common reaction to a picture and can also be a conscious 
exercise by the spectator. It is to be encouraged as 
long as it supplements the painting's images with images 
which might have existed had the artist chosen to depict 
more.
Imagining what is happening in a picture is, I think, 
the most common active use of imagination. On seeing a 
Degas painting, one might imagine the movement of 
ballerinas and the sound of soft ballet shoes on a wooden 
floor. We often imagine the atmosphere- the feeling of 
mist and darkness in a Turner seascape. We can animate 
the busy activity in a painting of a market, village 
square or city street: the images come alive as we 
imagine the movement of passers-by, livestock, or the 
sounds of traffic. J
Also, we can imaginatively project ourselves into a 
picture. Recall the example of Las Meninas referred to in 
Chapter 3. While some pictures do strongly suggest such 
projection (Friedrich's pictures come to mind), others do 
not, but I believe that it is still acceptable to engage 
in this kind of exercise. For example, one might want to 
"enter" and explore the classical landscapes of Poussin 
or Lorrain. On the other hand, there are classical scenes 
which do not, in my view, engage much imagination if any. 
Some of Titian's pictures are possible examples. His The
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Three Ages of Man is a study in composition, and the 
meaning of the images is clear from simple reflection on 
them. Understanding the images as depicting man at 
different times in his life may, however, require the use 
of explorative imagination.
It is worth noting the imaginative response of 
remembrance. Is it appropriate to treat a painting like a 
photograph; to inspire nostalgic recollections of a 
person, place or event in one's life? A portrait of an 
unknown subject might remind the spectator of a long lost 
love. This is often a natural response, and if the 
picture is appreciated for itself and a t  the same time 
acts as a catalyst for reflection, the response would not 
seem inappropriate. But if the spectator became 
completely detached, her attention shifting entirely to 
the painful recollection of a part of her life she spent 
years trying to forget, this would be inappropriate. Even 
if her attention returned to the portrait, part of her 
experience in viewing it could be considered irrelevant 
to the picture itself simply because she was thinking 
about someone not depicted by the artist. For example, 
she might be unable to see the unknown face as anyone 
other than her long lost love: she automatically projects 
this face onto the face in the picture. Such daydreaming 
should have no proper role in an imaginative response. On 
the other hand, some pictures, such as an English 
landscape, are meant to be nostalgic; an emotional
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response, even if personal, can be relevant nonetheless.
Some pictures are suggestive of a sequence of events, 
suggestion being a cue for the imagination. The spectator 
is invited to complete the story (Savile*s ampliative 
imagination). Who will be the victor in pictures of 
goddesses fighting wild beasts? The spectator may indeed 
become so engaged with the picture that it recreates all 
aspects of the fight- how it started, terrifying sounds, 
the climax, and the kill. We may empathize with the 
sufferers, feeling their fear and pain. The relevance of 
this response is clear since the imagination, though 
experiencing a kind of fantasy, is still involved in an 
interpretation of the images depicted in the picture; it 
grasps and plays with them.
The relevant imaginative responses which I have 
discussed range from the imagination as it is used for 
the basic interpretation of a picture to the spectator*s 
imaginative projection into a scene. In fact, we respond 
to what we see in real life in much the same way as we do 
to pictures. What we see in real life prepares us for 
what we see in pictures and what we see in pictures 
prepares us for what we see in real life. We may, for 
example, use our imagination to make sense of what could 
have happened in a near accident, or perhaps a face in 
the crowd evokes images of another time and place. In 
this respect the imaginative response to pictures is both 
natural and common.
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But what is the place of imagination in aesthetic 
experience? I would say that it is a tool, the use of 
which can lead to a more pleasurable experience and a 
positive judgement of the work itself. It adds to the 
visual experience and interpretation of pictures, and 
furthermore, in some cases, it be essential to grasping 
the meaning of a group of images. In general, it 
increases the spectator*s involvement with the artwork.
Moreover, many paintings clearly invite the spectator
to fantasize. Bosch depicted creatures and happenings
that could only exist in our wildest dreams. Here,
freeing the imagination to allow for fantasy has a
definite purpose for the work. But although the use of a
Bosch picture for indulging in horrific fantasies might
relate the horror of the picture*s world, such a fantasy
might be more disturbing than the spectator would have
expected. The imagination has interfered with the
aesthetic experience by throwing the spectator into a
nightmare. Those spectators who realize the power of
their own imagination might turn away from Bosch*s
0 /
pictures. A free imagination has its dangers.
The paradox remains then of how much freedom the 
imagination should be allowed. It is fair to say in 
response to Savile that fantasy can be part of a fruitful 
pictorial experience, and in response to Elliott, I have 
argued that the spectator must keep irrelevant imaginings 
in check wherever possible. An imagination unleashed
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could lead to a misunderstanding of a work, and/or a 
response which leaves aesthetic considerations behind.
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-*• R.K. Elliott, "Imagination in the Experience of Art" 
Philosophy and the Arts: Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Lectures, vol~ 6., 1971-1972 , (Macmillan, 1973), 89.
 ^ Savile takes up the Grunewald example when he discusses 
the projective mode of imagination (see 7.3).
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4 Elliott, 101.
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° Feagin cites Elliott on the value of imagination for 
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To emphasize a previous point, I think that all 
pictures require the use of imagination to grasp them as 
objects in the world. However the recognition and 
interpretation of a picture's images may not always 
require imagination to appreciate them properly.
91 Feagin, 46.
22 This idea, that imagination may not be evoked by such 
simple pictures, is similar to Walton's in Mimesis as 
Make-Believe (p. 296).
22 Here I use the term "animating" to describe the act of 
imagining movement in still images. Elliott refers to the 
"Animistic Imagination" which can make us see, for 
example, St. Albans cathedral as a living animal: "The 
cathedral seems to acquire a bodily posture, life, and 
intelligence of some sort, august and brooding." (see 
"Imagination in the Experience of Art", p. 92).
2^ I do not make a sharp distinction between imagination 
and fantasy with the view that the imaginative response 
is relevant while fantasy is not. I regard fantasy as the 
most active and inventive mode of imagination. Taking 
this into account, some fantastic imaginings can be 
relevant while others can go too far.
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CHAPTER 8: THE PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION
8.1 Introduction
I have argued that imagination has a role in the 
appreciation of art and have attempted to unravel the 
complexities involved in the imaginative response to 
pictures. The relevance of this activity has been 
questioned and evaluated by others as well as myself. In 
this chapter my argument will extend beyond a treatment 
of imaginative activity to an argument for the 
cultivation of the imaginative response. Not only do we 
use imagination when appreciating art, but we should use 
it to the best of our abilities where appropriate. I have 
already shown the value of this activity in Chapters 6 
and 7, but some additional remarks are required in order 
to justify the development of our imaginative capacities 
in relation to art, namely pictures.
Pictorial experience cannot be defined by identifying 
a unique feature of it. Some necessary conditions might 
hold, such as seeing the picture under normal viewing 
conditions, but it is unrealistic to expect the spectator 
to respond to every picture using a prescribed set of 
"pictorial skills". It is my view that "seeing-in" and 
"seeing-as" cannot define nor even explain the nature of 
pictorial experience. The spectators response consists 
in seeing the images in the picture, thinking about them,
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and imagining things about the images. But imagination, 
while a significant part of many responses, is also not a 
necessary condition for appreciating pictures. Particular 
pictures are intended for imaginative exploration while 
others are not. Some may evoke the spectator's 
imagination without that intention, and the use of 
imagination would nevertheless be justifiable. Similarly, 
many spectators will choose to use only their perceptual 
capacities to read the picture, leaving aside thoughts or 
imaginings which are not required for interpreting it.
Moreover, the taste of the spectator may dictate 
which capacities are put to use. A spectator who dislikes 
a particular artist or genre will pass by these pictures, 
affording them little beyond a cursory glance; a bad 
painting might cause the same result. Unappealing 
pictures will fail to evoke the kind of perceptual 
curiosity necessary for a sustained contemplation of a 
work. It follows that pictures which interest spectators 
are more likely to evoke the thoughts and imaginings that 
lend themselves to a fuller interpretation of the work.
8.2 Justifying the Imaginative Response
With these factors continually effecting pictorial 
experience, can we ever prescribe the use of certain 
capacities for any particular picture? There are three 
related reasons that show when and why we should use
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imagination for appreciating pictures: (1) some pictures 
are clearly intended for imagination; (2) imagination is 
essential to the "correct" interpretation of some 
pictures; (3) the use of imagination with any or all 
works increases the spectator's involvement with them.
Firstly, while we cannot always know what kind of 
response is expected by the artist, the images in a 
picture themselves can indicate how a spectator is 
expected to perceive a picture and the kinds of things he 
or she might say about it. The nature and composition of 
the images in a picture will also determine the way in 
which the spectator's imagination is evoked (if at all). 
Secondly, this imaginative activity may be essential to 
understanding the images as images of particular things. 
Although some pictures can generate different but equally 
valid interpretations, others generate only one 
interpretation which is appropriate (the David picture of 
the monk exemplifies this). In this capacity imagination 
need not exercise its power of imaging, for the picture 
may only require the spectator to imagine possibilities 
of what the images represent; to be imaginative in the 
effort to understand what the picture is about.
Thirdly, the use of imagination necessarily increases 
the spectator's concentration on the images of a picture. 
In the activity of interpretation, or even in a playful 
response, imagination increases the spectator's 
involvement with the work. While a free imagination can
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sometimes exceed the limits of a relevant exploration of 
the picture, this risk is worth the deeper appreciation 
which results.
The upshot of the imaginative response is not just a 
deeper appreciation of every picture, but an experience 
which is more satisfying. That is, the imaginative 
response can partly account for the pleasure (or shock, 
etc.) we have in our appreciation of a picture. I do not 
want to make the stronger claim that an imaginative 
response categorically leads to a more pleasurable 
experience. Rather, because of the greater involvement 
imagination affords, such an experience is more likely.
This pleasure is not the result of a personal fantasy, 
but is due to imaginings which are tied to the 
representation itself, and our imaginings are pleasurable 
in themselves. Although Feagin only argues that imaging 
in relation to literature is pleasurable in itself-*-, I 
believe that this argument can be extended to include all 
types of imaginings in relation to pictures (and the 
other arts for that matter).
In the course of her argument she defends imaging
against the view that it is a substitute for sensing,
i.e. that imagination "makes the absent present". She
identifies this confusion as follows:
...instead of asserting something about 
whatever qualities imaging has in common 
with sensing, it is understood to assert 
that the pleasurableness of imaging is due 
to the degree to which we would take 
pleasure in what is imaged if it were
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sensed.
In this respect it is wrong to explain the imaginative 
response to pictures in terms of a quasi-sensation of the 
objects depicted by the images. The pleasure we take in 
our imaginings related to pictures is due to the artist*s 
creative work- the subject-matter of the work, choice of 
colours, style, and the nature of depiction. My argument 
here is similar to that against the Illusion Theory. 
Pictures are not meant to be experienced as illusions of 
real objects, but as original, creative representations 
of them. It follows from this that an imaginative 
response which is part of the activity of interpreting a 
picture is not a response to the actual objects the 
artist sets out to depict, but rather to the images. 
Hence, the pleasure is from imaginings connected to the 
images themselves. This point is crucial for justifying 
the use of imagination for the appreciation of pictures.
Furthermore, that the pleasure of imagination arises 
from the images rather than from the spectator*s personal 
desires gives credence to the view that for art's sake we 
should cultivate and develop the imaginative response. If 
the imaginative response enriches the appreciation of 
pictures, and the pleasure of that appreciation is partly 
due to the imaginative component of pictorial experience, 
then such a response is valuable.
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8.3 The Value of Imagination
It could be argued that literature enlivens the
percipient's imagination more than pictorial works of art
because the images are given in pictures whereas they are
suggested through words and stories, thus giving the
reader more imaginative freedom. In reading a story we
freely visualize the faces of characters, their
environment; in reading poetry the image of a lamenting
figure flashes through our mind. However, pictures can
supply an equal amount of suggestion for the imagination:
in a way no picture leaves absolutely nothing to
imagination. Artists deliberately use suggestive images,
images which are designed to direct the imagination to a
further meaning and to enlarge the interpretation of the
work. Hepburn aptly describes this skill.
From the one-word metaphor to the 
allegorical epic, the indirectness of 
communication is no device of artistic 
coyness or evasiveness, but the most 
powerful means of not simply communicating 
a propositional content but of achieving a 
concomitant, perhaps abrupt, reorientation 
of perception and thought.
Imagination enables the spectator to grasp not only the 
images in a picture, but also those ideas which are 
suggested by them. The hidden meanings disclosed by 
imagination may be key to understanding the artist's 
overall message.
This returns us to the point made at the end of
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Chapter 6. Without treating art as a mere message-bearer, 
the human condition can be better understood through 
imaginative reflection on the expressions and 
representations of it in works of art. In this respect 
imagination is not opposed to truth and knowledge.** In 
fact, the search for truth in a representation can be 
facilitated by imaginative engagement with the work, such 
activity increasing the spectator*s concentration, with 
the aforementioned benefits resulting.
My underlying assumption here is that art contributes 
to life enhancement. Because this view is not unpopular, 
an argument for it is, I think, unnecessary for the 
points I wish to make regarding the value of imagination 
for the appreciation of art. However, Beardsley’s 
observations are particularly relevant here.
Regarding the inherent value of aesthetic experience, 
he makes two remarks which suggest the value of 
imagination. He first refers to Bertrand Russell’s Nobel 
Prize acceptance speech, paraphrasing the point that 
Russell makes about invention and artistic discovery: the 
excitement connected with creating a work of art and the 
discovery involved in exploring a "new complex work of 
art are two of the highest, purest, and most satisfying 
types of excitement."^ As I have argued, imagination 
underlies this creativity and discovery. Secondly, 
Beardsley points to the development of imagination 
through aesthetic experience. In aesthetic experience we
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are often forced to be open and receptive to the "new
qualities and new forms" presented in art. This serves to
exercise imagination, to "train" us to be creative and to
think of new possibilities.
...to think of original scientific 
hypotheses, to find new ways out of 
practical dilemmas, to understand more 
quickly what is going on in other people*s 
minds.
To add to this point, I think that imagination can 
facilitate the appreciation of new kinds of art, so 
imagination itself develops and changes alongside the 
concept of art. Generally, Beardsley sees the imaginative 
response to art as a training ground for life because 
through it, "We may become more flexible in our 
responses, better able to adjust to novel situations and 
unexpected contingencies."®
Imagination, then, would seem to be a skill worth 
developing in both aesthetic and ordinary experience. 
Although my primary aim in this dissertation has been to 
argue for the importance of pictorial experience in 
explaining the nature of pictorial representation 
(particularly the role of imagination), the overall 
merits of imaginative activity have become apparent. This 
activity has been shown to be relevant to the 
interpretation and appreciation of pictures, so by way of 
conclusion I will bring together my analysis of pictorial
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experience with the theory of depiction supported in 
Chapter 4, Natural Generativity.
8.4 Conclusion
Natural Generativity offers the most convincing 
account of depiction at present. Its particular strength 
lies in its no-nonsense explanation of how we understand 
pictorial representation as such. Other philosophers have 
tried to define pictorial representation by identifying a 
single feature such as a particular kind of visual 
perception (e.g. "seeing-in") or a particular kind of 
experience (e.g. illusion), but Schier concentrates on 
how we make pictorial interpretations, defining the 
structure of pictorial experience accordingly. On 
approaching each new picture we take it to be a 
representation, a process which is automatic as long as 
the conditions of Natural Generativity are met. With this 
basic understanding, we can then proceed to interpret the 
content of the representation. We require no special 
perception to arrive at this conclusion, and rarely, if 
ever, do we see the picture as an illusion of reality.
The weakness of Schier*s theory, like the others I 
have examined, is that it lacks a full account of 
pictorial experience, but I have maintained that it 
serves as an excellent starting point. Whereas "seeing- 
in" virtually disallows the imaginative response, Natural
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Generativity sets no limitations on the nature of 
pictorial experience. This flexibility is realistic: it 
welcomes our various responses to pictures.
Pictorial experience itself is indeterminate, yet it 
is possible to say that the spectator always exercises 
his or her perceptual capacities, which typically 
includes visually exploring the picture and having 
thoughts about it. In addition, the spectator often uses 
imagination, both in a sensory way, by visualizing or 
imaging in relation to the images, and/or in a non- 
sensory way, by imaginatively thinking about the images. 
The imaginative response is a neglected feature of 
pictorial experience, hence I have focused on the nature 
and relevance of it.
This neglect probably stems from the the vagueness of 
the concept of imagination in addition to the "dangers*' 
it poses to the disinterested character of aesthetic 
experience. In Chapter 5, having found definitions of 
imagination inadequate, I turned to the history of 
philosophy to discover which activities have been 
attributed to the imagination. The varied activities 
which fall under this concept are related more closely 
than a family resemblance model suggests, yet imagination 
is indefinable in terms of a common characteristic. The 
spectrum model best outlines the proximity and variety of 
imagination's powers.
A clearer notion of how we use imagination in
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ordinary experience helps to elucidate the ways in which 
it can be applied in the appreciation of art. While the 
value of imagination in this context has been recognized 
by such philosophers as Kant and Dewey, it is Savile and 
Elliott who demonstrate the actual application of 
imagination to pictures. We do use imagination to 
interpret the complexities of form, colour, composition 
and content which pictures present to us, and we take 
pleasure in this activity.
The significance of the role of imagination in 
pictorial experience cannot be disputed, and I have 
attempted to support this also with reference to the 
pleasure arising from imagination and the value of 
imaginative activity to art and life. Imagination is 
central to a theory of pictorial representation because 
it helps to elucidate how we experience pictures in 
comparison to the objects they depict.
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^ S. Feagin, "Some Pleasures of Imagination" Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism XLIII: 41-55, Fall 1984, p.
45:
 ^ Feagin, 52.
 ^ E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 5th Edition (Phaidon 
Press, 1977), 181.
^ R. W. Hepburn, "Art, Truth and the Education of 
Subiectivity" Journal of Aesthetic Education 24 (2): 185- 
198, 1990, p. 187:
** Hepburn, 194.
 ^ M. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of 
Criticism, 2nd Edition (Hackett Publishing Co., 1988), 
574.
 ^ Beardsley, 574-5.
® Beardsley, 575.
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